2024 year BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: This letter comes to you as part of Berkshire’s annual report. As a public company, we are required to periodically tell you many specific facts and figures. “Report,” however, implies a greater responsibility. In addition to the mandated data, we believe we owe you additional commentary about what you own and how we think. Our goal is to communicate with you in a manner that we would wish you to use if our positions were reversed – that is, if you were Berkshire’s CEO while I and my family were passive investors, trusting you with our savings. This approach leads us to an annual recitation of both good and bad developments at the many businesses you indirectly own through your Berkshire shares.
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦股份有限公司全体股东：
此函随年度报告一并呈上。作为一家上市公司，我们必须定期向诸位披露诸多具体数据与事实。但“报告”二字，意味着更深层的责任。除法定信息之外，我们自觉还应就您所拥有的事业以及我们的思考方式作出更充分的说明。
我们的沟通原则很简单：换位思考。倘若角色互易——您担任伯克希尔的首席执行官，而我与家人只是将积蓄交托于您的普通股东——我们希望您以何种态度向我们汇报，我们便以同样的方式对话。秉持这一理念，我们每年都会坦诚呈报，您因持有伯克希尔股票而间接拥有的各家企业，在过去一年中的佳绩与失误。
When discussing problems at specific subsidiaries, we do, however, try to follow the advice Tom Murphy gave to me 60 years ago: “praise by name, criticize by category.” Mistakes – Yes, We Make Them at Berkshire Sometimes I’ve made mistakes in assessing the future economics of a business I’ve purchased for Berkshire – each a case of capital allocation gone wrong. That happens with both judgments about marketable equities – we view these as partial ownership of businesses – and the 100% acquisitions of companies. At other times, I’ve made mistakes when assessing the abilities or fidelity of the managers Berkshire is hiring. The fidelity disappointments can hurt beyond their financial impact, a pain that can approach that of a failed marriage. A decent batting average in personnel decisions is all that can be hoped for. The cardinal sin is delaying the correction of mistakes or what Charlie Munger called “thumb-sucking.” Problems, he would tell me, cannot be wished away.
在谈及旗下子公司的具体问题时，我们始终力行汤姆·墨菲在六十年前给我的箴言：“表扬要指名道姓，批评则归类而谈。”
错误——是的，伯克希尔也会犯错
在为伯克希尔收购企业时，我曾误判其未来的经济表现——每一次，都意味着资本配置失当。这样的误判既见于对可流通股票的判断——我们将其视为对企业的部分所有权——也见于百分之百收购的案例。除此之外，在评估伯克希尔拟聘管理者的能力或忠诚时，我也曾看走眼。失望的忠诚带来的伤害往往超越财务亏损，其痛楚几可与婚姻破裂相提并论。在人事决策上，能维持一个尚可的“打击率”已属难得。真正的原罪，是发现错误却迟迟不予纠正——查理·芒格将其称为“吮拇指”。他常提醒我，问题并不会因为我们的祈愿而自行消散。
*- thumb-sucking 本义 = “吮拇指”，是婴儿常见的行为，带有依赖、退缩、找安慰的意味。
- 这里可以理解为： > “畏首畏尾的拖延，不痛快地承认和纠正错误，反而长期磨蹭，期望问题自行消失。”*
芒格所谓“thumb-sucking”的具体坏习惯表现 1.明知犯错却迟迟不纠正 2.决策过程中陷入过度分析瘫痪 3.怕得罪人、怕尴尬而不正面指出问题 4.对顽固问题抱有幻想 5.满足于口头讨论或会议，不落实到行动 这是一种“心理麻醉”——通过推迟、逃避、搪塞来减轻短期不适，但长远损失更大。
They require action, however uncomfortable that may be.
