Let’s move somewhat east to Knoxville, the third largest city in Tennessee. There, Berkshire has ownership in two remarkable companies – Clayton Homes (100% owned) and Pilot Travel Centers (38% owned now, but headed for 80% in 2023). Each company was started by a young man who had graduated from the University of Tennessee and stayed put in Knoxville. Neither had a meaningful amount of capital nor wealthy parents. But, so what?
让我们稍向东行，来到田纳西州第三大城市——诺克斯维尔。伯克希尔在这里拥有两家出色的企业：Clayton Homes（全资控股）以及 Pilot Travel Centers（目前持股 38%，计划在 2023 年增至 80%）。这两家公司，都是由田纳西大学毕业、选择扎根本地的年轻人一手创立。他们当年既没有雄厚的资本，也没有富裕的父母支持 —— 但又怎样呢？
译注：
…But, so what? —— 但又怎样呢？这代表的是巴菲特文字本后想说的那种“内地奇迹”故事的精神图腾。
我们除了看到白手起家，更要看到这故事背后的商业模式。Clayton Homes 精准地切入了美国中低收入人群的住房需求，Pilot 则占据了高速公路的咽喉要道，两者都拥有极其强大的护城河和刚性需求。这两家看似商业模式简单的公司，每年的税前利润都超过 10 亿美元。
stayed put in Knoxville —— 理解创始人品质的关键。代表了专注、承诺和对社区的责任感，与当今流行的“快速退出文化形成鲜明对比。
Today, Clayton and Pilot each have annual pre-tax earnings of more than 1 billion. Together they employ about 47,000 men and women. 今天，Clayton 和 Pilot 的年税前利润均已超过 10 亿美元，合计为约 47,000 名员工创造了稳定的工作机会。
Jim Clayton, after several other business ventures, founded Clayton Homes on a shoestring in 1956, and “Big Jim” Haslam started what became Pilot Travel Centers in 1958 by purchasing a service station for 6,000.
1956 年，在多次创业磨炼之后，Jim Clayton 仅凭微薄资金创办了 Clayton Homes；而“老吉姆”·哈斯拉姆（Big Jim Haslam）则在 1958 年花 6,000 美元买下一座加油站，开启了孕育 Pilot Travel Centers 的旅程。
Each of the men later brought into the business a son with the same passion, values and brains as his father. Sometimes there is a magic to genes. “Big Jim” Haslam, now 90, has recently authored an inspirational book in which he relates how Jim Clayton’s son, Kevin, encouraged the Haslams to sell a large portion of Pilot to Berkshire. Every retailer knows that satisfied customers are a store’s best salespeople. That’s true when businesses are changing hands as well.
后来，这两位创业者又先后将儿子引入家族事业——激情、价值观与才智一脉相承，有时基因的魔力确实令人惊叹。“大吉姆”·哈斯拉姆如今已九十高龄，最近出版了一本励志书。在书中，他讲述了吉姆·克莱顿的儿子凯文如何促使哈斯拉姆家族将 Pilot 的大部分股权卖给伯克希尔的故事。每位零售商都清楚：满意的顾客才是店铺最好的推销员；而在企业交接之际，这一规律同样成立。
译注：
传统并购通常是零和博弈，甚至是负和博弈。投行、律师、顾问们在中间撮合，买卖双方互相猜忌、斗智斗勇，过程充满摩擦和不信任，交易完成后往往两败俱伤或有一方仿佛占了很大便宜。
但既不干涉运营，却还选择卖给伯克希尔呢？
1.创始人最担心的往往不是卖掉公司，而是在卖掉后，公司被转手倒卖、裁员、文化被摧毁，或者总部被搬离家乡。
2.伯克希尔提供了一个独特的“选项”，既不是卖给会进行残酷整合的竞争对手，也不是卖给追求短期回报后退出的华尔街金融买家。它提供的是一个家。
Clayton Homes 在 2003 当时外部市场糟糕，急需强大的资金后盾。
Pilot Flying J 创始人哈斯拉姆家族经营公司已近 60 年，希望为公司的未来找到一个理念相同的“归宿”。期待企业能够被善待和传承，老员工不被裁员，当然还有一层是在当地的声誉。
巴菲特通过这些故事，回答了这几个关键问题。他不是在买公司，而是在接管一份遗产，并承诺成为这份遗产的忠实守护者。
When you next fly over Knoxville or Omaha, tip your hat to the Claytons, Haslams and Blumkins as well as to the army of successful entrepreneurs who populate every part of our country. These builders needed America’s framework for prosperity – a unique experiment when it was crafted in 1789 – to achieve their potential. In turn, America needed citizens like Jim C., Jim H., Mrs. B and Louie to accomplish the miracles our founding fathers sought.
下次当你在空中飞越诺克斯维尔或奥马哈时，不妨摘帽，向克莱顿、哈斯拉姆、布鲁姆金三大家族，以及遍布全国、业绩斐然的创业者大军致敬。正是他们，借助美国为繁荣奠定的制度框架——这一独特的制度实验诞生于 1789 年——才得以释放全部潜能；反过来，美国也需要像吉姆·克莱顿、吉姆·哈斯拉姆、布鲁姆金夫人和路易这样的人，才能兑现开国先贤追求的伟大愿景与奇迹。
译注： 通过收购上边几家公司，与开国先贤追求的伟大愿景与奇迹结合起来，于是财富积累的另一面是爱国行为和对文明的贡献，是实现理想和历史使命的神圣行为。
对人性的洞察让巴菲特找到了打开创始人内心大门的钥匙，用别人无法企及的方式完成交易。
对历史的洞察则为伯克希尔的商业模式提供了基础和远见，构建出一个穿越周期、基业长青的商业生态。
Today, many people forge similar miracles throughout the world, creating a spread of prosperity that benefits all of humanity. In its brief 232 years of existence, however, there has been no incubator for unleashing human potential like America. Despite some severe interruptions, our country’s economic progress has been breathtaking.
