1.财产险业务作为增长引擎
浮存金是客户预付的保费，理论上来说是负债而不是资产，本质上是伯克希尔从客户那里获取的一笔无需支付的贷款。到 2025 年，伯克希尔的浮存金规模已逼近 2000 亿美元。相当于凭空多出了一个高盛集团市值的资金可供巴菲特调遣，而他需要为此支付的利息成本接近于零，甚至是负数。这是一种优势，而且还非常的突出。别人需要为资本付出高昂代价，而伯克希尔的资本几乎是免费的。
那其他公司是否也是如此？
查了下最新的财产险公司，也在把浮存金用于投资，但效率赶伯克希尔就差太远了。它们的综合成本，即理赔和费用支出占保费收入的比例大致是在 100% 到 105% 之间。这意味着，它们每吸收 100 美元的浮存金，就要付出 0 到 5 美元的成本。这相当于一笔年利率 0%-5% 的贷款。而伯克希尔呢，大多数年份，综合成本率都在 90%-100% 之间。（详细数据参见：https://content.naic.org/）
是什么原因能够让伯克希尔的巨额浮存金成本为负呢？
普通保险公司的绝大部分浮存金受监管，必须投到安全、流动性高的资产，比如政府债、大公司债券。
伯克希尔的浮存金可以通过集团内部安排，进入集团层面投资池，投资范围更广，收益也更高。而且伯克希尔的信用、资产规模和历史表现让监管更信任它有能力承受波动。
浮存金，这个为伯克希尔提供了一切动力的、看似传统的业务，巴菲特多次强调这才是所有奇迹的起点和基石。
2.圣经一般的组织纪律
2025 年的今天，全球刚刚经历了数次创纪录的灾难，重读巴菲特 2019 年关于承保纪律的论述，其意义已经远远超出了金融分析，更是一则关于组织文化、风险哲学和系统韧性的深刻理解。
为什么巴菲特用 Old Testament 这个词，想来绝非偶然。这是一个充满敬畏、严厉和因果报应的词汇。旧约十诫，违反就必然会带来神罚。这意味着在保险行业，绝不可承保定价错误的风险。没有借口，没有权宜之计。一次愚蠢的承保，就可能带来毁灭性的后果。譬如：
瑞士再保险遇到的欧洲洪灾、美国飓风、澳大利亚东部洪灾等灾害，导致股价一个月暴跌 50%
很多家佛罗里达财产险公司在风暴潮与飓风过后直接倒闭或退出市场
当然，巴菲特在这封股东来信里不仅仅是谈论保险行业的风险，而是说他的商业模式能够获得成功的关键，在于伯克希尔又足够的资本、完善的承保纪律、强大的投资能力。
巴菲特通过集团内部的一家化学公司卢布 rizol 来说明：保险经理在评估这笔业务时，完全没有考虑这是统一集团旗下的另一家公司。而是只问一个问题：这个风险值多少钱？
所以旧约圣经一半的组织纪律是基础，而卢布 rizol 轶事证明了其理性。
3.利维坦的本质
这封 2020 年的股东来信，在 2025 年的今天再度读来就可以看清巴菲特的战略。伯克希尔的目标在混乱时代，提供确定性；在虚拟时代，掌握实体；在短视时代，执行长线。在 2025 年的今天，我们理解了巴菲特正在构建的，不是一个简单的业务板块，而是一个与美国国运深度绑定的经济利维坦。
当年以为投资 BHE 是剥夺了股东的现金回报权，因为很多人都把公用事业公司视为一个向股东派发现金的奶牛。
现在伯克希尔的股东明白了回报不是 BHE 的股息，而是伯克希尔整体内在价值的增长。
面临复杂的政治和监管审批挑战，大型基建项目审批流程复杂、投资周期长、政治风险大，所以吓跑了几乎所有的私人资本。但巴菲特说：伯克希尔有钱、有专业、有信誉，可以解决问题，只要给我们一个合理的长期回报承诺。
BHE 和 BNSF 这两大经济利维坦，在内部实现了资本循环，左手链接了美国内部的农业、制造业、能源和消费，右手链接了美国的出口贸易和全球供应链。它们是美国经济的动脉和毛细血管。从而在混乱中提供确定性，成为了伯克希尔最坚实的基座。
巴菲特瞄准的是百年以上的长跑，目标是在任何宏观天气里能够赢得比赛。
4.股权优于债券