During the 2019-23 period, I have used the words “mistake” or “error” 16 times in my letters to you. Many other huge companies have never used either word over that span. Amazon, I should acknowledge, made some brutally candid observations in its 2021 letter. Elsewhere, it has generally been happy talk and pictures. 1 I have also been a director of large public companies at which “mistake” or “wrong” were forbidden words at board meetings or analyst calls. That taboo, implying managerial perfection, always made me nervous (though, at times, there could be legal issues that make limited discussion advisable. We live in a very litigious society.) * * * * * * * * * * * * At 94, it won’t be long before Greg Abel replaces me as CEO and will be writing the annual letters. Greg shares the Berkshire creed that a “report” is what a Berkshire CEO annually owes to owners.
然而，再尴尬、再不舒服，也得采取行动。
2019 至 2023 年间，我在写给诸位的信中一共用了 16 次“错误”或“失误”一词。同期，许多庞大的同行连一次都没提过。需要说明的是，亚马逊在 2021 年致股东信中倒是做过几句刀刃向内的坦白；除此之外，更多公司只剩轻松的高调与漂亮的图片。
我还曾出任若干大型上市公司的董事会成员，在那些会议或分析师电话中，“错误”或“过失”都是讳莫如深的禁语，仿佛管理层天生不会犯错。这种自我粉饰总让我心里发毛——当然，偶尔也会因为潜在法律风险而宜少谈为妙；毕竟我们生活在一个诉讼频发的世界。
我已 94 岁，离 Greg Abel（格雷格·阿贝尔）接任首席执行官、执笔年信的那一天已不远。Greg 与我一样深信：每年向所有者呈上一份“报告”，是伯克希尔 CEO 不可推卸的本分。
creed 和 belief 在字面上都可以译作“信仰 / 信念 / 信条” 1.belief 重点是个人的主观信念、看法、认知立场。 2.creed 正式的信条、原则、信仰体系，带有制度化 / 组织化 / 稳定传承的意味。 这句话要表达的是：Greg（接班人之一）也认同伯克希尔一直奉行的、沿袭多年的核心准则： CEO 每年要向股东提交一份报告，这是职责、是承诺。
24 年财报的巴菲特就已 94 岁了！
And he also understands that if you start fooling your shareholders, you will soon believe your own baloney and be fooling yourself as well. Pete Liegl – One of a Kind Let me pause to tell you the remarkable story of Pete Liegl, a man unknown to most Berkshire shareholders but one who contributed many billions to their aggregate wealth. Pete died in November, still working at 80. I first heard of Forest River – the Indiana company Pete founded and managed – on June 21, 2005. On that day I received a letter from an intermediary detailing relevant data about the company, a recreational vehicle (“RV”) manufacturer. The writer said that Pete, the 100% owner of Forest River, specifically wanted to sell to Berkshire. He also told me the price that Pete expected to receive. I liked this no-nonsense approach. I did some checking with RV dealers, liked what I learned and arranged a June 28th meeting in Omaha. Pete brought along his wife, Sharon, and daughter, Lisa.
他也深知，一旦开始愚弄股东，用不了多久便会被自己的鬼话所迷，自欺欺人，酿成大祸。
皮特·利格尔——当世仅此一人
容我稍作停顿，讲述皮特·利格尔这段精彩绝伦的故事。对大多数伯克希尔·哈撒韦（Berkshire Hathaway）股东而言，他几乎名不见经传，却为诸位的总财富增添了数十亿美元。去年 11 月，80 岁的皮特仍坚守一线，随后与世长辞。
我第一次听说 Forest River——这家由皮特在印第安纳州创立并掌舵的公司——是在 2005 年 6 月 21 日。那天，我收到一封中间人寄来的信，详列这家休闲车（RV）制造商的关键信息。写信人说，Forest River 的唯一股东皮特特意指名要把公司卖给伯克希尔，并在信中标明他心中的要价。我对这种痛快利落的方式十分欣赏。于是，我向几位房车经销商做了些调查，结果令我相当满意，遂敲定 6 月 28 日在奥马哈的会面。皮特携妻子莎伦及女儿丽莎同行。
自己才是最容易被骗的！
1.先骗股东（fool shareholders）
2.结果信了自己的胡话（believe your own baloney）
3.还会连自己也骗了（fool yourself as well）
When we met, Pete assured me that he wanted to keep running the business but would feel more comfortable if he could assure financial security for his family. Pete next mentioned that he owned some real estate that was leased to Forest River and had not been covered in the June 21 letter. Within a few minutes, we arrived at a price for those assets as I expressed no need for appraisal by Berkshire but would simply accept his valuation. Then we arrived at the other point that needed clarity. I asked Pete what his compensation should be, adding that whatever he said, I would accept. (This, I should add, is not an approach I recommend for general use.) Pete paused as his wife, daughter and I leaned forward.