如今，世界各地都在上演着类似的奇迹——无数人正在创造惠及全人类的繁荣。但在短短 232 年的历史里，还没有任何地方像美国这样，成为释放人类潜能的最佳温床。纵使遭遇过严酷的风雨，我们的经济进步依旧令人赞叹不已。
Beyond that, we retain our constitutional aspiration of becoming “a more perfect union.” Progress on that front has been slow, uneven and often discouraging. We have, however, moved forward and will continue to do so. Our unwavering conclusion: Never bet against America.
更重要的是，我们始终怀揣着宪法所描绘的理想——“建立一个更趋完善的联邦”。通往这一目标的道路缓慢、崎岖，时常令人感到沮丧，但脚步从未停下，也不会停下。我们坚定的结论只有一句：永远不要押注美国会失败。
译注： 巴菲特在承认了所有复杂性和问题之后，给出了一个确定的答案： unwavering conclusion。这句话如同定海神针一样面对这各种不确定性。
Never bet against America 对他而言不是一句爱国口号，而是一个冷酷的金融指令。代表着这里的经济体是一个具有反脆弱性的复杂自适应系统。在遭遇冲击、混乱和压力时，反而会变得更强大、更具适应性。
The Berkshire Partnership
伯克希尔伙伴关系
Berkshire is a Delaware corporation, and our directors must follow the state’s laws. Among them is a requirement that board members must act in the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders. Our directors embrace that doctrine.
伯克希尔是一家注册于特拉华州的公司，我们的董事必须遵循该州的法律。其中一条最根本的要求，是董事必须始终把公司的整体利益及股东的利益放在首位。我们的董事会不仅坚守这一原则，而且身体力行。
In addition, of course, Berkshire directors want the company to delight its customers, to develop and reward the talents of its 360,000 associates, to behave honorably with lenders and to be regarded as a good citizen of the many cities and states in which we operate. We value these four important constituencies.
此外，伯克希尔的董事们当然希望公司能让客户满意，能够激发并嘉奖 36 万名员工的才干，以诚信回馈我们的放贷伙伴，并在我们经营的城市与州份树立好企业公民的形象。我们珍视这四个重要的利益相关群体。
None of these groups, however, have a vote in determining such matters as dividends, strategic direction, CEO selection, or acquisitions and divestitures. Responsibilities like those fall solely on Berkshire’s directors, who must faithfully represent the long-term interests of the corporation and its owners.
不过，这些群体并没有权利就分红、战略方向、CEO 选聘，或收购与剥离等重大事项进行投票。这类职责完全由伯克希尔的董事会承担，董事们必须忠实地代表公司及其所有者的长期利益。
Beyond legal requirements, Charlie and I feel a special obligation to the many individual shareholders of Berkshire. A bit of personal history may help you to understand our unusual attachment and how it shapes our behavior.
除了法律的要求之外，查理和我对伯克希尔的众多个人股东还怀有一份特别的责任感。或许，回顾一些个人往事，能够帮助大家理解我们与伯克希尔之间这份不同寻常的情感纽带，以及它又是如何塑造我们的行事风格。
译注：
伯克希尔的目标就是最大化公司及其所有者的长期利益。其他所有目标都必须服务于这个最高目标。
从法律要求到特殊义务的跳跃，是超越底线的个人承诺。巴菲特摇身一变，变为一个大家长的角色，赢得了股东们充分的信任。
Before my Berkshire years, I managed money for many individuals through a series of partnerships, the first three of those formed in 1956.
在执掌伯克希尔之前，我曾通过一系列合伙企业为许多个人管理资金；其中最早的三家，成立于 1956 年。
As time passed, the use of multiple entities became unwieldy and, in 1962, we amalgamated 12 partnerships into a single unit, Buffett Partnership Ltd. (“BPL”). By that year, virtually all of my own money, and that of my wife as well, had become invested alongside the funds of my many limited partners. I received no salary or fees.
随着时间的推移，多家合伙企业并行运作变得愈发臃肿低效。于是，1962 年，我们将原先的 12 家合伙企业合并为一个实体——巴菲特合伙有限公司（Buffett Partnership Ltd.，简称 “BPL”）。到了那一年，我和妻子的几乎全部资产，已与众多有限合伙人的资金一道，悉数投入了这家合伙企业。
Instead, as the general partner, I was compensated by my limited partners only after they secured returns above an annual threshold of 6%. If returns failed to meet that level, the shortfall was to be carried forward against my share of future profits. (Fortunately, that never happened: Partnership returns always exceeded the 6% “bogey.”)
我既不领取薪水，也不收取管理费。作为普通合伙人，只有在有限合伙人先获得年化超过 6% 的收益之后，我才能分得利润；若当年的收益低于 6%，差额将被记账留存，并在未来收益时从我的分成中扣除。（幸运的是，这种情况从未发生——合伙企业的回报始终高于那条 6% 的“及格线”。）
As the years went by, a large part of the resources of my parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, cousins and in-laws became invested in the partnership. Charlie formed his partnership in 1962 and operated much as I did. Neither of us had any institutional investors, and very few of our partners were financially sophisticated.
