导读：
1.延迟性风险 + 会计虚饰 + 人性弱点.
2.我们都会高估自己
3.长期价值导向：管理层不发期权、不拿特别奖金，不存在只拿好处不承担坏处的问题
4.保险行业： 一半是科学一半是艺术
(We are still making substantial payments on asbestos exposures that occurred 50 or more years ago.) This mode of operations has the desirable effect of giving P/C insurers cash before they incur most expenses but carries with it the risk that the company can be losing money – sometimes mountains of money – before the CEO and directors realize what is happening. Certain lines of insurance minimize this mismatch, such as crop insurance or hail damage in which losses are quickly reported, evaluated and paid.
（我们至今仍在为 50 多年前的石棉暴露事故支付可观赔款。）这种经营模式的优势在于，财产意外保险公司先收现金后承担费用；但风险也随之而来——在高管和董事尚未察觉时，公司可能已出现亏损，甚至亏损累累。某些险种可尽量缩短这种错配，例如农作物险或冰雹险，损失能够迅速上报、评估并赔付。
注释：
P/C insurers 指 承保财产险（property insurance）和意外险/责任险（casualty insurance）的保险公司，常常提供如房屋火灾、车祸、工伤、产品责任等。
所以才有巴菲特提到的：收保费时往往很早，而赔款可能拖很久甚至几十年，导致现金流与盈利风险表现不一致。
Other lines, however, can lead to executive and shareholder bliss as the company is going broke. Think coverages such as medical malpractice or product liability. In “long-tail” lines, a P/C insurer may report large but fictitious profits to its owners and regulators for many years – even decades. The accounting can be particularly dangerous if the CEO is an optimist or a crook. These possibilities are not fanciful: History reveals a large number of each species.
另一些险种却可能在公司濒临破产时仍令管理层和股东陶醉于“盈利”的假象，如医疗事故险、产品责任险等。对于这类“长尾”业务，财险公司往往能多年乃至数十年向股东和监管机构报出庞大却虚假的利润。如果 CEO 过分乐观，或干脆别有用心，这套会计把戏就尤为危险。此类风险绝非危言耸听——翻阅历史，两类案例不胜枚举。
注释：
延迟性风险 + 会计虚饰 + 人性弱点
伯克希尔的策略：
1）只做合适的险种
2）对“业绩造假”零容忍
3）雇佣理性、诚实、讨厌亏钱的经理
4）尽可能保守地计提准备金
5）很多高额“长尾”业务由 (NICO) 处理，该公司在再保险领域有顶尖的定价与风险控制能力
6）长尾险意味着未来可能有巨额理赔，因此保持极高的现金或短期国债
概括起来：
会计数字不能代替底层经济现实，要“反过来看问题”：
我们都会高估自己
一旦允许美化报表，激励作用会导致系统性低估负债。
需要铁的纪律 + 去中心化信任 + 准确的风险认知
In recent decades, this “money-up-front, loss-payments-later” model has allowed Berkshire to invest large sums (“float”) while generally delivering what we believe to be a small underwriting profit. We make estimates for “surprises” and, so far, these estimates have been sufficient. We are not deterred by the dramatic and growing loss payments sustained by our activities. (As I write this, think wildfires.) It’s our job to price to absorb these and unemotionally take our lumps when surprises develop. It’s also our job to contest “runaway” verdicts, spurious litigation and outright fraudulent behavior.
过去数十年，“先收保费、后行赔付”的经营模式，使伯克希尔得以运用大额浮存金进行投资，并通常还能取得我们所认为的微薄承保利润。我们会为各种“意外”预先计提准备，截至目前，这些估计足以应付实际情况。尽管我们的业务面临着赔付金额的急剧攀升（写到这里，我想到的是野火），我们并未因此却步。我们的职责就是合理定价，以吸收这些损失，并在意外发生时保持冷静，坦然承受。我们同样必须对抗“天价”判决、无理诉讼以及赤裸裸的欺诈。
注释：
这里提到的invest large sums (“float”)，有个数字需要了解：在 1970 年 Berkshire 的 float 大约只有 3,900 万美元；到 2020 年已经达到 1,380 亿美元。这个庞大的浮存金为巴菲特是提供了足够多的底气。
这是复利逻辑一个好案例。“以纪律换取低成本资金”，用大量的资本金和优秀的文化去承受波动与尾部，再把长期、稳定且低成本的浮存金转化为投资端的复利，完成了从几千万到千亿级别的跨越：
承保端：小幅正收益（或打平）＝浮存金成本≤0
投资端：将大额资金金配置于安全资产（用于随时赔付）与高质量股权资产（用于长期增值）
Under Ajit, our insurance operation has blossomed from an obscure Omaha-based company into a world leader, renowned for both its taste for risk and its Gibraltar-like financial strength. Moreover, Greg, our directors and I all have a very large investment in Berkshire in relation to any compensation we receive. We do not use options or other one-sided forms of compensation; if you lose money, so do we.