当我们见面时，皮特向我表示，他仍想亲自掌管公司；只要能为家人筑起财务保障，他便能更安心。接着他提到，自己名下有几处租赁给 Forest River（森林河公司）的房产，在 6 月 21 日的来信中并未提及。不到几分钟，我们便为这些资产敲定了价格——我当即表态，伯克希尔无需评估，直接采纳他的估值即可。随后，还有一件事需要厘清。我问皮特，他觉得自己的薪酬应该是多少，并补充道：无论他说多少，我都会照单全收。（得声明一下，这可不是普遍适用的谈判方法。）皮特沉吟片刻，他的妻子、女儿和我都情不自禁地前倾身子，屏息等待他的回答。
Then he surprised us: “Well, I looked at Berkshire’s proxy statement and I wouldn’t want to make more than my boss, so pay me $100,000 per year.” After I picked myself off the floor, Pete added: “But we will earn X (he named a number) this year, and I would like an annual bonus of 10% of any earnings above what the company is now delivering.” I replied: “OK Pete, but if Forest River makes any significant acquisitions we will make an appropriate adjustment for the additional capital thus employed.” I didn’t define “appropriate” or “significant,” but those vague terms never caused a problem. 2 The four of us then went to dinner at Omaha’s Happy Hollow Club and lived happily ever after. During the next 19 years, Pete shot the lights out. No competitor came close to his performance.
Every company doesn’t have an easy-to-understand business and there are very few owners or managers like Pete.
接着，他语出惊人：“我看了伯克希尔的股东代理文件，知道老板的年薪是 10 万美元。我可不想比您拿得多，就给我同样的 10 万吧。”等我从惊讶中回过神来，Pete 又补充道：“不过今年我们会赚到 X（他报了个数字），对超出现有水平的那部分利润，我想提成 10% 作为年度奖金。”我答道：“好，Pete。但如果 Forest River 进行重大收购，动用额外资本，我们将对奖金做出合适的调整。”我并未界定“合适”或“重大”究竟为何，但这些含糊的措辞从未带来任何麻烦。2
随后，我们四人来到奥马哈的 Happy Hollow Club 共进晚餐，从此皆大欢喜。在之后的 19 年里，Pete 的业绩可谓光芒四射，竞争者无人能及。
世上并非每家公司的业务都浅显易懂，而像 Pete 这样卓绝的所有者或经理人，更是凤毛麟角。
And, of course, I expect to make my share of mistakes about the businesses Berkshire buys and sometimes err in evaluating the sort of person with whom I’m dealing. But I’ve also had many pleasant surprises in both the potential of the business as well as the ability and fidelity of the manager. And our experience is that a single winning decision can make a breathtaking difference over time. (Think GEICO as a business decision, Ajit Jain as a managerial decision and my luck in finding Charlie Munger as a one-of-a-kind partner, personal advisor and steadfast friend.) Mistakes fade away; winners can forever blossom. * * * * * * * * * * * * One further point in our CEO selections: I never look at where a candidate has gone to school. Never! Of course, there are great managers who attended the most famous schools. But there are plenty such as Pete who may have benefitted by attending a less prestigious institution or even by not bothering to finish school.
