2020 年的这封信中巴菲特告诉我们：持有一家卓越公司的少数股权，比100%掌控一家平庸企业更赚钱、更轻松。这是是巴菲特投资哲学的“进化宣言”。它标志着他从格雷厄姆式的、执着于价格与控制的捡烟蒂者，彻底蜕变为芒格式的、追求品质与放手的资本配置大师。
省略了第一页历年财务对比
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Berkshire earned 42.5 billion in 2020 according to generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called “GAAP”).
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东： 按照美国公认会计准则（GAAP），伯克希尔 2020 年实现净利润 425 亿美元。
The four components of that figure are 21.9 billion of operating earnings, 4.9 billion of realized capital gains, a 26.7 billion gain from an increase in the amount of net unrealized capital gains that exist in the stocks we hold and, finally, an 11 billion loss from a write-down in the value of a few subsidiary and affiliate businesses that we own. All items are stated on an after-tax basis.
那笔总收益来自四个部分： 第一，营业收益 219 亿美元； 第二，已实现资本收益 49 亿美元； 第三，是我们持有的股票净未实现资本收益增加了 267 亿美元； 最后，是几家子公司和联营企业计提减值，带来的 110 亿美元亏损。 以上全是税后数字。
Operating earnings are what count most, even during periods when they are not the largest item in our GAAP total. Our focus at Berkshire is both to increase this segment of our income and to acquire large and favorably-situated businesses.
对伯克希尔来说，营业收益始终是最重要的指标——即使在有些年份，它在 GAAP 报表里的占比并不是最大。我们的目标一直很清晰： 一是稳步提升这部分收益， 二是买下规模可观、地位稳固的好企业。
译注：
看上去巴菲特在说一些会计数据，但实际上他在说会计上的数据和真实的商业情况还是有很大的不同的。
GAAP 净利润其实并不重要，甚至有误导。那么什么是重要的？Operating earnings are what count most——巴菲特认为这个收益才是真金白银，通过向客户提供商品和服务所赚来的钱。具有稳定性和可预测性，更是管理能力和价值投资的锚点。
除了巴菲特的文字所表达的内容，更关键是理解他的思考框架：
- 营业收益质量如何？它的未来增长动力在哪？
- 110 亿美元的巨额减值，揭示了伯克希尔收购策略的哪些潜在风险？
- 267亿的未实现收益，背后隐藏的集中度风险有多大？
- 9亿的已实现收益，加上219亿的营业收益，这些现金将流向何方？
2020 年是疫情肆虐全球的一年，全球经济遭受重创。伯克希尔显然展露出了强大的韧性。BNSF铁路依然创造了巨额利润，能源继续在增长，保险虽然灾害不断但继续在盈利。
110 亿美元的巨额减值主要是对精密机件公司 PCC 的商誉减记，依赖少数大客户，缺乏定价权和抗风险能力。
267 亿美元来自苹果股票投资，依然存在长期投资面对的最大困难：看对未必一定能拿住。
49 亿的已实现收益，加上 219 亿的营业收益都用来购了伯克希尔股票，最佳投资机会是自己果然没错。
Last year, however, we met neither goal: Berkshire made no sizable acquisitions and operating earnings fell 9%. We did, though, increase Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by both retaining earnings and repurchasing about 5% of our shares.
但去年，这两个目标我们都没碰上： 没有做大型收购，营业收益比前年下降了 9%。 不过，好消息是， 通过留存利润，再加上回购了大约 5% 的公司股份，我们依然让伯克希尔的每股内在价值有所提升。
译注：
2020 年伯克希尔找不到可以并购的目标，于是回购了创纪录的 247 亿美元自家股票。这样即使总利润不增长，每股的利润也会因为股本减少而增加。
对比下 2020 年其他公司的回购：苹果当时市值 2.2 万亿回购 730 亿左右，占比 3.3%。 谷歌当时市值 1.2 万亿，回购 331 亿，占比 2.6%。从数据可以看出伯克希尔回购比例遥遥领先于所有这些规模更大的巨头。这在大型企业中极为少见，除了苹果比较接近外，微软谷歌都明显低于这一比例。
The two GAAP components pertaining to capital gains or losses (whether realized or unrealized) fluctuate capriciously from year to year, reflecting swings in the stock market. Whatever today’s figures, Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I firmly believe that, over time, Berkshire’s capital gains from its investment holdings will be substantial.
