To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing a portion of your savings. We are honored by your trust. Our position carries with it the responsibility to report to you what we would like to know if we were the absentee owner and you were the manager.
致伯克希尔哈撒韦的全体股东：
我的老搭档查理·芒格和我，替大家管理着一部分的储蓄。 感谢你们的信任，我们深感荣幸。
我们会站在一个身在远方、却拥有公司股份的股东立场，把我们自己想知道的事，都如实告诉你。
译注：
巴菲特这是年年提、次次说啊。为什么他每次年报都这么说呢？
- 股东是公司真正的主人。
- 不在现场不参与管理的股东，我希望听到什么？那么现在我作为管理层，也要用同等标准对股东说。
这是你的公司，我们是你的管家。
这也是伯克希尔品牌资产的一部分——信任。
We enjoy communicating directly with you through this annual letter, and through the annual meeting as well. Our policy is to treat all shareholders equally. Therefore, we do not hold discussions with analysts nor large institutions. Whenever possible, also, we release important communications on Saturday mornings in order to maximize the time for shareholders and the media to absorb the news before markets open on Monday.
我们尤其珍视通过这封年度股东信，以及一年一度的股东大会，直接与您交流的机会。我们始终坚持对全体股东一视同仁的原则，因此从不与分析师或大型机构单独沟通。并且，为了让股东和媒体在周一开市前有充足时间消化重要信息，我们尽可能安排在周六上午发布重大公告。
译注：
巴菲特不喜欢和分析师或机构沟通：
- 和某些人（分析师、大机构）交流、提供额外信息，就形成了**“信息不对称”**。
- 伯克希尔的理念是长期经营 & 减少噪音，所以更愿意直接对股东原汁原味说明。
- 巴菲特公开说：“我们不会迎合华尔街的短期预期，我们只关心长期价值的增长。”
伯克希尔这种方法更利于保持信息披露的公平性、和股东建立直接的信任关系，并避免短期化压力。同时，他用发布时机（周六早上发布）和沟通方式，确保所有股东在信息获取上站在同一条起跑线。
A wealth of Berkshire facts and figures are set forth in the annual 10-K that the company regularly files with the S.E.C. and that we reproduce on pages K-1 – K-119.
关于伯克希尔的详细数据与事实，均已载于公司照例向美国证券交易委员会（S.E.C.）提交的年度 10-K 报告之中。本信已将报告原文附于 K-1 至 K-119 页，欢迎查阅。
Some shareholders will find this detail engrossing; others will simply prefer to learn what Charlie and I believe is new or interesting at Berkshire. Alas, there was little action of that sort in 2021. We did, though, make reasonable progress in increasing the intrinsic value of your shares. That task has been my primary duty for 57 years. And it will continue to be.
有些股东会兴致勃勃地钻研这些细节；也有些人更关心查理和我眼中，伯克希尔在过去一年里有什么新的、或者有趣的变化。遗憾的是，2021 年在这方面并没有太多值得一提的事情。 不过，我们在提升您所持股份的内在价值上，依然取得了不错的进展。这项工作，五十七年来一直是我的首要任务，未来也将如此。
译注：
内在价值（Intrinsic Value）不是账面价值（book value）、也不是股价（market price），内在价值是企业未来可以产生的现金流/利润，基于理性假设折现回今天的价值。是一个基于企业真实赚钱能力的长期评估。
所以，对股东来说，公司价值增长的最终来源，不是今年有多少并购、多少股价炒作，而是每股内在价值的持续增长。
57 年的“一以贯之”，终究打造出了伯克希尔这条超级航母。
What You Own
Berkshire owns a wide variety of businesses, some in their entirety, some only in part. The second group largely consists of marketable common stocks of major American companies. Additionally, we own a few non-U.S. equities and participate in several joint ventures or other collaborative activities.
关于你持有的资产
伯克希尔的业务版图十分多样：有些公司我们全资拥有，有些我们只是部分持股。后一类主要是美国大型上市公司的可流通普通股。除此之外，我们还持有少量非美国公司的股票，并参与若干合资企业及其他合作项目。
译注：
伯克希尔的业务版图行业跨度极大：保险、铁路、能源、制造、零售、食品饮料、金融服务、科技、基础设施……
举个全资控股业务的例子，保险与再保险就包括 GEICO（汽车保险）、Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group、Berkshire Hathaway Primary Group。
而且股票投资的公司也极其庞大，像 American Express、Kraft Heinz、Occidental Petroleum 这种公司，已经是“第一大或重要战略股东”，接近或超过 20%。而像 Apple、Chevron、Coca-Cola，这种巨无霸公司市值特别高，所以持股比例虽低于 10%，但市值规模依然巨大。
Whatever our form of ownership, our goal is to have meaningful investments in businesses with both durable economic advantages and a first-class CEO.
不管持有形式如何，我们的目标始终一致——投资于那些既拥有持久经济优势，又由一流 CEO 带领的企业。
译注：
巴菲特一再强调“宁愿买一家傻瓜也能赚钱的生意”，但如果老板是一流的，那就锦上添花。
投资，容易被投资形式框住，而巴菲特建议关键看能否参与长期价值复利。少做一大堆小打小闹的分散投资，而是集中下注。终究我们寻求的不是一年赚快钱，而是要有可持续“护城河”锁住长期回报。
企业是否足够优秀？是否有足够强大的护城河？管理层是否优秀？
如果这些都是，那就是的目标了。在不停去发掘伟大的企业同时，然后静候属于你的大机会，遇到了毫不犹豫地出击！
这就是巴菲特掌舵伯克希尔 57 年的核心
Please note particularly that we own stocks based upon our expectations about their long-term business performance and not because we view them as vehicles for timely market moves.