当然，我也预料到自己在为伯克希尔收购企业时难免犯错，有时甚至会误判合作对象的人品。然而，我同样收获过不少惊喜——既有企业潜力的超乎想象，也有管理者能力与忠诚的意外惊艳。我们的经验表明，一次正确的决策，任凭岁月流转，都足以带来惊心动魄的变化。（想想 GEICO 的收购是一次商业妙手，Ajit Jain 的加盟是一项管理英明，而我有幸结识查理·芒格，更是觅得一位无可替代的合伙人、私人顾问与挚友。）错误终会黯然褪色，赢家却可长久绽放。
巴菲特心中的 “single winning decision → breathtaking result” 案例：
- GEICO 的收购
- Ajit Jain 的加盟
- 查理·芒格，这是巴菲特人生和投资哲学的重大转折点，对投资理念和业务判断影响巨大。而且改变了伯克希尔几乎所有后续的重大战略方向。
巴菲特与芒格的关系跨越 60 多年，经历过：
- 股市的多轮牛熊
- 商业决策上的分歧和碰撞
- 伯克希尔从小规模到超级集团的蜕变
- 巨大的财富与外界关注带来的种种诱惑和压力
- 和芒格在健康、年纪上的挑战
再谈遴选首席执行官：我从不在意候选人毕业于哪所学校——绝不！固然，也有出色的管理者来自名校；但同样不乏像 Pete 那样的人才，或因就读于不甚显赫的院校，甚至因未完成学业，反而走出别样天地。
Look at my friend, Bill Gates, who decided that it was far more important to get underway in an exploding industry that would change the world than it was to stick around for a parchment that he could hang on the wall. (Read his new book, Source Code.) Not long ago, I met – by phone – Jessica Toonkel, whose step-grandfather, Ben Rosner, long ago ran a business for Charlie and me. Ben was a retailing genius and, in preparing for this report, I checked with Jessica to confirm Ben’s schooling, which I remembered as limited. Jessica’s reply: “Ben never went past 6th grade.” I was lucky enough to get an education at three fine universities. And I avidly believe in lifelong learning. I’ve observed, however, that a very large portion of business talent is innate with nature swamping nurture. Pete Liegl was a natural. 3 Last Year’s Performance In 2024, Berkshire did better than I expected though 53% of our 189 operating businesses reported a decline in earnings.
看看我的朋友比尔·盖茨（Bill Gates）：与其为了墙上一纸文凭按部就班，他更愿意在一场注定改写世界的产业爆发前率先起步。（顺便推荐他的新书《Source Code》。）
前些日子，我通过电话结识了杰西卡·图恩克尔（Jessica Toonkel）。她的继外祖父本·罗斯纳（Ben Rosner）多年前曾替我和查理经营企业。Ben 是零售业的天才。撰写本报告时，我特地向 Jessica 再次求证他受教育的情况——我记得似乎不高。Jessica 回信道：“Ben 只念到六年级。”
我有幸在三所出色的大学深造，并始终笃信终身学习。然而我也观察到：商业天赋往往源自天性，先天禀赋常常压倒后天培养。皮特·利格尔（Pete Liegl）便是天生的高手。
2024 年业绩回顾
2024 年，尽管我们 189 家运营企业中有 53% 的盈利下滑，伯克希尔·哈撒韦（Berkshire Hathaway）的整体表现仍超出我的预期。
巴菲特和芒格认为：
- 他们都认识到，真心信奉终身学习（nurture能持续提升绩效、避免大错）。
- 当然也观察到，商业才干很大一部分是天生气质与直觉（nature）决定，关键时刻“气质碾压训练”。
在他们认为的终身学习的“可训练部分”（nurture）的案例： 1.See’s Candies代表着他们投资的转折：“以合理价买伟大公司”。后来用这一框架做可口可乐、喜诗、富国银行等。这是认知升级带来的永久性红利。 2.气质与天赋的“难教部分”（nature）：很多人学会了“贪婪恐惧”的口号，却扛不住价格与舆论的折磨。当然别忘了还有自己的恐惧。
所以，先识别自身的“天性边界”，把可以学习的部分做到极致，然后用学到的规律和技巧（人都是可以训练的）形成习惯，弥补天赋差距。
终身学习让你更容易赢，天赋的才能让你“常赢”。然而最重要的还是要认清自身的边界，再用一系列规则形成习惯，把二者拼起来，才是普通人能复制的“巴菲特/芒格方法”。
We were aided by a predictable large gain in investment income as Treasury Bill yields improved and we substantially increased our holdings of these highly-liquid short-term securities. Our insurance business also delivered a major increase in earnings, led by the performance of GEICO. In five years, Todd Combs has reshaped GEICO in a major way, increasing efficiency and bringing underwriting practices up to date. GEICO was a long-held gem that needed major repolishing, and Todd has worked tirelessly in getting the job done. Though not yet complete, the 2024 improvement was spectacular. In general, property-casualty (“P/C”) insurance pricing strengthened during 2024, reflecting a major increase in damage from convective storms. Climate change may have been announcing its arrival. However, no “monster” event occurred during 2024. Someday, any day, a truly staggering insurance loss will occur – and there is no guarantee that there will be only one per annum.