按照美国公认会计准则（GAAP），与资本利得或损失挂钩的两项科目——不论是已实现还是未实现——都会随着股市的起落而大幅波动，今天的数字可能让人微笑，明年的数字也可能皱眉。 但无论短期结果如何，我和查理·芒格都深信，只要时间够长，伯克希尔的投资组合将带来非常丰厚的资本利得。
译注：
巴菲特在这里使用了 capriciously 这个词，不仅仅是说波动，而是任意地、随心所欲地摇摆，完全就是一个不稳定的疯子。所以巴菲特坚信只要给于股市假以时日，那价值必将回归并反映其真实的重量（股市就是一杆秤）。
股东们，请不用盯着 GAAP 了，那是股市里边的一群疯子所决定的。请把目光投向这些优秀的企业身上，只要他们持续不断地更强壮、更出色，最终他们一定会赢。
As I’ve emphasized many times, Charlie and I view Berkshire’s holdings of marketable stocks – at yearend worth 281 billion – as a collection of businesses. We don’t control the operations of those companies, but we do share proportionately in their long-term prosperity.
我多次强调，查理和我看待伯克希尔持有的可交易股票——年末市值达 2,810 亿美元——并不是把它们当作一堆“纸资产”，而是当作一组我们有份参与的企业集合。我们并不掌管这些公司的日常运营，但我们能按持股比例分享它们的长期繁荣。
译注：
可不要被‘long-term prosperity’给迷惑了，巴菲特可不仅仅是想着分享企业成长那么简单。
- view … stocks … as a collection of businesses. 这是我们学习巴菲特的关键点：股票不仅仅是一张纸，而是对一家企业的真正所有权。
- 我们不控制这些公司的运营，但为什么还会买入苹果？因为巴菲特相信苹果的能力和品格。
如何真正识别、判断、并与这些伟大的企业同行？这才是巴菲特投资的真谛。
From an accounting standpoint, however, our portion of their earnings is not included in Berkshire’s income. Instead, only what these investees pay us in dividends is recorded on our books. Under GAAP, the huge sums that investees retain on our behalf become invisible.
不过，会计规则有自己的玩法：我们该分到的那部分盈余并不会进入伯克希尔的收益表。报表只会记录这些公司向我们支付的股息。而它们替我们保留、再投资的那一大笔利润——在 GAAP 下，会悄无声息地消失在字面数字之外。
What’s out of sight, however, should not be out of mind: Those unrecorded retained earnings are usually building value – lots of value – for Berkshire.
然而，“视而不见”并不代表“心无所念”。那些尚未在账面呈现的留存收益，正悄然为伯克希尔累积——而且是巨额——价值。
译注：
真正的价值创是下边四种方式：业务增长、并购交易、偿还债务、股份回购。所以 GAAP 规则只展示了一部分信息，而且非常的保守，只记录分红，忽略了未分派利润的价值。这也是驱动美国企业壮大的百年传统一直有效的原因。
Investees use the withheld funds to expand their business, make acquisitions, pay off debt and, often, to repurchase their stock (an act that increases our share of their future earnings). As we pointed out in these pages last year, retained earnings have propelled American business throughout our country’s history. What worked for Carnegie and Rockefeller has, over the years, worked its magic for millions of shareholders as well.
我们的被投资企业将这部分保留资金用于业务扩张、并购交易、偿还债务，常常还会回购自家股份（此举既提高了我们在其未来收益中的持股占比，也放大了回报）。正如去年信中所述，自美国商业史伊始，留存收益便是驱动企业成长的不竭引擎。昔日卡内基与洛克菲勒凭此奠基，而今这一魔力仍造福于千百万股东。
Of course, some of our investees will disappoint, adding little, if anything, to the value of their company by retaining earnings. But others will over-deliver, a few spectacularly. In aggregate, we expect our share of the huge pile of earnings retained by Berkshire’s non-controlled businesses (what others would label our equity portfolio) to eventually deliver us an equal or greater amount of capital gains.
