导读:
两手策略：伯克希尔一边控股189家、一边持有了不少苹果/可口可乐等股票，年末投资股权市值2720亿美元，约占总市值三成左右。
资产偏好：现金是选择权而非终点，长期多数资金配置在优质企业股权，以企业提价权和成长性对抗通胀。
纪律与约束：几乎不卖控股公司；少数股权错了能更快纠偏，但伯克希尔体量庞大已削弱灵活性；保险“浮存金”与再投资驱动长期复利。
Part 2：
In one hand we own control of many businesses, holding at least 80% of the investee’s shares. Generally, we own 100%. These 189 subsidiaries have similarities to marketable common stocks but are far from identical. The collection is worth many hundreds of billions and includes a few rare gems, many good-but-far-from-fabulous businesses and some laggards that have been disappointments. We own nothing that is a major drag, but we have a number that I should not have purchased. In the other hand, we own a small percentage of a dozen or so very large and highly profitable businesses with household names such as Apple, American Express, Coca-Cola and Moody’s. Many of these companies earn very high returns on the net tangible equity required for their operations. At yearend, our partial-ownership holdings were valued at $272 billion.
一方面，我们对众多企业实现控股，持股比例至少 80%，通常高达 100%。这 189 家子公司在某些层面与可交易的普通股相似，却又迥然不同。它们合计价值数千亿美元：有凤毛麟角的瑰宝，也有表现尚可却称不上卓越者，更有少数后进生令人失望。我们并无任何严重拖累整体业绩的资产，却也确实买过几家本不该买的公司。
另一方面，我们还持有十余家规模庞大、盈利丰厚、家喻户晓的企业的小部分股权，例如 Apple（苹果）、American Express（美国运通）、Coca-Cola（可口可乐）和 Moody’s（穆迪）。这些企业大多能在所需的有形净资产上取得极高回报。截至年末，这部分少数股权的市值为 2,720 亿美元。
注释：
以伯克希尔2024年报口径，这部分投资约占伯克希尔总市值的27%–32%。用中位数9000亿美元计，约30%。
Understandably, really outstanding businesses are very seldom offered in their entirety, but small fractions of these gems can be purchased Monday through Friday on Wall Street and, very occasionally, they sell at bargain prices. We are impartial in our choice of equity vehicles, investing in either variety based upon where we can best deploy your (and my family’s) savings. Often, nothing looks compelling; very infrequently we find ourselves knee-deep in opportunities. Greg has vividly shown his ability to act at such times as did Charlie. 6 With marketable equities, it is easier to change course when I make a mistake. Berkshire’s present size, it should be underscored, diminishes this valuable option. We can’t come and go on a dime. Sometimes a year or more is required to establish or divest an investment. Additionally, with ownership of minority positions we can’t change management if that action is needed or control what is done with capital flows if we are unhappy with the decisions being made.
情理之中，真正卓越的企业几乎从不整体出让。不过，它们的少量股权却可在华尔街的周一至周五随时买到，且偶尔还会低价出售。我们选择股权投资工具向来不拘一格，只看哪里最能善用你们—以及我家族—的资金。多数时候，没有任何机会足够吸引我们；极为罕见地，我们也会遇到投资良机接踵而来、机会多得应接不暇的局面。正如查理当年所示，格雷格已经鲜明地向大家证明，他在这种关键时刻也能迅速出手、作出正确决策。对于可流通股票，一旦我看错方向，转身相对容易。但必须强调，伯克希尔如今的庞大规模削弱了这种难能可贵的灵活性，我们已无法随进随出。建仓或撤资，有时得耗上一年甚至更久。此外，当我们仅持有少数股权时，若需更换管理层，我们无权插手；若对资本流向不满，也难以左右其决策。
注释：
这句话是否和巴菲特自己的投资理念冲突： ‘Understandably, really outstanding businesses are very seldom offered in their entirety’ 关键需要把“买整家公司”和“管理可流通持仓”分开看。 1.巴菲特的投资包含两部分：
买得起、愿出售的“整家公司”（See’s、BNSF、GEICO、BHE等）；
在公开市场买“部分股权”（marketable equities），当作长期的“部分所有权”。
为什么还能减持苹果，这是否定其优秀吗？ 觉得这是仓位管理。
1）苹果一度占伯克希尔股票投资组合的近半壁江山，单一公司权重过高，不利于总体风险控制与流动性管理，而且还没有任何管理权。
2）持股比例受5%、10%等监管门槛影响；尤其是苹果持续回购会自然提高伯克希尔的持股占比。
3）即便卖出一部分，如果苹果的回购力度更大，伯克希尔的“持股占比”未必下降太多。
4）核心不是看空苹果，而是总体资本配置。
With controlled companies, we can dictate these decisions, but we have far less flexibility in the disposition of mistakes. In reality, Berkshire almost never sells controlled businesses unless we face what we believe to be unending problems. An offset is that some business owners seek out Berkshire because of our steadfast behavior. Occasionally, that can be a decided plus for us. * * * * * * * * * * * * Despite what some commentators currently view as an extraordinary cash position at Berkshire, the great majority of your money remains in equities. That preference won’t change. While our ownership in marketable equities moved downward last year from 272 billion, the value of our non-quoted controlled equities increased somewhat and remains far greater than the value of the marketable portfolio.