随着国库券收益率上扬，我们大举增持流动性极佳的短期国债，投资收益如预期般显著攀升，为公司业绩添上浓墨重彩的一笔。保险业务同样交出亮眼成绩单，其中 GEICO 的贡献尤为突出。过去五年，Todd Combs 对 GEICO 进行了脱胎换骨的革新：运营效率显著提升，承保流程与时俱进。这块我们长期珍藏的“宝石”亟待再度打磨，Todd 为此殚精竭虑。改革虽未完全收官，但 2024 年的跃进已足以令人惊叹。
整体而言，2024 年财产意外保险（P/C）费率普遍走高，源于对流性风暴带来损失的急剧增加——气候变化似乎正以此宣示存在。幸运的是，2024 年并未出现导致“怪兽”级损失的灾难。但终有一日，亦可能在任何一天，保险业将遭遇令人咋舌的巨额赔付，而且无法保证一年只来一次。
The P/C business is so central to Berkshire that it warrants a further discussion that appears later in this letter. Berkshire’s railroad and utility operations, our two largest businesses outside of insurance, improved their aggregate earnings. Both, however, have much left to accomplish. Late in the year we increased our ownership of the utility operation from about 92% to 100% at a cost of roughly $3.9 billion, of which $2.9 billion was paid in cash with a balance in Berkshire “B” shares. * * * * * * * * * * * * All told, we recorded operating earnings of $47.4 billion in 2024. We regularly – endlessly, some readers may groan – emphasize this measure rather than the GAAP-mandated earnings that are reported on page K-68. Our measure excludes capital gains or losses on the stocks and bonds we own, whether realized or unrealized. Over time, we think it highly likely that gains will prevail – why else would we buy these securities? – though the year-by-year numbers will swing wildly and unpredictably.