随着岁月流转，我的父母、兄弟姐妹，以及姑叔舅姨、堂表亲和姻亲们的大量资金，也陆续投入了合伙企业。同年，查理创立了自己的合伙企业，运作方式与我几乎一模一样。我们都没有引入机构投资者，合伙人中真正精通金融的人也寥寥无几。
The people who joined our ventures simply trusted us to treat their money as we treated our own. These individuals – either intuitively or by relying on the advice of friends – correctly concluded that Charlie and I had an extreme aversion to permanent loss of capital and that we would not have accepted their money unless we expected to do reasonably well with it.
当初加入我们事业的伙伴，都是出于信任，把资金交给我们管理，深信我们会像对待自己的钱那样慎之又慎。无论是凭直觉，还是听取朋友的建议，他们都准确看出——查理和我对资本的永久性损失近乎本能地抗拒；如果我们不确信能够取得相当不错的回报，就绝不会接受别人的托付。
译注：
这是一个关于诚信、责任和利益高度一致的完美故事。巴菲特让你信任他，而是通过一个制度设计，让信任成为唯一合理的结果。
对哪些投入了毕生积蓄人来说，不亏钱的承诺远比赚大钱更具吸引力。
伯克希尔提供的不是彩票，是保险柜。
I stumbled into business management after BPL acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. Later still, in 1969, we decided to dissolve BPL. After yearend, the partnership distributed, pro-rata, all of its cash along with three stocks, the largest by value being BPL’s 70.5% interest in Berkshire.
1965 年，BPL 收购了伯克希尔的控股权，我也因此半推半就地走进了企业经营的大门。随后，在 1969 年，我们决定解散 BPL。到年底，合伙企业按比例向伙伴们分配了全部现金和三只股票，其中市值最大的是 BPL 所持伯克希尔 70.5% 的股份。
译注：
巴菲特的开始，也并非野性勃勃，所以巴菲特用了 stumbled into。 而早期的 BPL 有一个致命的、与生俱来的缺陷：资本面临合伙人随时可能赎回的问题。解散 BPL 给了投资人们股票后，合伙人可以买卖股票，而巴菲特也不再面对这个困境了。
传统合伙有利益高度一致的优点，但缺点也很明显：资本不稳定。当然因为幸存者偏差，我们只看到巴菲特转变成功的案例。其实，失败的案例更多。
而且，在 2020 年这个充满挑战（业绩下滑、疫情冲击）的年份，巴菲特向股东发出的“不忘初心”的宣言。通过回顾历史，巧妙地将股东的注意力从短期的财务数据引向构建公司长青基业的文化和哲学。
Charlie, meanwhile, wound up his operation in 1977. Among the assets he distributed to partners was a major interest in Blue Chip Stamps, a company his partnership, Berkshire and I jointly controlled. Blue Chip was also among the three stocks my partnership had distributed upon its dissolution.
1977 年，查理也结束了他的合伙业务。在他分配给伙伴们的资产中，有一项重要的持股——Blue Chip Stamps。这家公司由他的合伙企业、伯克希尔和我共同持有并控制。巧的是，Blue Chip 也是我当年解散合伙企业时分出的那三只股票之一。
In 1983, Berkshire and Blue Chip merged, thereby expanding Berkshire’s base of registered shareholders from 1,900 to 2,900. Charlie and I wanted everyone – old, new and prospective shareholders – to be on the same page. Therefore, the 1983 annual report – up front – laid out Berkshire’s “major business principles.” The first principle began: “Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.”
1983 年，伯克希尔与蓝筹邮票公司（Blue Chip Stamps）合并，注册股东数从 1,900 人增加到 2,900 人。查理和我希望所有人——无论是老股东、新股东，还是潜在股东——都能对公司有一致的认识。于是，我们在 1983 年的年报开篇，就明明白白地写下了伯克希尔的“主要经营原则”。第一条这样说：“公司之形，合伙之心。”
译注：
巴菲特通过追溯自己和芒格如何将各自的合伙人及资产最终融入伯克希尔，其核心目的是为了引出并强调 1983 年年报中定下的首要经营原则：“虽然我们的形式是公司，但我们的态度是伙伴关系。”
That defined our relationship in 1983; it defines it today. Charlie and I – and our directors as well – believe this dictum will serve Berkshire well for many decades to come.
这句话在 1983 年界定了我们的关系，今天依然如此。查理、我，以及董事会都坚信，这一信念将在未来几十年继续为伯克希尔保驾护航。
Ownership of Berkshire now resides in five large “buckets,” one occupied by me as a “founder” of sorts. That bucket is certain to empty as the shares I own are annually distributed to various philanthropies. Two of the remaining four buckets are filled by institutional investors, each handling other people’s money.
如今，伯克希尔的股权被分装在五个“大桶”里。其中一桶属于我这个算是“创始人”的人。这只桶确定会逐年见底，因为我持有的股份正在持续捐赠给各类慈善机构。剩下的四桶中，有两桶由机构投资者掌管——他们管理的是他人的资金。
译注： 那个水桶注定会变空！巴菲特极为坦率地直面自己终将离世或不再管理公司这一事实。他没有回避这个市场最担忧的问题，而是将其公开化、透明化。这种坦诚本身就能极大地建立信任。通过一个长期的、有计划的过程，逐年捐赠给慈善机构。这消除了市场对未来可能出现的巨大抛压的恐慌。
巴菲特通过强调“伙伴”想告诉大家，伯克希尔的成功是建立在一个强大的、可传承的文化和系统之上，而不仅仅依赖于他个人。文化是公司的护城河，可以超越任何一代管理者。他希望通过公开信的方式，让所有类型的股东，包括机构，都理解并遵守这一核心原则。
That, however, is where the similarity between those buckets ends: Their investing procedures could not be more different.