在巴菲特眼里，5 年、10 年来看，优秀企业的股权回报率会优于债券、现金等固定收益，因为企业会不断壮大、收益会复利增长。然而，要享受回报，必须承受极端波动。
因为巴菲特认为利率对估值的影响是数学计算，非常直白。所以利率就像是金融世界的万有引力。它决定了所有资产的估值水平。 当超低利率甚至零利率，让资金成本几乎为零，投资人愿意用很高的价格去买未来收益。但是当利率回到正常甚至偏高水平时，这些估值的基础就会被逆转，结果就是很多股票的价格快速下跌。而估值重新修正时，市场可能暴跌 50% 甚至更多。
当然这并不意味着利率就是万能钥匙，巴菲特再次强调，专注于理解具体业务，比徒劳地预测宏观经济要有价值得多。投资决策本身就隐含了对市场估值的判断，这本身就是一种宏观判断。
有了这就理解了巴菲特的持仓也不是永恒的，也会进行战术性调整。虽然他一再强调投资的唯一评判标准是企业本身，而非市场情绪。但还是需要在别人恐慌时贪婪，在别人贪婪时恐惧，更重要的是，在资产基本面损坏时，能更加理性地判断。
最终，只有能控制情绪且不使用杠杆的投资者才能最终胜出。
5.公司治理与未来展望
信中所提到的 GUARD 保险收购，BHE 的成就，都是在高度赞扬了两位指定的继任者——阿吉特·贾恩和格雷格·阿贝尔，这是对其领导能力的公开背书。但和往常一样，并没有提供任何关于何时退休、以及权力如何交接的具体时间表或路线图，这些大家关注的焦点。
说美国顺风是巴菲特投资体系的基石不为过，他的整个策略都是建立在美国经济将持续创新和增长的这一核心信念上。在 2025 的当下，全球竞争加剧，政治分歧更加距离，也有许多评论在质疑这种依赖是否过于乐观。
6.不可预知的巨灾风险
总有一天，一场规模远超卡特里娜与迈克尔飓风的世纪巨灾会降临。也许就是明天，也许要等几十年才到来。这样的终极浩劫可能来自传统威胁，比如飓风或地震；也可能完全出乎意料，例如一次网络攻击，其破坏程度将远远超出今天保险业的设想。
所以，巴菲特也是在强调承保的纪律性与对冲风险的必要性，也在向股东说明伯克希尔的财务结构是为了承受任何级别的冲击而设计的。当然还间接批评了哪些同业，为了追求收益而承担不当风险的行为。
对于投资者而言，同样的道理也是核心投资哲学。
如何才能够在 50% 甚至更大跌幅的大跌中生存下来，并最终获得长期回报？
答案是：不使用杠杆，控制好情绪。
2019 伯克希尔股东来信第二部分 双语版 #
Our total net income in 2019 from the non-insurance businesses we control amounted to 17.7 billion, an increase of 3% from the 17.2 billion this group earned in 2018. Acquisitions and dispositions had almost no net effect on these results.
2019 年，我们所控股的非保险业务合计实现净利润 177 亿美元，比 2018 年的 172 亿美元增长了 3%。各项收购与处置，对这一数字的净影响几乎可以忽略不计。
I must add one final item that underscores the wide scope of Berkshire’s operations. Since 2011, we have owned Lubrizol, an Ohio-based company that produces and markets oil additives throughout the world. On September 26, 2019, a fire originating at a small next-door operation spread to a large French plant owned by Lubrizol.