财产及意外保险（P/C）业务对伯克希尔·哈撒韦举足轻重，因此我将在信件后文另作详述。伯克希尔的铁路与公用事业是除保险外规模最大的两大板块，2024 年合计盈利有所增长，但仍大有可为。临近年末，我们将对公用事业公司的持股由约 92% 提高至 100%，为此投入约 39 亿美元，其中 29 亿美元以现金支付，其余以伯克希尔 B 类股票交割。
2024 年，我们合计实现营业利润 474 亿美元。我们一向——有些读者或许已听得耳熟——强调这一指标，而非美国公认会计准则（GAAP）在 K-68 页所要求披露的净利润。营业利润口径剔除了我们所持股票与债券在资本层面的损益，无论这些变动已否实现。长远看来，我们深信收益终将占优——否则，我们又何必买入这些证券？——但年度数字势必大幅起伏，难以逆料。
Our horizon for such commitments is almost always far longer than a single year. In many, our thinking involves decades. These long-termers are the purchases that sometimes make the cash register ring like church bells. 4 Here’s a breakdown of the 2023-24 earnings as we see them. All calculations are after depreciation, amortization and income tax. EBITDA, a flawed favorite of Wall Street, is not for us. (in $ millions)
2024 2023 Insurance-underwriting . . . . $ 9,020 $ 5,428
Insurance-investment income … 13,670 9,567
BNSF … 5,031 5,087
Berkshire Hathaway Energy … 3,730 2,331
Other controlled businesses … 13,072 13,362
Non-controlled businesses* … 1,519 1,750
Other** … 1,395 (175)
Operating earnings … 47,437 37,350
我们对这类投资的持有期限，几乎从不以一年为计；在许多情况下，我们的规划跨越数十载。正是这些“长期选手”，有时会令公司的“收银机”奏响宛如教堂钟声般的悦耳回响。
以下是我们对 2023—2024 年营业利润的分项说明，所有数字均已扣除折旧、摊销及所得税。华尔街偏爱的 EBITDA（息税折旧摊销前利润）并非我们的衡量口径——这一指标缺陷明显，与我们无缘。 （单位：百万美元）
2024 2023
保险承保业务…………… $9,020 $5,428
保险投资收益…………… 13,670 9,567
BNSF 铁路………………… 5,031 5,087
伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源…… 3,730 2,331
其他控股企业…………… 13,072 13,362
非控股企业*……………… 1,519 1,750
其他**…………………… 1,395 (175)
营业利润……………… $47,437 $37,350
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Includes certain businesses in which Berkshire had between a 20% and 50% ownership such as Kraft Heinz, Occidental Petroleum and Berkadia. ** Includes foreign currency exchange gains of approximately $1.1 billion in 2024 and approximately $211 million in 2023 produced by our usage of non-U.S. dollar-denominated debt. Surprise, Surprise! An Important American Record is Smashed Sixty years ago, present management took control of Berkshire. That move was a mistake – my mistake – and one that plagued us for two decades. Charlie, I should emphasize, spotted my obvious error immediately: Though the price I paid for Berkshire looked cheap, its business – a large northern textile operation – was headed for extinction. The U.S. Treasury, of all places, had already received silent warnings of Berkshire’s destiny. In 1965, the company did not pay a dime of income tax, an embarrassment that had generally prevailed at the company for a decade.
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包括伯克希尔持股 20%–50% 的若干企业，如卡夫亨氏（Kraft Heinz）、西方石油（Occidental Petroleum）和 Berkadia。
** 因使用非美元计价债务而产生的外汇收益：2024 年约 11 亿美元，2023 年约 2.11 亿美元。
意外惊喜！一项重要的美国纪录被改写
六十年前，现任管理层接掌伯克希尔。那桩收购本身就是一个错误——我的错误——并让我们背负了长达二十年的包袱。我必须强调，查理当时就一眼识破了我的明显失算：尽管我买入伯克希尔的价格看似低廉，但其核心业务——一家位于北方的大型纺织厂——事实上已行将就木。
更具讽刺意味的是，美国财政部早已收到伯克希尔命运的无声警示。1965 年，公司没有缴纳一分钱所得税，而这种令人尴尬的状况大体上已持续了十年。
巴菲特也会出错，人都会出错。关键在于是否能及时发现并纠正。
That sort of economic behavior may be understandable for glamorous startups, but it’s a blinking yellow light when it happens at a venerable pillar of American industry. Berkshire was headed for the ash can. Fast forward 60 years and imagine the surprise at the Treasury when that same company – still operating under the name of Berkshire Hathaway – paid far more in corporate income tax than the U.S. government had ever received from any company – even the American tech titans that commanded market values in the trillions. To be precise, Berkshire last year made four payments to the IRS that totaled $26.8 billion. That’s about 5% of what all of corporate America paid. (In addition, we paid sizable amounts for income taxes to foreign governments and to 44 states.) 5 Note one crucial factor allowing this record-shattering payment: Berkshire shareholders during the same 1965-2024 period received only one cash dividend. On January 3, 1967, we disbursed our sole payment – $101,755 or 10¢ per A share.