不过，这两只“资金桶”的相似之处也就到此为止了——它们的投资方式可谓南辕北辙。
In one institutional bucket are index funds, a large and mushrooming segment of the investment world. These funds simply mimic the index that they track. The favorite of index investors is the S&P 500, of which Berkshire is a component. Index funds, it should be emphasized, own Berkshire shares simply because they are required to do so. They are on automatic pilot, buying and selling only for “weighting” purposes.
其中一只机构桶里装的是指数基金——这是投资世界里一个庞大且依然在迅速膨胀的群体。它们的策略简单到可以用一句话概括：机械复制所跟踪的指数。最受指数投资者青睐的，是把伯克希尔纳入其中的标普 500 指数。必须强调的是，指数基金持有伯克希尔股票并非出于对公司的研究或判断，而只是因为规则要求如此。它们就像开着自动驾驶——买卖只为了调整权重。
In the other institutional bucket are professionals who manage their clients’ money, whether those funds belong to wealthy individuals, universities, pensioners or whomever. These professional managers have a mandate to move funds from one investment to another based on their judgment as to valuation and prospects. That is an honorable, though difficult, occupation.
另一只机构桶里，则由专业投资经理操盘，他们替客户管理资金——这些客户可能是富裕家庭、大学、退休基金，或其他任何类型的投资者。这些经理的任务，是依据自己对估值和前景的判断，将资金从一个投资转到另一个。这是一份困难但值得尊敬的职业。
We are happy to work for this “active” group, while they meanwhile search for a better place to deploy the funds of their clientele. Some managers, to be sure, have a long-term focus and trade very infrequently. Others use computers employing algorithms that may direct the purchase or sale of shares in a nano-second. Some professional investors will come and go based upon their macro-economic judgments.
我们乐于与这批“积极型”投资人合作，他们一边与我们打交道，一边为客户的资金寻找更理想的去处。的确，有些管理者着眼长期，几乎不怎么交易；也有些依靠电脑算法，在纳秒之间就能完成买卖；还有一些专业投资者则会根据自己的宏观经济判断时而进场、时而出场。
Our fourth bucket consists of individual shareholders who operate in a manner similar to the active institutional managers I’ve just described. These owners, understandably, think of their Berkshire shares as a possible source of funds when they see another investment that excites them. We have no quarrel with that attitude, which is similar to the way we look at some of the equities we own at Berkshire.
我所说的第四个“桶”，装着的是那些操作方式与这些活跃机构相似的个人股东。当他们发现另一个令他们眼前一亮的投资机会时，往往会自然地把伯克希尔的持股当作一个可以调度的资金来源。对此，我们没有任何异议——这正是我们在伯克希尔对待部分股票时的思路。
All of that said, Charlie and I would be less than human if we did not feel a special kinship with our fifth bucket: the million-plus individual investors who simply trust us to represent their interests, whatever the future may bring. They have joined us with no intent to leave, adopting a mindset similar to that held by our original partners. Indeed, many investors from our partnership years, and/or their descendants, remain substantial owners of Berkshire.
前面说了这么多，但如果说查理和我对“第五类股东”没有特别的情谊，那可就太不近人情了。这一类股东，是那一百多万名个人投资者——无论未来风云如何变幻，他们始终信任我们，愿意把自己的利益交到我们手中。他们买入伯克希尔时并没有离开的打算，这种心态与当年的原始合伙人如出一辙。事实上，许多合伙基金时期的老投资人，及/或他们的后代，如今依然是伯克希尔的重要股东。
A prototype of those veterans is Stan Truhlsen, a cheerful and generous Omaha ophthalmologist as well as personal friend, who turned 100 on November 13, 2020. In 1959, Stan, along with 10 other young Omaha doctors, formed a partnership with me. The docs creatively labeled their venture Emdee, Ltd. Annually, they joined my wife and me for a celebratory dinner at our home.
这批“老兵”里有一个特别的代表——斯坦·特鲁尔森（Stan Truhlsen），一位乐观、慷慨的奥马哈眼科医生，也是我的老朋友。2020 年 11 月 13 日，斯坦迎来了百岁生日。早在 1959 年，他就与另外十位年轻的奥马哈医生一道，与我共同成立了一个合伙企业，并颇有创意地为它取名 “Emdee Ltd.”。此后，每年他们都会到我家，与我和我妻子一起共进一顿“周年晚宴”庆祝友情与合作。
When our partnership distributed its Berkshire shares in 1969, all of the doctors kept the stock they received.
1969 年，当合伙企业将所持的伯克希尔股票分配给各位伙伴时，这批医生无一例外选择了长期持有。
They may not have known the ins and outs of investing or accounting, but they did know that at Berkshire they would be treated as partners. Two of Stan’s comrades from Emdee are now in their high-90s and continue to hold Berkshire shares. This group’s startling durability – along with the fact that Charlie and I are 97 and 90, respectively – serves up an interesting question: Could it be that Berkshire ownership fosters longevity?
他们或许并不熟悉投资或会计的门道，但却清楚，在伯克希尔，他们会被当作真正的合伙人来看待。“Emdee”团队里，斯坦的两位老伙伴如今已九十多岁，依然紧紧握着伯克希尔的股票不放手。这样的长寿——再加上查理 97 岁、我 90 岁——不免让人好奇：难道持有伯克希尔股票，还能延年益寿？
Berkshire’s unusual and valued family of individual shareholders may add to your understanding of our reluctance to court Wall Street analysts and institutional investors. We already have the investors we want and don’t think that they, on balance, would be upgraded by replacements. There are only so many seats – that is, shares outstanding – available for Berkshire ownership. And we very much like the people already occupying them.