诚然，一些企业可能令人失望，其留存利润对公司价值贡献寥寥；然亦有企业表现超乎预期，甚至惊艳绝伦。总体而言，我们深信，伯克希尔所持非控股企业——亦即他人所称的权益投资组合——所积累的大量留存收益，终将为我们带来相当甚至更高的资本利得。
译注：
投资者的本质是和被投资企业在同一艘船上。而留存收益就是这首大船前进的动力。优秀的企业能够确保用同样多的动力，走得更远、更快、更稳。所以，作为股东你不是每天盯着股票市场的变化，而是要确保的是这手船本身是否足够好，并且有源源不断的动力供给能够跑的最快？
巴菲特的一美元原则：实则就是这件企业的管理层，是否能够用留下来的一美元，创造出比一美元更多的价值，是否能够用投资者留下来的钱，创造出更多的价值？这，是检验一家公司是否值得长期投资的试金石。
Over our 56-year tenure, that expectation has been met.
在过去56年的经营岁月里，这一期望始终得到兑现。
The final component in our GAAP figure – that ugly 11 billion write-down – is almost entirely the quantification of a mistake I made in 2016. That year, Berkshire purchased Precision Castparts (“PCC”), and I paid too much for the company. No one misled me in any way – I was simply too optimistic about PCC’s normalized profit potential. Last year, my miscalculation was laid bare by adverse developments throughout the aerospace industry, PCC’s most important source of customers. 在按美国公认会计准则（GAAP）列示的最终数据中，那笔刺眼的110亿美元减值，几乎全部源于我在2016年犯下的一桩过失。那一年，伯克希尔收购了 Precision Castparts（“PCC”），而我为之支付的价格过高。无人误导我——只是我对PCC的常态化盈利能力抱持过度乐观的预期。去年，航空航天业——PCC最重要的客户群——遭逢逆风，我的误判因而暴露无遗。
译注：
老巴一直在教我们如何在别人贪婪的时候恐惧，避免支付过高的价格，尤其是哪些周期性的企业。但 PCC 这次收购某种程度上是他的败笔，他被‘优秀企业’这个光环所吸引，忽略了好价格的重要性，直接带来了百亿美元的损失和巨大的机会成本。
如果，这笔 372 亿的收购是投入到苹果股票上，到 2024 年底将带来接近 3500 亿的回报（2020 年苹果股价 24, 2024 年底大约 240 以上。）。 不可想象，当然另外一面也可看出科技平台型公司的财富创造能力是传统制造业完全无法比拟的。
In purchasing PCC, Berkshire bought a fine company – the best in its business. Mark Donegan, PCC’s CEO, is a passionate manager who consistently pours the same energy into the business that he did before we purchased it. We are lucky to have him running things. I believe I was right in concluding that PCC would, over time, earn good returns on the net tangible assets deployed in its operations.
尽管如此，伯克希尔买下的依旧是一家卓越的企业，在其领域首屈一指。PCC首席执行官 Mark Donegan 干劲十足、激情如故，与我们入主前无异，全力投身业务。能够由他掌舵，实乃我们的幸运。我仍相信，PCC在运营中投入的净有形资产，终将带来令人满意的回报。
译注：
通过自己的错误分析，再次阐述了好公司未必是好投资的原则。承担了全部责任来保护和激励自己的团队。
I was wrong, however, in judging the average amount of future earnings and, consequently, wrong in my calculation of the proper price to pay for the business.
然而，我对未来平均盈利能力的预估失准，因而在衡量应为此业务支付的合理价格时亦犯下了错误。PCC并非我首次栽在这类判断上，但这一回尤为沉重。
PCC is far from my first error of that sort. But it’s a big one. Two Strings to Our Bow Berkshire is often labeled a conglomerate, a negative term applied to holding companies that own a hodge-podge of unrelated businesses. And, yes, that describes Berkshire – but only in part. To understand how and why we differ from the prototype conglomerate, let’s review a little history.