为了再补充一个细节，说明伯克希尔业务覆盖范围之广：自 2011 年起，我们全资拥有路博润（Lubrizol），这是一家总部位于美国俄亥俄州、在全球生产并销售润滑油添加剂的公司。2019 年 9 月 26 日，在法国的一座由路博润拥有的大型工厂旁边的一处小型作业点发生火灾，火势蔓延至该工厂。
The result was significant property damage and a major disruption in Lubrizol’s business. Even so, both the company’s property loss and business-interruption loss will be mitigated by substantial insurance recoveries that Lubrizol will receive.
火灾造成了严重的财产损失，并对路博润的业务运营造成了重大中断。即便如此，公司将获得相当可观的保险赔付，用以弥补因财产损毁和业务停摆带来的损失。
But, as the late Paul Harvey was given to saying in his famed radio broadcasts, “Here’s the rest of the story.” One of the largest insurers of Lubrizol was a company owned by . . . uh, Berkshire.
不过，正如已故广播名人保罗·哈维（Paul Harvey）在他著名的节目中常说的那句：“故事还没完。”为路博润承保大量风险的主要保险公司之一，正是……呃，伯克希尔自己旗下的保险公司。
In Matthew 6:3, the Bible instructs us to “Let not the left hand know what the right hand doeth.” Your chairman has clearly behaved as ordered.
《马太福音》6章3节有言：“不要让左手知道右手所行。”看来，你们的董事长贯彻得相当彻底。
Property/Casualty Insurance
财产/意外保险
Our property/casualty (“P/C”) insurance business has been the engine propelling Berkshire’s growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for 8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest P/C company in the world as measured by net worth. Insurance is a business of promises, and Berkshire’s ability to honor its commitments is unmatched.
自1967年我们以860万美元收购 National Indemnity 及其姊妹公司 National Fire & Marine 以来，财产/意外保险（“P/C”）便一直是驱动伯克希尔成长的主引擎。如今，按净资产计，National Indemnity 已高居全球 P/C 业之首。保险是一门关于承诺的生意，而伯克希尔兑现承诺的能力，当今无人能及。
One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was the industry’s business model: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, or severe workplace accidents, payments can stretch over many decades.
我们当初看好 P/C（财产及意外伤害）保险行业，其中一个重要原因，是它独特的业务模式：保费先收进来，赔付则在之后进行。在一些极端情况下，比如因石棉暴露造成的索赔，或严重的工作场所事故，这类赔付可能会延续几十年。
This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:
这种“先收后付”的模式，使得 P/C 公司能够长期持有一大笔暂时属于它们的资金——我们称之为“保险浮存金”（float）。这笔钱最终会支付给索赔人，但在此期间，保险公司可以将其用于自身投资以获取收益。虽然单个保单和赔案不断发生和结束，但浮存金的总量通常会与保费规模保持相对稳定的比例。因此，业务规模越大，浮存金也会随之增长。而它的增长幅度之大，请看下面的表格：
Year Float (in millions) 1970 39 1980 237 1990 1,632 2000 27,871 2010 65,832 2018 122,732 2019 129,423
We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. That structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. That strength will never be compromised.
未来，我们的浮存金可能会有所下降。即便如此，下降的速度也会非常缓慢——每年的降幅最多不超过 3%。我们的保险合同结构，确保我们不会突然面临任何可能动摇现金实力的即时或短期支付压力。这种安排是刻意设计的，也是伯克希尔保险业务卓越财务实力的核心组成部分。这样的实力，我们绝不会让它受到丝毫损害。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
当我们的保费收入超过各项费用与最终赔付时，保险业务就会产生承保利润。 这部分利润与浮存金带来的投资收益相加，进一步提升了我们的整体回报。在这种情况下，我们不仅能动用这笔“免费资金”，更妙的是，还能因为持有它而获得报酬。
For the P/C industry as a whole, the financial value of float is now far less than it was for many years. That’s because the standard investment strategy for almost all P/C companies is heavily – and properly – skewed toward high-grade bonds. Changes in interest rates therefore matter enormously to these companies, and during the last decade the bond market has offered pathetically low rates.