这种经济行径若发生在光彩夺目的初创企业，人们或许可释然；可若出现在美国工业的老牌支柱身上，便如警示黄灯闪烁，预示险情。那时的伯克希尔几乎要被扫进废纸篓。
时光倏忽六十载，试想财政部的惊愕——同一家公司，仍以“伯克希尔·哈撒韦（Berkshire Hathaway）”之名经营，去年向美国国税局（IRS）缴纳的公司所得税之巨，竟创下美国历史上任何企业所缴税款之最，连市值动辄数万亿美元的科技巨擘亦望尘莫及。确切数字是：伯克希尔去年分四次向国税局缴税，总额 268 亿美元，约占全美企业所得税总额的 5%。（此外，我们还向外国政府及 44 个州缴纳了可观的所得税。）5 请注意，支撑这一破纪录缴税额的关键在于：1965 至 2024 年间，伯克希尔股东仅收到过一次现金股息——1967 年 1 月 3 日，我们派发了唯一的股息，总计 101,755 美元，即每股 A 类股 0.10 美元。
(I can’t remember why I suggested this action to Berkshire’s board of directors. Now it seems like a bad dream.) For sixty years, Berkshire shareholders endorsed continuous reinvestment and that enabled the company to build its taxable income. Cash income-tax payments to the U.S. Treasury, miniscule in the first decade, now aggregate more than $101 billion . . . and counting.
Huge numbers can be hard to visualize. Let me recast the $26.8 billion that we paid last year. If Berkshire had sent the Treasury a $1 million check every 20 minutes throughout all of 2024 – visualize 366 days and nights because 2024 was a leap year – we still would have owed the federal government a significant sum at yearend. Indeed, it would be well into January before the Treasury would tell us that we could take a short breather, get some sleep, and prepare for our 2025 tax payments. Where Your Money Is Berkshire’s equity activity is ambidextrous.
（我已经记不起当初为何向伯克希尔董事会提出那项建议了，如今回想，恍如一场噩梦。）六十年来，伯克希尔的股东始终支持我们将盈余持续投入再投资，由此不断积累应税收益。最初十年，我们向美国财政部缴纳的现金所得税微乎其微；如今，累计金额已突破 1,010 亿美元……且仍在不断攀升。
面对天文数字，直观感受往往失灵。不妨这样来体会去年的 268 亿美元：设想伯克希尔在 2024 年全年——请记住，那是闰年，共计 366 个昼夜——每隔 20 分钟就向财政部寄出一张 100 万美元的支票，到了年终，我们仍会欠联邦政府一大笔税款。事实上，要到翌年一月中旬，财政部才会通知我们暂可歇口气，眯一会儿，再着手准备 2025 年的税款。
您的资金所在伯克希尔的股权运作可谓左右开弓、双手齐发。
这句话太重要了：“For sixty years, Berkshire shareholders endorsed continuous reinvestment and that enabled the company to build its taxable income.”
1.巴菲特经常强调 不派息 / 少派息 + 保留盈余 用于再投资，而不是把利润分配给股东。
2.不断把盈利再投入到新的业务、扩张、并购等。
企业盈利不是终点，而是燃料。盈利如果直接分红给股东，股东再去找其他投资机会，可能无法获得同样高的回报率。
如果企业本身有高质量的再投资机会，每留下一元在企业里，能带来超过一元的市场价值增长，那就应该把钱继续花在公司内部。连续的再投资，使得利润基数不断扩大。长期下来，这种雪球对应的“公司应税收入”水涨船高，企业价值也越来越大。
不在短期分红上计较，才能把未来利润最大化优先。需要知道伯克希尔 60 年来都靠股东的耐心，持续用“几乎免费的自有资金”做高回报再投资，这不仅在账面上滚大了应税利润，也从成本角度上实现了资金利用的极致高效——资金既不稀释股东，也不付高息，回报又高于替代投资。