双弦在弓
伯克希尔常被贴上“企业集团”的标签——这一用语往往带有贬义，专指那些持有形形色色、彼此无关业务的控股公司。诚然，伯克希尔在某种程度上符合这一描述，但那仅是部分真相。要理解我们缘何与典型“企业集团”迥异，不妨先追溯历史。
Over time, conglomerates have generally limited themselves to buying businesses in their entirety. That strategy, however, came with two major problems. One was unsolvable: Most of the truly great businesses had no interest in having anyone take them over. Consequently, deal-hungry conglomerateurs had to focus on so-so companies that lacked important and durable competitive strengths. That was not a great pond in which to fish.
长期以来，企业集团大多倾向于整盘收购其他公司。然而此举天生伴随两大顽疾，其中之一无解：现实中真正卓越的企业鲜少愿意被他人接管。于是，渴求交易的集团经营者只能把网撒向那些缺乏持久竞争优势的平庸公司——那可不是一片理想的“钓鱼的池塘”。
译注：
从自己的一次具体失败，巴菲特引申到整个行业的通病。优质资产的稀缺性导致了真正好的企业很难被收购，而且你还得支付额外的控制权溢价。于是，企业集团只能在平庸的企业中寻找机会，而这本身就大大增加了失败的概率。
Beyond that, as conglomerateurs dipped into this universe of mediocre businesses, they often found themselves required to pay staggering “control” premiums to snare their quarry. Aspiring conglomerateurs knew the answer to this “overpayment” problem: They simply needed to manufacture a vastly overvalued stock of their own that could be used as a “currency” for pricey acquisitions. (“I’ll pay you 10,000 for your dog by giving you two of my 5,000 cats.”)
此外，这些“集团缔造者”一旦踏入由平庸企业构成的池塘，往往需支付惊人的“控制权溢价”才能捕获猎物。志在并购的操盘手很快找到了破解“高价”难题的诀窍：先把自家股票吹得虚高，再把这种被高估的股票当作“货币”去支付昂贵的收购价码。（“我用两只标价5,000美元的猫，换你那条标价10,000美元的狗。”）
译注： 我给你10000块（高估值）买你的狗，但支付的方式，是给你两只我声称每只值5000块的猫（我的虚高股票）。媒体喜欢这样的宏大叙事能够吸引眼球，华尔街只在乎有没有交易因为这样才能赚取巨额的承销费和顾问费。
一家公司的股价可能仅仅因为一个激动人心的故事或一个有魅力的创始人而被推上天，完全脱离其商业基本面。
这如同 2000 年开始的 SPAC（空壳上市公司）类似，手握重金，必须在规定时间内找到一家公司收购，否则就要清算。
究竟什么才是价值创造，哪些又是价值幻觉呢？作为投资者的必修课，需要警惕那些热衷于交易、擅长讲故事、使用复杂会计手法的对象。
在并购稀缺的现实里，巴菲特也提供了另一种方式：通过被动持股分享伟大企业的复利、并在低估时回购自家股票，是更高胜率、更低摩擦的长期增值之道。
Often, the tools for fostering the overvaluation of a conglomerate’s stock involved promotional techniques and “imaginative” accounting maneuvers that were, at best, deceptive and that sometimes crossed the line into fraud. When these tricks were “successful,” the conglomerate pushed its own stock to, say, 3x its business value in order to offer the target 2x its value.
推动股价虚高的武器，通常是一套浮夸的宣传伎俩，外加几笔“富于想象力”的会计骚操作——轻则误导，重则逾越欺诈。当这些把戏“奏效”时，集团便能把自身股价抬到其真实业务价值的三倍，再用它去给目标公司开出相当于对方价值两倍的报价。
Investing illusions can continue for a surprisingly long time. Wall Street loves the fees that deal-making generates, and the press loves the stories that colorful promoters provide.
投资幻象可以维系出人意料的长久：华尔街钟情并购佣金，媒体也沉迷于色彩斑斓的资本故事。
At a point, also, the soaring price of a promoted stock can itself become the “proof” that an illusion is reality. Eventually, of course, the party ends, and many business “emperors” are found to have no clothes. Financial history is replete with the names of famous conglomerateurs who were initially lionized as business geniuses by journalists, analysts and investment bankers, but whose creations ended up as business junkyards. Conglomerates earned their terrible reputation.