对于我们控股的公司，我们可以一手拍板各项决策，但一旦出了差错，可腾挪的空间就小得多。事实上，伯克希尔几乎从不出售控股企业，除非我们断定其将长期陷入难以根治的麻烦。也正因为这种坚定不移的作风，一些企业主主动寻求成为伯克希尔的一员；偶尔，这会为我们带来显著的裨益。
尽管有评论认为伯克希尔目前持有的现金规模空前庞大，但你们的资金依旧绝大多数投在股票上，这一取向未来也不会改变。去年，我们持有的可流通股票市值从 3,540 亿美元降至 2,720 亿美元，而未上市控股股权的价值则略有上升，且仍远高于上市股票组合的市值。
注释：
在财报中巴菲特说‘Berkshire almost never sells controlled businesses unless we face what we believe to be unending problems.’
确实如此，60 年的企业，快速查了下只有两笔出售，当然，伯克希尔体量庞大，各子集团偶有小型资产剥离/业务线出售：
1.2019年：Applied Underwriters（工伤险/雇主成本控制平台）卖回给创始人团队与外部资本。
2.2020年：BH Media Group与The Buffalo News（报业）整体出售给Lee Enterprises（同时伯克希尔向Lee提供长期贷款；多数报社不动产保留在伯克希尔并回租给Lee）。
3.更常见的是“遇到无解问题就关停/收缩”，而非出售（如：1985年纺织业务关闭；Dexter Shoe被并入后逐步关停美国制鞋产能等）。
巴菲特的原则是：能修就修、能熬就熬；实在是结构性下行或不再匹配伯克希尔原则/监管要求时，才会出售或退出。当然，伯克希尔体量庞大，各子集团可能还是有小型资产剥离/业务线出售。
Berkshire shareholders can rest assured that we will forever deploy a substantial majority of their money in equities – mostly American equities although many of these will have international operations of significance. Berkshire will never prefer ownership of cash-equivalent assets over the ownership of good businesses, whether controlled or only partially owned. Paper money can see its value evaporate if fiscal folly prevails. In some countries, this reckless practice has become habitual, and, in our country’s short history, the U.S. has come close to the edge. Fixed-coupon bonds provide no protection against runaway currency. Businesses, as well as individuals with desired talents, however, will usually find a way to cope with monetary instability as long as their goods or services are desired by the country’s citizenry. So, too, with personal skills.