在 Ajit 的领导下，我们的保险业务已从一家名不见经传、扎根奥马哈的小公司，成长为世界领先者，以勇于承担风险和如直布罗陀般坚如磐石的财务实力而著称。此外，Greg、董事会成员和我本人在伯克希尔的投资规模，远远大于我们领取的薪酬。我们不采用股票期权等这类“单向获利”的薪酬结构：如果你（股东）赔钱，我们同样赔钱。
注释：
如何能保持像“Gibraltar-like/美式习语”一样牢固，意味着：
- 足够现金和资本缓冲
- 强大的偿付能力
- 逆周期承受力很高
关于‘one-sided forms of compensation’单向获利的薪酬结构，巴菲特明确不用，那他如何激励管理层呢？
One-sided compensation 面临的实际问题
1）2008 金融危机前，比如雷曼、贝尔斯登等高管通过财务手段推高短期利润从而获得巨额奖金和期权收益。
2）危机爆发后，股东资产大幅缩水，但高管们却落袋为安。
巴菲特之道（Two-sided）
1）年薪几乎固定在 $100,000
2）大部分财富是伯克希尔股票
3）不发期权、不拿特别奖金，不存在只拿好处不承担坏处的问题
总的说来，这是一种风险共担，以长期价值导向的激励方式。
This approach encourages caution but does not ensure foresight.
P/C insurance growth is dependent on increased economic risk. No risk – no need for insurance. Think back only 135 years when the world had no autos, trucks or airplanes. Now there are 300 million vehicles in the U.S. alone, a massive fleet causing huge damage daily. Property damage arising from hurricanes, tornadoes and wildfires is massive, growing and increasingly unpredictable in their patterns and eventual costs.
这种做法固然能促使我们保持谨慎，却并不能赐予我们前瞻之明。
财产意外保险（P/C 保险）的扩张建立在经济风险的抬升之上。无风险，便无保险。试想 135 年前，世上尚无汽车、卡车与飞机；而今，仅美国就拥有 3 亿辆车，这支庞然车队日复一日地制造着巨额损失。飓风、龙卷风与野火带来的财产损失同样惊人，规模不断攀升，发生规律与最终代价也愈发难以预测。
注释：
巴菲特的方法不是预测灾害，而是系统性提升承受力：用价格与合同把不确定性货币化，用准备金与再保把尾部切割，用现金与文化把波动变为可承受的亏损，再用时间把“低/负成本资金”转化为复利。
It would be foolish – make that madness – to write ten-year policies for these coverages, but we believe one-year assumption of such risks is generally manageable. If we change our minds, we will change the contracts we offer. During my lifetime, auto insurers have generally abandoned one-year policies and switched to the six-month variety. This change reduced float but allowed more intelligent underwriting.
若为此类风险签下十年期保单，可谓愚不可及——不，简直疯狂。我们认为，一年期的风险承担大体仍可驾驭；若有朝一日看法改变，我们也会同步调整保单条款。
在我这一生中，汽车保险公司已普遍将一年期保单缩短为六个月期。此举虽压缩了浮存金（float），却带来了更为精细、理性的核保决策。
No private insurer has the willingness to take on the amount of risk that Berkshire can provide. At times, this advantage can be important. But we also need to shrink when prices are inadequate. We must never write inadequately-priced policies in order to stay in the game. That policy is corporate suicide. Properly pricing P/C insurance is part art, part science and is definitely not a business for optimists. Mike Goldberg, the Berkshire executive who recruited Ajit, said it best: “We want our underwriters to daily come to work nervous, but not paralyzed.”