有时候，一只被大肆炒作的股票价格扶摇直上，本身便成了“幻象成真”的铁证。然而，宴席终有散场的一刻，被奉为商业“帝王”的诸多人物，终究会被揭穿——原来不过是身披“皇帝的新装”。金融史对此早已司空见惯：那些曾被媒体、分析师与投行吹捧为天才的著名多元化集团创建者，最后往往把自己的“杰作”弄成一片商业废墟。多元化集团之所以臭名昭著，实在是自食其果。
译注：
巴菲特鄙视的不是多元化集团这个外壳，而是那种特定模式的、建立在手段和幻觉上的骗子。
伯克希尔，正是一个反向教材，在每一个核心原则上都与他所鄙视的对象截然相反。刻意规避了这套激励、财务技巧、并购循环的原罪，用一套反向设计的机制：去中心化运营+集中化资本配置、少用自家股作为并购货币、被动持股分享伟大公司、内在价值回购纪律，对冲了集团臭名的结构性困境。
Charlie and I want our conglomerate to own all or part of a diverse group of businesses with good economic characteristics and good managers. Whether Berkshire controls these businesses, however, is unimportant to us. It took me a while to wise up.
查理和我希望我们的集团能全资或参股一系列兼具优异经济特质、卓越管理团队的多元化企业。至于伯克希尔是否握有控股权，对我们并非关键。要真正悟透这一点，我也走了不少弯路。
译注：
这段话，不仅仅是一份投资策略，更是一份投资觉醒回忆录。哪些看似伟大的丰功伟绩并非与身俱来，而是经过了长达 20 年的痛苦挣扎和深刻反思才最终形成。从上个世纪六十年代买下纺织厂伯克希尔开始，巴菲特持续不断往这个糟糕生意里投钱。好在有芒格不断影响他不再捡“烟蒂”，而是去买伟大的公司，哪怕只是少数股权。从而开始购买美国运通、华盛顿邮报等公司的部分股票，以及全资收购喜诗糖果公司等。
But Charlie – and also my 20-year struggle with the textile operation I inherited at Berkshire – finally convinced me that owning a non-controlling portion of a wonderful business is more profitable, more enjoyable and far less work than struggling with 100% of a marginal enterprise.
多年来，查理与我在伯克希尔继承的纺织厂里苦战二十载，终于使我悟到：与其百分之百掌控一家勉强维生的企业，不如持有一家卓越公司的少数股权——不仅获利更丰厚，过程更惬意，且省心许多。
译注：
与其花100%的精力去试图把一门60分的生意做到65分，不如花10%的精力去投资一门95分的生意，然后坐享其成。决策的唯三标准就是：好公司、好管理、好价格。这就是一个投资大师如何从一个执着于控制和价格的格雷厄姆门徒，转变为追求品质和不控制的伟大资本投资人。
For those reasons, our conglomerate will remain a collection of controlled and non-controlled businesses. Charlie and I will simply deploy your capital into whatever we believe makes the most sense, based on a company’s durable competitive strengths, the capabilities and character of its management, and price. If that strategy requires little or no effort on our part, so much the better. In contrast to the scoring system
正因如此，我们的集团将继续是一座由控股与非控股业务组成的“百宝箱”。查理和我会依据企业持久的竞争优势、管理层的能力与品格，以及价格高低，将您的资本投向最合乎理性的去处；如果这样的策略几乎不需要我们多费心思，那就再好不过了。与之相对的，则是那套评分体系……
utilized in diving competitions, you are awarded no points in business endeavors for “degree of difficulty.” Furthermore, as Ronald Reagan cautioned: “It’s said that hard work never killed anyone, but I say why take the chance?”
在跳水赛场，动作越难分数越高；可在商界，“难度系数”并不会为你加分。罗纳德·里根曾打趣道：“大家都说努力工作不会要人命，可我想——何必冒这个险？”
The Family Jewels and How We Increase Your Share of These Gems On page A-1 we list Berkshire’s subsidiaries, a smorgasbord of businesses employing 360,000 at yearend. You can read much more about these controlled operations in the 10-K that fills the back part of this report. Our major positions in companies that we partly own and don’t control are listed on page 7 of this letter. That portfolio of businesses, too, is large and diverse. Most of Berkshire’s value, however, resides in four businesses, three controlled and one in which we have only a 5.4% interest. All four are jewels. The largest in value is our property/casualty insurance operation, which for 53 years has been the core of Berkshire. Our family of insurers is unique in the insurance field.