对于整个财产与意外险（P/C）行业而言，浮存金的财务价值如今已大不如前。原因在于，几乎所有同业的投资策略都合理且高度地偏向于高评级债券。这样一来，利率的变动对这些公司影响极大。然而，在过去十年中，债券市场所提供的利率却一直低得令人感叹。
Consequently, insurers suffered, as year by year they were forced – by maturities or issuer-call provisions – to recycle their “old” investment portfolios into new holdings providing much lower yields. Where once these insurers could safely earn 5 cents or 6 cents on each dollar of float, they now take in only 2 cents or 3 cents (or even less if their operations are concentrated in countries mired in the never-never land of negative rates).
因此，保险公司日子并不好过。债券到期，发行人又频频行使提前赎回权，他们年复一年只能将“旧”投资组合换成收益率大幅走低的新债券。从前，每一美元浮存金能稳稳赚到 5 到 6 美分；如今却只剩 2 到 3 美分。如果业务集中在那些长期陷在负利率“梦境国”的国家，回报甚至更接近于零。
Some insurers may try to mitigate their loss of revenue by buying lower-quality bonds or non-liquid “alternative” investments promising higher yields. But those are dangerous games and activities that most institutions are ill-equipped to play.
为了弥补收入的缺口，一些保险公司开始购入信用质量较低的债券，或者流动性不足但承诺更高收益的“另类”投资。然而，这些都是风险极高的游戏，大多数机构既缺乏经验，也没有合适的工具去应付，结果往往不尽人意。
Berkshire’s situation is more favorable than that of insurers in general. Most important, our unrivaled mountain of capital, abundance of cash and a huge and diverse stream of non-insurance earnings allow us far more investment flexibility than is generally available to other companies in the industry. The many choices open to us are always advantageous – and sometimes have presented us with major opportunities.
与业内大多数保险公司相比，伯克希尔的处境显然更为有利。最关键的是，我们拥有无与伦比的雄厚资本、充沛的现金储备，以及巨大且多元的非保险收益来源。这三重优势赋予了我们远超同行的投资灵活度。丰富的选择总能让我们处于有利位置——而有时，它们甚至为我们带来了意义重大的投资机遇。
Our P/C companies have meanwhile had an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 16 of the last 17 years, the exception being 2017, when our pre-tax loss was a whopping 3.2 billion. For the entire 17-year span, our pre-tax gain totaled 27.5 billion, of which 400 million was recorded in 2019.
与此同时，我们的财产与意外险业务也保持了出色的承保纪录。回顾过去 17 年，伯克希尔有 16 年实现了税前承保盈利，仅在 2017 年例外——当年税前亏损高达 32 亿美元。在这整个 17 年期间，我们的税前承保利润累计达到 275 亿美元，其中 2019 年录得 4 亿美元。
That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of our insurance managers, who know that the rewards of float can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service.At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.
这样的纪录绝非偶然。我们的保险经理每天都将严谨的风险评估放在首位，他们深知：如果承保不当，再丰厚的浮存金收益也会被迅速吞噬。几乎所有保险公司在口头上都会强调这一点。但在伯克希尔，这是一条铁律——而且是带着《旧约》式严厉色彩的铁律。
As I have repeatedly done in the past, I will emphasize now that happy outcomes in insurance are far from a sure thing: We will most certainly not have an underwriting profit in 16 of the next 17 years. Danger always lurks.
我过去已多次强调，现在仍要提醒：保险业务的好成绩绝非必然。未来 17 年里，我们几乎可以确定不会像过去那样在 16 年中都实现承保盈利。风险始终存在，并且时刻潜伏。
Mistakes in assessing insurance risks can be huge and can take many years – even decades – to surface and ripen. (Think asbestos.) 在保险业务中，风险评估一旦失误，其代价可能极为巨大，而且往往需要多年，甚至数十年，才会浮现并完全发酵。（想想石棉案例。）
A major catastrophe that will dwarf hurricanes Katrina and Michael will occur – perhaps tomorrow, perhaps many decades from now. “The Big One” may come from a traditional source, such as wind or earthquake, or it may be a total surprise involving, say, a cyber attack having disastrous consequences beyond anything insurers now contemplate. 总有一天，一场规模远超卡特里娜与迈克尔飓风的世纪巨灾会降临——也许就是明天，也许要等几十年才到来。这个“终极浩劫”可能来自传统威胁，比如飓风或地震；也可能完全出乎意料，例如一次网络攻击，其破坏程度将远远超出今天保险业的设想。
When such a mega-catastrophe strikes, Berkshire will get its share of the losses and they will be big – very big. Unlike many other insurers, however, handling the loss will not come close to straining our resources, and we will be eager to add to our business the next day.