没有任何一家私人保险公司愿意，也没有能力，承接伯克希尔所能承担的庞大风险。关键时刻，这一优势分外显著；然而，一旦保费不足以覆盖风险，我们就会果断收缩，绝不为“留在牌桌”而承保亏本保单——那无异于企业自戕。为财产与意外险（P/C）定价，一半是科学，一半是艺术，绝非天生乐观者的天地。正如当年将阿吉特（Ajit）招至麾下的伯克希尔高管迈克·戈德堡（Mike Goldberg）所言：“我们希望我们的核保员每天带着紧张感上班，但别紧张到僵住。”
注释：
为什么说一半是科学一半是艺术？
- “科学”的一面：需要可量化、模型化、可复现
- “艺术”的一面：市场的判断、竞争者行为、价格—关系—份额的博弈，还需要去处理不可量化的制度与行为不确定性：既要会算，更要会取舍与博弈。
All things considered, we like the P/C insurance business. Berkshire can financially and psychologically handle extreme losses without blinking. We are also not dependent on reinsurers and that gives us a material and enduring cost advantage. Finally, we have outstanding managers (no optimists) and are particularly well-situated to utilize the substantial sums P/C insurance delivers for investment.
总体而言，我们钟爱财产意外险这门生意。面对极端损失，伯克希尔无论财力还是心态都能泰然自若。我们不依赖再保险商，由此赢得持久且显著的成本优势。再加之出类拔萃、绝非盲目乐观的管理团队，以及对财险业务带来的巨额可投资资金的卓越运用能力，伯克希尔在这条赛道上占尽先机。
注释：
产险把“短期的剧烈波动”换成“长期、低/负成本资金”，再由强大的投资能力转化为复利；这套组合几乎是量身定制的巴菲特型生意。
Over the past two decades, our insurance business has generated $32 billion of after-tax profits from underwriting, about 3.3 cents per dollar of sales after income tax. Meanwhile, our float has grown from $46 billion to $171 billion. The float is likely to grow a bit over time and, with intelligent underwriting (and some luck), has a reasonable prospect of being costless.
在过去二十年里，我们的保险业务通过承保实现了 320 亿美元的税后利润，折合每 1 美元销售额净赚约 3.3 美分。同时，浮存金已由 460 亿美元增至 1,710 亿美元。展望未来，这一数字还有望小幅攀升；只要承保有方，再添几分运气，这笔浮存金大概率可做到“零成本”。
注释：
放到全球产险同行里的位置，以20年为期能保持持续正的承保利润，且税后平均约3.3%，属行业顶尖少数。这在长周期、且包含巨灾与长尾业务的综合组合里非常少见。属于长期纪律与资本优势叠加后才能达到的“高段位”表现。
Berkshire Increases its Japanese Investments A small but important exception to our U.S.-based focus is our growing investment in Japan. It’s been almost six years since Berkshire began purchasing shares in five Japanese companies that very successfully operate in a manner somewhat similar to Berkshire itself.
伯克希尔加码日本投资
在以美国为投资重心的格局中，日本是一处小而关键的例外——我们的在日持股正稳步增长。自近六年前伯克希尔首次购入五家日本公司的股份以来，这些企业延续了与伯克希尔颇为相似且卓有成效的经营方式。
The five are (alphabetically) ITOCHU, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo. Each of these large enterprises, in turn, owns interests in a vast array of businesses, many based in Japan but others that operate throughout the world. 10 Berkshire made its first purchases involving the five in July 2019.
按字母顺序，它们分别是：伊藤忠（ITOCHU）、丸红（Marubeni）、三菱商事（Mitsubishi）、三井物产（Mitsui）以及住友商事（Sumitomo）。这些商业巨擘各自拥有形形色色的业务权益，既深耕日本本土，也遍布全球各地。
伯克希尔首度买入这五家公司股份是在 2019 年 7 月。
注释：
巴菲特看好这些公司的治理与股东回报文化提升（治理准则、交叉持股拆解、推动提升ROE/PB>1），现金分红与回购更积极。在“长期主义、分权运营、保守财务、回购与再投资纪律”上与伯克希尔高度同频，这正是他觉得“与伯克希尔有些相似”的原因。
We simply looked at their financial records and were amazed at the low prices of their stocks. As the years have passed, our admiration for these companies has consistently grown. Greg has met many times with them, and I regularly follow their progress. Both of us like their capital deployment, their managements and their attitude in respect to their investors. Each of the five companies increase dividends when appropriate, they repurchase their shares when it is sensible to do so, and their top managers are far less aggressive in their compensation programs than their U.S. counterparts.