伯克希尔这个由众多个人股东构成、独具特色且被我们珍视的“大家庭”，或许能让你理解我们为何始终不去迎合华尔街分析师或机构投资者。我们已经拥有了理想的股东群体，并不觉得换一批人会更好。伯克希尔的“座位”——也就是有限的流通股——只有这么多，而我们非常欣赏现在坐在这些座位上的人。
Of course, some turnover in “partners” will occur. Charlie and I hope, however, that it will be minimal.
当然，“合伙人”的更替总是会发生，但查理和我希望这种更替尽量少一点。
Who, after all, seeks rapid turnover in friends, neighbors or marriage?
毕竟，谁会希望在朋友、邻居，甚至婚姻关系上频繁换人呢？
译注：
“家庭”、“朋友”、“婚姻”：这些词汇高效吸引那些寻求稳定、信任和长期关系的投资者。他们投资伯克希尔，不仅仅是购买一份资产，更是在寻求一种精神归属感。
In 1958, Phil Fisher wrote a superb book on investing. In it, he analogized running a public company to managing a restaurant. If you are seeking diners, he said, you can attract a clientele and prosper featuring either hamburgers served with a Coke or a French cuisine accompanied by exotic wines. But you must not, Fisher warned, capriciously switch from one to the other: Your message to potential customers must be consistent with what they will find upon entering your premises.
1958 年，菲尔·费舍尔（Phil Fisher）出版了一本精彩的投资书籍，他把经营一家上市公司比作管理一家餐馆。他说，如果想招揽食客，你可以选择供应“汉堡配可乐”，也可以主打“法餐佐美酒”，两条路都能培养忠诚客群并取得成功。但他提醒，最忌讳的是心血来潮地在两种风格间来回摇摆——你递给潜在顾客的那份“期待”，必须和他们推门入座时的体验完全一致。
At Berkshire, we have been serving hamburgers and Coke for 56 years. We cherish the clientele this fare has attracted.
在伯克希尔，我们 56 年来一直端着这一份“汉堡加可乐”菜单，并由衷珍惜因此而聚拢的人群。
译注：
菲利普·费雪的餐厅比喻，看似简单，实则揭示了一个深刻的模型：56 年不变的汉堡和可乐代表了价值、可靠、不花哨。哪些寻求长期、稳定、可理解的回报投资者，来到这家餐厅，会感到宾至如归，因为这里的一切都符合他们的预期。那些寻求刺激、新奇、快速回报的投资者想要的是“法式大餐和异国红酒”，对他们来说不仅没有吸引力，甚至是排斥的。
当然，伯克希尔的巨大成功，是其商业模式与所在的社会、经济产生出完美的共振。但作为旁观者不得不想，这种极其个例、难以复制的商业模式，是否能够在创始人离去后，再续辉煌？
The tens of millions of other investors and speculators in the United States and elsewhere have a wide variety of equity choices to fit their tastes. They will find CEOs and market gurus with enticing ideas. If they want price targets, managed earnings and “stories,” they will not lack suitors.
美国乃至全球，数以千万计的投资者与投机者面前有琳琅满目的股权“餐单”，可以照着自己的口味挑选。他们会遇到口才出众的 CEO 和市场“导师”，听到五花八门、诱人至极的理念。若有人偏好价格目标、调教业绩以及“故事”，他们绝不会缺少主动上门的追求者。
“Technicians” will confidently instruct them as to what some wiggles on a chart portend for a stock’s next move. The calls for action will never stop.
“技术派”则会信心十足地对于图表上的几道“波动曲线”，总有人拍着胸脯说能预测股票的下一步走势，并不断呼吁你马上采取行动。这种声浪从来没有停过。
Many of those investors, I should add, will do quite well. After all, ownership of stocks is very much a “positive-sum” game. Indeed, a patient and level-headed monkey, who constructs a portfolio by throwing 50 darts at a board listing all of the S&P 500, will – over time – enjoy dividends and capital gains, just as long as it never gets tempted to make changes in its original “selections.”
我得补充一句，其中确实有不少投资者的表现相当不错。毕竟，股票投资是一场“正和博弈”。事实上，一只耐心且心态平和的猴子，只要对着贴满全部 S&P 500 成分股名称的靶板随手掷出 50 支飞镖组建投资组合，并且坚决不改变最初的“选股”，随着时间推移，也能收获股息和资本增值。
Productive assets such as farms, real estate and, yes, business ownership produce wealth – lots of it. Most owners of such properties will be rewarded. All that’s required is the passage of time, an inner calm, ample diversification and a minimization of transactions and fees.
像农场、房地产，乃至企业所有权这类生产性资产，都会源源不断地创造财富，且回报丰厚。大多数持有这类资产的人，最终都会得到不错的回报。所需的秘诀很简单：让时间发酵、保持内心平静、充足的分散，以及尽量减少交易和费用。
译注：
成功不是靠智商或技巧，而是靠几个“反华尔街”的原则：
- 时间：让资产自然增值，而不是追求快速致富。
- 内心平静：克服人性中因市场波动而产生的恐惧和贪婪。
- 不要频繁买卖。
Still, investors must never forget that their expenses are Wall Street’s income. And, unlike my monkey, Wall Streeters do not work for peanuts.