伯克希尔的股东大可放心，我们将始终把绝大部分资金长期投向股票——以美国公司为主，尽管其中不少企业的业务版图横跨全球。与其持有现金等价物，我们永远偏爱拥有优质企业，无论是控股还是参股。倘若财政失度，纸币价值顷刻蒸发；在一些国家，这种轻率已是家常便饭，而在美国短短的历史长河中，也曾几度逼近危崖。固定票息债券在币值狂跌面前毫无庇护。反过来，只要企业的产品或服务仍为民众所需，或者个人具备社会渴求的技能，大都能在货币动荡中自辟生机；个人才能亦当如此。
注释：
巴菲特的三层逻辑：
1.长期资产配置要偏向“生产性资产”（优质企业的股权），而不是现金；
2.在货币与财政失序的世界里，优秀的企业（能提价、有大市场）才是真正的通胀对冲；
3.具来说，以美国企业且有全球业务为主。
这和芒格的投资理念不谋而合：
1.少而精的决策、质量和价格的双重纪律、对通胀与利率的“第一性原理”。
2.别把股票当筹码，而要当“可长期复利的企业”。什么是长期复利？需要细细品味。
3.持有很多现金，是为了随时出击与防止极端风险，而不是喜欢现金的回报。
4.通胀是长期投资者的最大敌人。
5.最好的投资是投资自己；形成“不可替代的能力圈”和名誉。
6.好公司也要好价格（或至少不荒谬的价格）；宁可等待，也不“为持仓而持仓”。
总得看来就是：
1.投资动作要少、重做复盘，错过焦虑比买贵焦虑好。
2.机会来了重拳出击，平时“坐得住”。
3.不加杠杆、不做复杂金融工程；保留现金选择权。
Lacking such assets as athletic excellence, a wonderful voice, medical or legal skills or, for that matter, any special talents, I have had to rely on equities throughout my life. In effect, I have depended on the success of American businesses and I will continue to do so. One way or another, the sensible – better yet imaginative – deployment of savings by citizens is required to propel an ever-growing societal output of desired goods and services. This system is called capitalism. It has its faults and abuses – in certain respects more egregious now than ever – but it also can work wonders unmatched by other economic systems. America is Exhibit A. Our country’s progress over its mere 235 years of existence could not have been imagined by even the most optimistic colonists in 1789, when the Constitution was adopted and the country’s energies were unleashed. 7 True, our country in its infancy sometimes borrowed abroad to supplement our own savings.
由于我既不擅长运动，也不具备天籁般的歌喉；既无行医或从事法律工作的本领，更缺乏其他任何特殊天赋，这一生只能将希望寄托于股票投资。归根结底，我一直依赖美国企业的繁荣，未来亦将如此。 要让社会持续产出人们所需的商品与服务，公民就必须把储蓄以审慎——若能兼具想象力更佳——的方式加以运用。这套机制被称作资本主义。它固然有缺陷，也会被滥用——某些方面如今甚至尤为显著——但其创造奇迹的能力，迄今没有任何其他经济体制可比肩。美国正是最佳例证。短短 235 年间，我们国家取得的成就，远非 1789 年制宪时最乐观的殖民者所能想象；那一年，宪法点燃了这片新大陆的活力。
当然，美国在蹒跚学步之初，也不时向海外借贷，以补本国储蓄之不足。
注释：
好不容易存下的钱，至少要明智地投资，最好还能在投资策略上有创造性和长远眼光。
1.老巴很谦虚，一边说我没啥才能只能靠股票
2.间接过渡到说只能依靠个人投资
3.然后转到说投资者所依靠的是自己的明智、持续的增长、寻找伟大的企业
But, concurrently, we needed many Americans to consistently save and then needed those savers or other Americans to wisely deploy the capital thus made available. If America had consumed all that it produced, the country would have been spinning its wheels. The American process has not always been pretty – our country has forever had many scoundrels and promoters who seek to take advantage of those who mistakenly trust them with their savings. But even with such malfeasance – which remains in full force today – and also much deployment of capital that eventually floundered because of brutal competition or disruptive innovation, the savings of Americans has delivered a quantity and quality of output beyond the dreams of any colonist. From a base of only four million people – and despite a brutal internal war early on, pitting one American against another – America changed the world in the blink of a celestial eye.
与此同时，我们需要无数美国人持之以恒地储蓄，也需要这些储蓄者，或其他同胞，能够明智地调配由此汇聚的资本。倘若美国把所生产的一切全数消费，国家的发展便只能原地打转。美国的崛起历程并非总是赏心悦目——自建国以来，骗子与推销者层出不穷，专门利用那些轻信他们并托付积蓄的人。尽管如此，纵有此类不法行径——至今仍未绝迹——再加上不少资本因惨烈竞争或颠覆式创新而最终沉没，美国人的储蓄依旧催生了数量与质量皆超越任何殖民时代梦想的成果。以区区四百万人口为基石——且早年还经历了一场同室操戈的残酷内战——美国却在历史长河中弹指一瞬，便改变了世界。
In a very minor way, Berkshire shareholders have participated in the American miracle by foregoing dividends, thereby electing to reinvest rather than consume. Originally, this reinvestment was tiny, almost meaningless, but over time, it mushroomed, reflecting the mixture of a sustained culture of savings, combined with the magic of long-term compounding. Berkshire’s activities now impact all corners of our country. And we are not finished. Companies die for many reasons but, unlike the fate of humans, old age itself is not lethal. Berkshire today is far more youthful than it was in 1965. However, as Charlie and I have always acknowledged, Berkshire would not have achieved its results in any locale except America whereas America would have been every bit the success it has been if Berkshire had never existed. So thank you, Uncle Sam. Someday your nieces and nephews at Berkshire hope to send you even larger payments than we did in 2024. Spend it wisely.