当这样的超级灾难来袭，伯克希尔也会分担属于我们的损失，而且数额会非常巨大——确实巨大。可是，与许多同行不同，处理这样的冲击绝不足以威胁我们的财务资源；灾后的第二天，我们仍会积极拓展业务。
Close your eyes for a moment and try to envision a locale that might spawn a dynamic P/C insurer. New York? London? Silicon Valley?
现在，请闭上眼睛，去设想一个可能孕育出充满活力的财产与意外险公司的地方。纽约？伦敦？硅谷？
How about Wilkes-Barre?
那威尔克斯—巴里如何？
Late in 2012, Ajit Jain, the invaluable manager of our insurance operations, called to tell me that he was buying a tiny company – GUARD Insurance Group – in that small Pennsylvania city for 221 million (roughly its net worth at the time). He added that Sy Foguel, GUARD’s CEO, was going to be a star at Berkshire. Both GUARD and Sy were new names to me.
2012 年底，我们保险业务中不可多得的掌舵者阿吉特·贾恩打来电话，说他正准备以 2.21 亿美元收购一家位于宾夕法尼亚州小城市的袖珍公司——GUARD 保险集团，这个价格大致等于它当时的净资产。阿吉特还补充道，GUARD 的首席执行官赛·福格尔将在伯克希尔大放异彩。那时候，无论是 GUARD，还是赛·福格尔，对我来说都是头一次听到的名字。
Bingo and bingo: In 2019, GUARD had premium volume of 1.9 billion, up 379% since 2012, and also delivered a satisfactory underwriting profit. Since joining Berkshire, Sy has led the company into both new products and new regions of the country and has increased GUARD’s float by 265%.
神机妙算，捷报连连：2019 年，GUARD 的保费规模达到 19 亿美元，比 2012 年增长了 379%，并且取得了令人满意的承保利润。自加入伯克希尔以来，赛·福格尔不仅带领公司推出了新产品、进入更多州的市场，还将 GUARD 的浮存金提升了 265%。
In 1967, Omaha seemed an unlikely launching pad for a P/C giant. Wilkes-Barre may well deliver a similar surprise.
1967 年，几乎没人会认为奥马哈能成为孕育财产与意外险巨头的起点；如今，威尔克斯-巴雷或许也在悄悄酝酿一场同样的惊喜。
Berkshire Hathaway Energy
伯克希尔哈撒韦能源（BHE）
Berkshire Hathaway Energy is now celebrating its 20th year under our ownership. That anniversary suggests that we should be catching up with the company’s accomplishments.
伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）在我们的旗下一晃已迈入第二十个年头。值此里程碑，我们理当回顾公司这些年来的辉煌成绩。
We’ll start with the topic of electricity rates. When Berkshire entered the utility business in 2000, purchasing 76% of BHE, the company’s residential customers in Iowa paid an average of 8.8 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh). Prices for residential customers have since risen less than 1% a year, and we have promised that there will be no base rate price increases through 2028.
故事得从电价开始讲起。2000 年，伯克希尔收购了伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）76% 的股权，正式踏入公用事业领域。当年，BHE 在爱荷华州的居民电价平均为每千瓦时 8.8 美分。此后二十多年，居民电价年均涨幅不足 1%，我们还承诺到 2028 年为止不提高基准电价。
In contrast, here’s what is happening at the other large investor-owned Iowa utility: Last year, the rates it charged its residential customers were 61% higher than BHE’s. Recently, that utility received a rate increase that will widen the gap to 70%. The extraordinary differential between our rates and theirs is largely the result of our huge accomplishments in converting wind into electricity.