不过，投资者务必要记住：你的支出，就是华尔街的收入。而华尔街可不像那只猴子——它绝不会“为几粒花生米”就卖力干活。
译注：
绝大多数投资者的失败，根源就在于混淆了正和、零和两种游戏，误以为在零和游戏中频繁操作能够帮助他们在正和游戏中获胜。
When seats open up at Berkshire – and we hope they are few – we want them to be occupied by newcomers who understand and desire what we offer. After decades of management, Charlie and I remain unable to promise results. We can and do, however, pledge to treat you as partners. And so, too, will our successors.
当伯克希尔的“股东席位”偶尔空出——我们真心希望这样的情况少之又少——我们希望坐上去的，是那些理解并真心欣赏我们所提供价值的新面孔。 经过数十年的经营，查理和我依旧无法向各位保证具体的投资成果；但我们始终可以——而且一直以来也确实这样做——郑重承诺：把你们视作真正的合伙人。我们的接班人，也会恪守这一原则。
A Berkshire Number that May Surprise You
一个可能令你意外的伯克希尔数字
Recently, I learned a fact about our company that I had never suspected: Berkshire owns American-based property, plant and equipment – the sort of assets that make up the “business infrastructure” of our country – with a GAAP valuation exceeding the amount owned by any other U.S. company.
不久前，我才得知一个自己此前从没怀疑过、也从未想象过的事实：按美国通用会计准则（GAAP）计价，伯克希尔拥有的美国本土物业、厂房及设备——也就是构成全美商业基础设施的那些生产性资产——其价值超过了任何一家美国公司。
Berkshire’s depreciated cost of these domestic “fixed assets” is 154 billion. Next in line on this list is AT&T, with property, plant and equipment of 127 billion.
伯克希尔这些国内固定资产的折旧后账面价值高达 1540 亿美元；排在第二位的是 AT&T，为 1270 亿美元。
Our leadership in fixed-asset ownership, I should add, does not, in itself, signal an investment triumph.
需要说明的是，固定资产规模居首，并不等同于投资上连连告捷。
The best results occur at companies that require minimal assets to conduct high-margin businesses – and offer goods or services that will expand their sales volume with only minor needs for additional capital. We, in fact, own a few of these exceptional businesses, but they are relatively small and, at best, grow slowly.
最佳的经营成果，往往来自资产占用极少、利润率却极高的企业——它们的产品或服务，只需很少的新增资本，就能持续扩大销售规模。 我们确实拥有几家这样的好公司，只是体量不大，即便业务优秀，增长也偏温和。
Asset-heavy companies, however, can be good investments. Indeed, we are delighted with our two giants – BNSF and BHE: In 2011, Berkshire’s first full year of BNSF ownership, the two companies had combined earnings of 4.2 billion. In 2020, a tough year for many businesses, the pair earned 8.3 billion.
不过，重资产型企业同样可能是不错的投资。事实上，我们对两位“巨人”——BNSF 铁路公司和伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）——的表现非常满意。 2011 年，也就是伯克希尔首次完整持有 BNSF 的年份，这两家公司合计赚得 42 亿美元；到 2020 年，那是许多企业都过得艰难的一年，它们的合计利润依然达到 83 亿美元。
BNSF and BHE will require major capital expenditures for decades to come. The good news is that both are likely to deliver appropriate returns on the incremental investment.
可以预见，在未来的几十年里，BNSF 和 BHE 都将需要持续投入巨额资本支出。好消息是，这些新增投资很有可能带来相匹配的回报。
Let’s look first at BNSF. Your railroad carries about 15% of all non-local ton-miles (a ton of freight moved one mile) of goods that move in the United States, whether by rail, truck, pipeline, barge or aircraft.
我们先来看 BNSF。它承担了全美约 15% 的非本地吨英里货运任务（吨英里指每吨货物运输一英里），无论这些货物最终是走铁路、公路、管道、驳船还是航空运输，它都在美国货运体系中发挥着举足轻重的作用。
By a significant margin, BNSF’s loads top those of any other carrier.
BNSF 的货运量，远远超过美国其他任何承运人。
The history of American railroads is fascinating. After 150 years or so of frenzied construction, skullduggery, overbuilding, bankruptcies, reorganizations and mergers, the railroad industry finally emerged a few decades ago as mature and rationalized.
美国铁路的历史可谓波澜壮阔：在大约 150 年的时间里，经历了狂热的建设、明争暗斗、过度扩张、破产、重组以及并购的起起落落，这个行业终于在数十年前走向成熟与理性。
BNSF began operations in 1850 with a 12-mile line in northeastern Illinois. Today, it has 390 antecedents whose railroads have been purchased or merged. The company’s extensive lineage is laid out at http://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/about-bnsf/History_and_Legacy.pdf.
BNSF 的起点可以追溯到 1850 年——当时它只在伊利诺伊州东北部运营一条 12 英里的线路。发展到今天，它的“血脉”已融合了 390 家先辈铁路公司的资产与经营，这些公司都已通过收购或合并而成为 BNSF 的一部分。有关这段悠长的谱系，可以在这里看到完整的故事：http://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/about-bnsf/History_and_Legacy.pdf。
Berkshire acquired BNSF early in 2010. Since our purchase, the railroad has invested 41 billion in fixed assets, an outlay 20 billion in excess of its depreciation charges.
伯克希尔·哈撒韦在 2010 年初收购了 BNSF。自那以来，这家铁路在固定资产上的投入累计达到 410 亿美元，比同期的折旧额多出 200 亿美元。
Railroading is an outdoor sport, featuring mile-long trains obliged to reliably operate in both extreme cold and heat, as they all the while encounter every form of terrain from deserts to mountains. Massive flooding periodically occurs.