伯克希尔的股东以极其微小的方式参与了“美国奇迹”——他们自愿放弃分红，把原本可以消费的收入继续投入，再投资而非挥霍。最初，这笔再投资微不足道，几乎可以忽略不计；然而随着岁月流转，它犹如雨后春笋般迅速膨胀，映照出持久储蓄文化与长期复利魔力的交相辉映。如今，伯克希尔的事业已遍及美国的每一个角落，而我们的征程远未止步。
企业衰亡的原因林林总总，但与人类不同，岁月本身并不会令企业寿终正寝。如今的伯克希尔，比 1965 年更显青春、活力十足。然而，正如查理与我一直坦承，若非扎根于美国，伯克希尔难以取得今日成就；而即便没有伯克希尔，美国依然会成就同样的辉煌。
因此，谨向“山姆大叔”致谢。伯克希尔的“侄儿侄女”盼望有朝一日向您缴纳比 2024 年更为丰厚的税款——望您善加使用。
注释：
1.不分红≠不回报。只有当内部再投资的边际回报率≥股东在外部可得回报时，才应该留存收益；否则应回购或分配。
2.三大法宝：买伟大的企业、控股整家公司、等机会。 3.“把简单的事做深”：围绕极少数高质量资产重仓+长期持有，胜过频繁换手。
优秀的企业不是熬出来的，是“反熵”做出来的。列好清单不找死，比追热点更重要。还有一个是选好哪些真正的长期复利的地方很重要。
避开会让复利中断的致命风险，以十年为单位思考，以每年为单位复盘。少交易、低费用、延税。
Take care of the many who, for no fault of their own, get the short straws in life. They deserve better. And never forget that we need you to maintain a stable currency and that result requires both wisdom and vigilance on your part. Property-Casualty Insurance P/C insurance continues to be Berkshire’s core business. The industry follows a financial model that is rare – very rare – among giant businesses. Customarily, companies incur costs for labor, materials, inventories, plant and equipment, etc. before – or concurrently with – the sale of their products or services. Consequently, their CEOs have a good fix on knowing the cost of their product before they sell it. If the selling price is less than its cost, managers soon learn they have a problem. Hemorrhaging cash is hard to ignore. 8 When writing P/C insurance, we receive payment upfront and much later learn what our product has cost us – sometimes a moment of truth that is delayed as much as 30 or more years.
要关爱那些并非自身过错却抽到人生“短签”的人，他们理应拥有更好的境遇。同时，请牢记：维系货币稳定倚仗诸位，而这一目标既需睿智，也需警惕。
财产意外保险 财产意外保险（P/C 保险）仍是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的核心业务。该行业所奉行的财务模式，在大型企业中可谓凤毛麟角。通常，企业在出售产品或服务之前，或与出售同步时，就必须先承担劳动力、原材料、库存、厂房与设备等成本，因此，首席执行官们大多能在销售前就对产品成本了然于胸。一旦售价低于成本，管理层很快便会察觉，毕竟现金如血外流，难以坐视。
然而，在承保财产意外保险时，我们先收取保费，真正的成本则要许久之后才能揭晓——有时，“真相大白”的时刻甚至会被推迟三十年乃至更久。
注释：
要长期可持续，必须给那些因运气不佳而受损的人留一张安全的兜底
这既是道德立场（承认运气与初始不平等），也是理性选择（维护市场合法性、提高人力资本回报、稳定企业所依赖的社会土壤）。
Original Title: 伯克希尔股东来信
Author: Warren E. Buffett
Original Source: https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2024ltr.pdf
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