家族瑰宝：我们如何扩大你对这些宝石的持有份额
在 A-1 页，我们罗列了伯克希尔的子公司——一桌琳琅满目的商业“自助餐”，截至年末共雇用 360,000 名员工。关于这些控股企业，你可在本报告后半部分的 10-K 文件中找到更详尽的说明。至于我们持股但不控股的主要公司，则列于本信第 7 页；该投资组合同样体量庞大、行业多元。
然而，伯克希尔的大部分价值实则凝聚于四大业务：三项为我们控股，一项则是我们仅持有 5.4% 股份的公司。四者皆为瑰宝。
其中价值最高的，是我们的产险业务——53 年来，它一直是伯克希尔的中流砥柱，而我们的保险家族在业内堪称独树一帜。
So, too, is its manager, Ajit Jain, who joined Berkshire in 1986. Overall, the insurance fleet operates with far more capital than is deployed by any of its competitors worldwide. That financial strength, coupled with the huge flow of cash Berkshire annually receives from its non-insurance businesses, allows our insurance companies to safely follow an equity-heavy investment strategy not feasible for the overwhelming majority of insurers. Those competitors, for both regulatory and credit-rating reasons, must focus on bonds. And bonds are not the place to be these days. Can you believe that the income recently available from a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond – the yield was 0.93% at yearend – had fallen 94% from the 15.8% yield available in September 1981? In certain large and important countries, such as Germany and Japan, investors earn a negative return on trillions of dollars of sovereign debt. Fixed-income investors worldwide – whether pension funds, insurance companies or retirees – face a bleak future.
自1986年加盟伯克希尔以来，Ajit Jain 一直领航这支保险舰队。整体而言，伯克希尔旗下保险集团所运用的资本规模，远超全球任何竞争对手。雄厚的资本实力，加之公司每年从非保险业务源源流入的大量现金，使我们的保险公司得以稳健实施以股票为主的投资策略——这一点绝大多数同业望尘莫及。受制于监管和信用评级，竞争者们只能把重心放在债券上。然而，如今债券早已不是投资的乐土。你能想象吗？截至年末，10年期美国国债收益率仅0.93%，较1981年9月高达15.8%的水平暴跌94%。更甚者，在德国、日本等重要经济体，投资者持有数万亿美元的主权债券，却不得不忍受负收益。放眼全球，固定收益投资者——无论是养老金、保险公司还是退休人士——都面临着黯淡前景。
Some insurers, as well as other bond investors, may try to juice the pathetic returns now available by shifting their purchases to obligations backed by shaky borrowers. Risky loans, however, are not the answer to inadequate interest rates. Three decades ago, the once-mighty savings and loan industry destroyed itself, partly by ignoring that maxim. Berkshire now enjoys 138 billion of insurance “float” – funds that do not belong to us, but are nevertheless ours to deploy, whether in bonds, stocks or cash equivalents such as U.S. Treasury bills. Float has some similarities to bank deposits: cash flows in and out daily to insurers, with the total they hold changing very little. The massive sum held by Berkshire is likely to remain near its present level for many years and, on a cumulative basis, has been costless to us. That happy result, of course, could change – but, over time, I like our odds. I have repetitiously – some might say endlessly – explained our insurance operation in my annual letters to you.
某些保险公司以及其他债券投资者，为了榨取眼下聊胜于无的收益，或许会转向购买由资质堪忧的借款人发行的债务。但以高风险贷款补偿低利率，并非良策。三十年前，曾经叱咤一时的储蓄与贷款业正是因无视此理而走向覆灭。
目前，伯克希尔掌握着1,380亿美元保险浮存金——这笔钱名义上不归我们所有，却可由我们调度，投向债券、股票，或美国国债等现金等价物。浮存金颇似银行存款：资金日进日出，总量却波动甚微。预计这一庞大资金池今后多年仍将维持在当前水平，且从累计角度看，对伯克希尔几乎零成本。当然，这一良机并非牢不可破，但长远而言，我仍看好我们的胜算。
至于伯克希尔的保险业务，我已在历年致股东信中三番五次——有人甚至说喋喋不休——做过详尽阐释。