我们起初只是随手翻阅了这些公司的财务报表，便对其股价之低廉惊叹不已。随着岁月推移，我们对这些公司的敬意愈发深厚。Greg 与它们多次会面，我本人也一直密切关注其进展。我们皆欣赏它们的资本运用之道、管理层素质以及对投资者的态度。这五家公司在时机合适时提高分红，在价格合理时回购股份，而其高管薪酬计划远不及美国同行激进。
Our holdings of the five are for the very long term, and we are committed to supporting their boards of directors. From the start, we also agreed to keep Berkshire’s holdings below 10% of each company’s shares. But, as we approached this limit, the five companies agreed to moderately relax the ceiling. Over time, you will likely see Berkshire’s ownership of all five increase somewhat.
我们持股的初衷是长久拥有，并承诺支持它们的董事会。从一开始，我们就同意将伯克希尔在每家公司的持股控制在 10% 以下。然而，当我们逼近这一上限时，五家公司同意稍作放宽。今后，您大概率会看到伯克希尔在这五家公司的持股比例略有提升。
At yearend, Berkshire’s aggregate cost (in dollars) was $13.8 billion and the market value of our holdings totaled $23.5 billion. Meanwhile, Berkshire has consistently – but not pursuant to any formula – increased its yen-denominated borrowings. All are at fixed rates, no “floaters.” Greg and I have no view on future foreign exchange rates and therefore seek a position approximating currency-neutrality.
截至年末，伯克希尔的累计投资成本为 138 亿美元，所持股票的市值为 235 亿美元。与此同时，我们持续——但并非遵循任何既定公式——增加以日元计价的借款；全部借款均为固定利率，没有任何浮动利率工具。Greg 和我对未来汇率的走向不作预测，因此力求维持大体货币中性的头寸。
注释：
在芒格在 2020–2023 里，他多次公开称赞这笔日本投资的思路与执行，并称其“价格便宜、质量不错、用日元低息融资匹配日元资产，非常明智”
在这笔交易中芒格式的投资哲学：
- 这种资源类、商品类的公司有周期波动和地缘不确定性，因此不去追寻控制权，而是分散投资。并按价格涨跌实时调整持仓。
- 这些公司，尤其是日本的公司的治理改善并不是快速的，所以会用十年维度评估。
- 心态平和，有机会就买。“耐心资本”是受欢迎的。
We are required, however, under GAAP rules to regularly recognize in our earnings a calculation of any gains or losses in the yen we have borrowed and, at yearend, had included $2.3 billion of after-tax gains due to dollar strength of which $850 million occurred in 2024. I expect that Greg and his eventual successors will be holding this Japanese position for many decades and that Berkshire will find other ways to work productively with the five companies in the future. We like the current math of our yen-balanced strategy as well.
然而，根据 GAAP 规定，我们必须定期将因借入日元而产生的汇兑损益计入收益。年末时，美元走强为我们带来 23 亿美元的税后收益，其中 8.5 亿美元发生于 2024 年。我预计，Greg 及其后继者将在未来数十年继续持有这笔日本头寸，伯克希尔也将寻求与这五家公司探索更多卓有成效的合作。我们同样十分满意目前“日元平衡”策略所呈现的经济效果。
注释：
汇率/融资是否也是配套考量核心因素？
特别注意的是巴菲特说明了，在日本的投资并不只是“五家商社的股票持有”，还包含“用日元举债去匹配这些资产”的整体安排。
也就是说伯克希尔买了日本公司的股票，同时借了日元来匹配，这样汇率涨跌相互抵消，长期持有更稳。
货币跌时，股票用美元看起来缩水，但日元债务用美元看也同时变小，彼此对冲，净影响小很多
日本货币长期利率很低，用低息日元借到的钱去持有能分红、回购、成长的优质公司，长期“进出相差”有望是正的。
所以，巴菲特不是押注日元走势，从长期角度看仍然看企业基本面来赚钱。
As I write this, the annual dividend income expected from the Japanese investments in 2025 will total about $812 million and the interest cost of our yen-denominated debt will be about $135 million.
截至成稿时，预计日本投资可在 2025 年为我们贡献约 8.12 亿美元年度股息，而日元计价债务的利息支出约为 1.35 亿美元。
Original Title: 伯克希尔股东来信 2024
Author: Warren E. Buffett
Original Source: https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2024ltr.pdf
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