相比之下，州内另一家大型民营电力公司在去年收取的居民电价，比 BHE 高出了 61%。最近它又获批加价，差距将继续扩大到 70%。出现如此悬殊的价格，核心原因在于：我们在“把风变成电”方面取得了巨大成果。
In 2021, we expect BHE’s operation to generate about 25.2 million megawatt-hours of electricity (MWh) in Iowa from wind turbines that it both owns and operates. That output will totally cover the annual needs of its Iowa customers, which run to about 24.6 million MWh. In other words, our utility will have attained wind self-sufficiency in the state of Iowa. In still another contrast, that other Iowa utility generates less than 10% of its power from wind.
到 2021 年，BHE 在爱荷华州自有并运营的风机预计发电约 2,520 万兆瓦时，足够满足本州客户每年约 2,460 万兆瓦时的用电需求。换句话说，我们将在爱荷华州实现风电完全自给。而那家竞争对手的风电占比还不到 10%。
Furthermore, we know of no other investor-owned utility, wherever located, that by 2021 will have achieved a position of wind self-sufficiency.
放眼全美，我们也找不到另一家民营公用事业公司，能在 2021 年以前达到风电自给的水平。
In 2000, BHE was serving an agricultural-based economy; today, three of its five largest customers are high-tech giants. I believe their decisions to site plants in Iowa were in part based upon BHE’s ability to deliver renewable, low-cost energy.
2000 年，BHE 服务的还是一个以农业为主的经济体；如今，它的五大客户中有三家是高科技巨头。我相信，他们选择在爱荷华落地建厂，部分原因正是看中了 BHE 能稳定提供可再生、低成本的电力。
Of course, wind is intermittent, and our blades in Iowa turn only part of the time. In certain periods, when the air is still, we look to our non-wind generating capacity to secure the electricity we need. At opposite times, we sell the excess power that wind provides us to other utilities, serving them through what’s called “the grid.” The power we sell them supplants their need for a carbon resource – coal, say, or natural gas.
当然，风并不是全天候的能源。在风停的时候，我们依赖非风电装机保障供电；而在大风时段，如果电量有余，我们就通过电网把多余电力卖给其他电力公司，替他们减少对煤炭或天然气等碳基能源的依赖。
Berkshire Hathaway now owns 91% of BHE in partnership with Walter Scott, Jr. and Greg Abel. BHE has never paid Berkshire Hathaway a dividend since our purchase and has, as the years have passed, retained 28 billion of earnings.
伯克希尔哈撒韦与沃尔特·斯科特（Walter Scott, Jr.）以及格雷格·阿贝尔（Greg Abel）共同持股，合计拥有伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）91% 的股份。自我们在 2000 年入主以来，BHE 从未向母公司派发股息，而是在这些年里累计留存了 280 亿美元的利润。
That pattern is an outlier in the world of utilities, whose companies customarily pay big dividends – sometimes reaching, or even exceeding, 80% of earnings.
在公用事业行业，这种做法极为罕见——该行业的公司往往高额分红，派息比例有时可达到甚至超过当期利润的 80%。
Our view: The more we can invest, the more we like it. Today, BHE has the operating talent and experience to manage truly huge utility projects – requiring investments of 100 billion or more – that could support infrastructure benefitting our country, our communities and our shareholders. We stand ready, willing and able to take on such opportunities.
我们的理念很直接：能够投入再建的资金越多，我们就越喜欢。如今，BHE 已具备一流的运营人才和丰富的经验，能够管理动辄百亿美元、甚至高达 1,000 亿美元的大型公用事业项目。这些项目不仅能为国家和社区建设重要的基础设施，同时也能为股东创造价值。面对这样的机会，我们随时准备迎接挑战，既有意愿，也有能力去承担。
Investments
投资
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding – 325,442,152 shares – because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore mustaccount for this investment on the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries the Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of 13.8 billion, an amount that represents Berkshire’s share of the audited net worth of Kraft Heinz at December 31, 2019. Please note, though, that the market value of our shares on that date was only 10.5 billion.