铁路运输堪称一种“户外运动”：长达一英里的列车必须在严寒与酷暑中稳健运行，穿越从沙漠到山脉的各种复杂地形，还要定期与肆虐的洪水正面交锋。
BNSF owns 23,000 miles of track, spread throughout 28 states, and must spend whatever it takes to maximize safety and service throughout its vast system.
BNSF 拥有长达 2.3 万英里 的铁路线路，覆盖 28 个州。为了让这样庞大的网络在安全与服务上都保持一流，公司必须长期、不惜成本地投入维护与升级。
Nevertheless, BNSF has paid substantial dividends to Berkshire – 41.8 billion in total. The railroad pays us, however, only what remains after it both fulfills the needs of its business and maintains a cash balance of about 2 billion. This conservative policy allows BNSF to borrow at low rates, independent of any guarantee of its debt by Berkshire.
尽管如此，BNSF 依然累计向伯克希尔支付了 418 亿美元 的可观股息。不过，它的政策很谨慎：只有在满足业务运营所需，并维持约 20 亿美元 的现金储备之后，才会将剩余资金分给我们。这种保守而稳健的做法，让 BNSF 在无需伯克希尔为其债务提供任何担保的情况下，也能以低成本借款。
One further word about BNSF: Last year, Carl Ice, its CEO, and his number two, Katie Farmer, did an extraordinary job in controlling expenses while navigating a significant downturn in business. Despite a 7% decline in the volume of goods carried, the two actually increased BNSF’s profit margin by 2.9 percentage points. 再说一句 BNSF：去年，首席执行官 卡尔·艾斯（Carl Ice） 与他的副手 凯蒂·法默（Katie Farmer） 在业务下滑的环境下依然表现出色——一面控制开支，一面应对显著减少的货运量。尽管运输的货物量减少了 7%，他们却将利润率提升了 2.9 个百分点。
Carl, as long planned, retired at yearend and Katie took over as CEO. Your railroad is in good hands.
按既定计划，卡尔已于年末退休，凯蒂接任首席执行官。您的铁路公司，现在交到了值得信赖的人手中。
Unlike railroads, our country’s electric utilities need a massive makeover in which the ultimate costs will be staggering. BHE, unlike BNSF, pays no dividends on its common stock, a highly-unusual practice in the electric-utility industry. That Spartan policy has been the case throughout our 21 years of ownership.
和 BNSF 铁路公司不同，伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）从不向普通股东派发股息——在电力公用事业行业，这几乎是“异类中的异类”。自我们在 21 年前 接手以来，这种**“斯巴达式”**的分配政策始终未变。
The effort will absorb all of BHE’s earnings for decades to come. We welcome the challenge and believe the added investment will be appropriately rewarded.
与铁路行业相比，美国的电力系统迫切需要一次规模空前的升级换代，最终账单之庞大可想而知。未来几十年，BHE 的全部利润都会投入这场改造。我们乐于迎难而上，也相信这些追加的资本，终将收获与之匹配的合理回报。
Let me tell you about one of BHE’s endeavors – its 18 billion commitment to rework and expand a substantial portion of the outdated grid that now transmits electricity throughout the West. BHE began this project in 2006 and expects it to be completed by 2030 – yes, 2030.
让我先讲其中一项工程：BHE 已承诺投入 180 亿美元，重建并扩容如今负责输送美国西部电力、但已明显陈旧的大型电网。这个项目始于 2006 年，预计要到 2030 年 才能完工——没错，就是 2030 年。
The advent of renewable energy made our project a societal necessity. Historically, the coal-based generation of electricity that long prevailed was located close to huge centers of population.
可再生能源的兴起，让这项工程成为社会发展的必然。回顾过去，那些以煤炭为主的发电设施，长期布局在人口稠密的中心地带。
The best sites for the new world of wind and solar generation, however, are often in remote areas. When BHE assessed the situation in 2006, it was no secret that a huge investment in western transmission lines had to be made.
然而，风能与太阳能的最佳发电场址，往往远离人烟。早在 2006 年，伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）评估形势时，大家其实都很清楚：要让西部的输电网络焕然一新，就必须投入巨资建设输电线路。
Very few companies or governmental entities, however, were in a financial position to raise their hand after they tallied the project’s cost. BHE’s decision to proceed, it should be noted, was based upon its trust in America’s political, economic and judicial systems. Billions of dollars needed to be invested before meaningful revenue would flow.
但是，当项目成本被放上桌时，真正有能力、也有勇气举手参与的企业或政府机构，寥寥无几。BHE 之所以选择继续前行，靠的是对美国政治、经济与司法体系的坚定信任——在尚未看到可观收入之前，就愿意先投入数十亿美元。
Transmission lines had to cross the borders of states and other jurisdictions, each with its own rules and constituencies. BHE would also need to deal with hundreds of landowners and execute complicated contracts with both the suppliers that generated renewable power and the far-away utilities that would distribute the electricity to their customers.
输电线路需跨越多个州及其他司法辖区，每个地方都有自己的规则和利益团体；与此同时，BHE 还要与数百位土地业主逐一谈判，并与可再生能源的发电方及远在千里的电力公司签署错综复杂的合同，才能让清洁能源顺畅地抵达终端用户手中。
Competing interests and defenders of the old order, along with unrealistic visionaries desiring an instantly-new world, had to be brought on board. Both surprises and delays were certain. Equally certain, however, was the fact that BHE had the managerial talent, the institutional commitment and the financial wherewithal to fulfill its promises.
形形色色的既得利益者与旧秩序的守护者，还有那些幻想一夜之间重塑新世界的理想派，都必须被争取，也要被安顿。意外与延误几乎是必然的；同样确定的是，伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）具备兑现承诺所需的管理才干、制度担当和雄厚资本。
Though it will be many years before our western transmission project is completed, we are today searching for other projects of similar size to take on. Whatever the obstacles, BHE will be a leader in delivering ever-cleaner energy.
虽然西部输电干线项目的竣工尚需多年，但我们已经开始寻找另一个规模不相上下的项目来承担。无论前路有多少阻碍，BHE 都会在更洁净能源的输送领域持续发挥领军作用。
The Annual Meeting
年度股东大会
Last year, on February 22nd, I wrote you about our plans for a gala annual meeting. Within a month, the schedule was junked.
去年 2 月 22 日，我曾致信各位，描绘一场盛大股东大会的蓝图；不到一个月，计划就被迫取消。
Berkshire’s Vice Chairmen, joined me on stage facing a dark arena, 18,000 empty seats and a camera. There was no rehearsal: Greg and I arrived about 45 minutes before “showtime.”
于是，伯克希尔副董事长格雷格·阿贝尔（Greg Abel）与我一同登上舞台——面对的是一个漆黑的场馆、18,000 个空座位，以及唯一的“观众”——摄像机镜头。
There was no rehearsal: Greg and I arrived about 45 minutes before “showtime.”
我们没有排练：距离“开场”只有大约 45 分钟，我和格雷格才匆匆赶到现场。
Debbie Bosanek, my incredible assistant who joined Berkshire 47 years ago at age 17, had put together about 25 slides displaying various facts and figures that I had assembled at home. An anonymous but highly-capable team of computer and camera operators projected the slides onto the screen in proper order.
我的得力助手 黛比·博萨内克（Debbie Bosanek）——47 年前，年仅 17 岁的她加入伯克希尔，如今已是公司不可或缺的中坚——把我在家整理的各项数据，制成了大约 25 张 幻灯片。一支低调却技术精湛的电脑与摄像团队，将这些幻灯片按正确顺序投射在大屏幕上。
Yahoo streamed the proceedings to a record-sized international audience. Becky Quick of CNBC, operating from her home in New Jersey, selected questions from thousands that shareholders had earlier submitted or that viewers had emailed to her during the four hours Greg and I were on stage.
Yahoo 把这一过程直播给创纪录的全球观众。CNBC 的 贝基·奎克（Becky Quick） 坐镇新泽西的家中，在我与格雷格四小时的舞台答问中，从股东事先提交的数千个问题中遴选，并接收观众在直播期间发送的电邮，将问询交给我们作答。
See’s peanut brittle and fudge, along with Coca-Cola, provided us with nourishment.
我们的能量补给来源简单而经典：See’s 花生糖与软糖，加上 可口可乐。
This year, on May 1st, we are planning to go one better. Again, we will rely on Yahoo and CNBC to perform flawlessly. Yahoo will go live at 1 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time (“EDT”). Simply navigate to https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream.
今年 5 月 1 日，我们计划更上一层楼。同样会依赖 Yahoo 与 CNBC 的完美配合。Yahoo 将在 美国东部夏令时间（EDT）下午 1 点 准时开播，届时只需访问：https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream 即可收看。
Our formal meeting will commence at 5:00 p.m. EDT and should finish by 5:30 p.m.
我们的正式股东大会，将在 美国东部夏令时间下午 5:00 准时开始，预计 5:30 结束。
Earlier, between 1:30-5:00, we will answer your questions as relayed by Becky. As always, we will have no foreknowledge as to what questions will be asked. Send your zingers to BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com. Yahoo will wrap things up after 5:30.
在此之前的 下午 1:30 到 5:00，我们会现场回答由 Becky 转达的各位提问。和往年一样，我们事先并不会知道问题的内容。欢迎大家把犀利的提问发送至 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com。在 5:30 之后，Yahoo 将为整个直播画下句点。
And now – drum roll, please – a surprise. This year our meeting will be held in Los Angeles . . . and Charlie will be on stage with me offering answers and observations throughout the 31⁄2-hour question period. I missed him last year and, more important, you clearly missed him.
现在——请敲响鼓点——来一个惊喜：今年的股东大会将移师 洛杉矶……查理 会与我同台，在长达 三小时三十分钟 的问答环节中，与你们分享他的回答与观察。去年我便十分想念他的身影，更重要的是，我知道你们也一样。
Our other invaluable vice-chairmen, Ajit Jain and Greg Abel, will be with us to answer questions relating to their domains.
我们的另外两位副董事长——Ajit Jain 和 Greg Abel——也会到场，解答各自领域的问题。
Join us via Yahoo. Direct your really tough questions to Charlie! We will have fun, and we hope you will as well. Better yet, of course, will be the day when we see you face to face. I hope and expect that will be in 2022.
欢迎通过 Yahoo 线上参与，把最棘手的问题直接抛给查理！我们一定会其乐融融，也希望你同样如此。当然，更值得期待的，是那一天我们能面对面相聚——我期望，并相信，那将在 2022 年 实现。
The citizens of Omaha, our exhibiting subsidiaries and all of us at the home office can’t wait to get you back for an honest-to-God annual meeting, Berkshire-style.
February 27, 2021
Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board
奥马哈的市民、参展的各家子公司，以及总部的全体同仁，早已翘首以盼——期待你们再次回到这里，共同参与一场真正的、纯正的“伯克希尔式”年度股东大会。
2021 年 2 月 27 日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席