截至年末，我们列出了市值排名前十五位的普通股投资。卡夫亨氏（Kraft Heinz）虽持有 325,442,152 股，却未计入其中——因伯克希尔与他人构成控股集团，必须按照“权益法”入账。按美国通用会计准则（GAAP），我们在资产负债表中将这笔投资列为 138 亿美元，这一数字代表截至 2019 年 12 月 31 日，我们应占的卡夫亨氏经审计净资产份额。然而，彼时这部分持股的市场价值仅为 105 亿美元。
Charlie and I do not view the 248 billion detailed above as a collection of stock market wagers – dalliances to be terminated because of downgrades by “the Street,” an earnings “miss,” expected Federal Reserve actions, possible political developments, forecasts by economists or whatever else might be the subject du jour.
需要说明的是，查理和我并不把上述约 2,480 亿美元的持仓视为一组股市赌博——不会因为“华尔街”调降评级、某季业绩不达预期、美联储的政策动作、政治局势变化、经济学家的预测，或任何一天的热门话题，就随意进出。
What we see in our holdings, rather, is an assembly of companies that we partly own and that, on a weighted basis, are earning more than 20% on the net tangible equity capital required to run their businesses. These companies, also, earn their profits without employing excessive levels of debt.
在我们的投资组合中，呈现的是一支我们部分持股的优质企业方阵。按加权计算，它们在维持业务运转所需的净有形股本上，能够赚取超过 20% 的回报；更可贵的是，这份佳绩并非依赖高负债，而是建立在稳健的经营基础之上。
Returns of that order by large, established and understandable businesses are remarkable under any circumstances. They are truly mind-blowing when compared to the returns that many investors have accepted on bonds over the last decade – 2 1⁄2% or even less on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds, for example.
在任何环境下，规模庞大、基础扎实且业务清晰可懂的企业，若能实现这样的收益率，已属罕见。而若与过去十年间，投资者在债券市场所接受的回报相比——以 30 年期美国国债收益率仅 2.5%甚至更低为例——这种差距之大，实在令人震惊。
Forecasting interest rates has never been our game, and Charlie and I have no idea what rates will average over the next year, or ten or thirty years. Our perhaps jaundiced view is that the pundits who opine on these subjects reveal, by that very behavior, far more about themselves than they reveal about the future.
预测利率从来不是我们的拿手好戏。对于未来一年、十年，甚至三十年的平均利率，查理和我完全没有头绪。依我们略带偏见的看法，那些在这个话题上滔滔不绝的“专家”，从他们的言行中透出的，与其说是未来的走势，不如说是他们自己的底色。
What we can say is that if something close to current rates should prevail over the coming decades and if corporate tax rates also remain near the low level businesses now enjoy, it is almost certain that equities will over time perform far better than long-term, fixed-rate debt instruments.
我们能明确的是：如果未来几十年利率大体维持在目前水平，企业所得税率也继续保持在当下的低位，那么股票的长期表现几乎可以肯定会远远跑赢长期固定利率的债券等债务工具。
That rosy prediction comes with a warning: Anything can happen to stock prices tomorrow. Occasionally, there will be major drops in the market, perhaps of 50% magnitude or even greater.
这个乐观的展望，也附带着一个警示：股价在明天可能翻云覆雨，市场偶尔会遭遇大幅下挫，跌幅甚至可能达到 50% 或更高。
But the combination of The American Tailwind, about which I wrote last year, and the compounding wonders described by Mr. Smith, will make equities the much better long-term choice for the individual who does not use borrowed money and who can control his or her emotions. Others? Beware!
然而，“美国顺风”——正如我去年所论述的——与史密斯先生所称道的复利奇迹相结合，将使股票成为长期回报更佳的选择，前提是投资者不动用杠杆，并且能够稳住自己的情绪。其他人？请务必戒慎恐惧。