需要特别强调的是：我们投资股票，是因为看好它们的长期经营表现，而不是为了抓住短期的市场行情机会。
译注：
农民不会每天去挖土看根系长没长，这和不盯每日股价一个逻辑：过度干预反而破坏生长。
That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers. I make many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses includes some enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many others that enjoy good economic characteristics, and a few that are marginal. 这一点至关重要：查理和我，不是“挑股票的人”，而是“挑企业的人”。 我自己也会犯很多错误。因此，在我们庞大的业务组合里，有些公司的经济特质堪称卓越，也有不少表现稳健良好，当然，还夹着极少数差强人意的业务。
译注：
这看似巴菲特在谦虚，但实则是提醒股东们要用“企业主的心态”去选股，你应该关心：这个生意好不好、能不能长久赚钱，而不是它下一周涨还是跌。
买伯克希尔不是为了下周股价，而是为了未来几十年的生意价值。
One advantage of our common-stock segment is that – on occasion – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. That shooting-fish-in-a-barrel experience is very rare in negotiated transactions and never occurs en masse. It is also far easier to exit from a mistake when it has been made in the marketable arena. 普通股投资的一个巨大优势在于——有时，你会碰上那种**“瓮中捉鳖”**的机会：能以极好的价格，买入一家伟大企业的一部分。 这种打靶都懒得瞄准的好事，在谈判收购里几乎从不出现，更不可能一大堆同时砸到你头上。 而且，如果是在流通市场犯了错，想退出也容易得多。
译注：
市场上偶尔会出现“天赐良机”，但这种情况极其稀少，而且根本不可能大规模发生，所以别指望每天有馅饼从天上掉下来。
Surprise, Surprise
Here are a few items about your company that often surprise even seasoned investors:
意想不到的惊喜
下面几条关于伯克希尔的事实，常常连经验丰富的投资者都会感到吃惊：
• Many people perceive Berkshire as a large and somewhat strange collection of financial assets. In truth, Berkshire owns and operates more U.S.-based “infrastructure” assets – classified on our balance sheet as property, plant and equipment – than are owned and operated by any other American corporation. That supremacy has never been our goal. It has, however, become a fact.
很多人以为，伯克希尔只是个庞大而略显奇怪的金融资产拼盘。
但事实上，伯克希尔在美国本土直接拥有并运营的**“基础设施”类资产**——在我们的资产负债表中列作“物业、厂房及设备”——比任何一家美国公司都多。这种“全国第一”的地位从来不是我们的目标，但它的确已经发生了。
At yearend, those domestic infrastructure assets were carried on Berkshire’s balance sheet at 158 billion. That number increased last year and will continue to increase. Berkshire always will be building.
在上一年年底，这些美国本土基础设施资产的账面价值为 1,580 亿美元。这个数字过去一年已经增长，未来还会继续增长。 伯克希尔会一直在建设和发展中。
• Every year, your company makes substantial federal income tax payments. In 2021, for example, we paid 3.3 billion while the U.S. Treasury reported total corporate income-tax receipts of 402 billion. Additionally, Berkshire pays substantial state and foreign taxes. “I gave at the office” is an unassailable assertion when made by Berkshire shareholders.
每一年，伯克希尔都会向联邦政府缴纳可观的企业所得税。以 2021 年为例，我们缴了 33 亿美元——而当年美国财政部收到的全部企业所得税是 4,020 亿美元。 此外，伯克希尔还向各州以及海外政府缴纳了相当可观的税款。 对伯克希尔的股东来说，说一句**“我已经尽到了义务”**，是毋庸置疑的。
译注：
33 亿美元是什么水平？
| 公司 | 所得税（income tax expense） | 备注 |
|---|---|---|
| Berkshire Hathaway | $3.3B（联邦税部分额外州税 & 海外税 | 巴菲特文中只提 3.3B 是美国联邦，公司总所得税高于这个数字 |
| Apple | $14.5B（总所得税支出，全球范围） | 当年苹果营收 3,658 亿，净利 946 亿 |
| Alphabet (Google) | $4.8B（总所得税支出，全球范围） | 营收 2,578 亿，净利 760 亿 |
| Tencent | 约 $2.75B（人民币 176 亿元，按汇率折算） | 营收 RMB 5,607 亿，净利 RMB 1,232 亿 |
Berkshire’s history vividly illustrates the invisible and often unrecognized financial partnership between government and American businesses. 伯克希尔的历史，正生动地诠释着——政府与美国企业之间，这种隐形但常常被忽视的财政伙伴关系。
Our tale begins early in 1955, when Berkshire Fine Spinning and Hathaway Manufacturing agreed to merge their businesses. In their requests for shareholder approval, these venerable New England textile companies expressed high hopes for the combination.
故事要从 1955 年初讲起
那一年，伯克希尔精纺公司与哈撒韦制造公司决定合并业务，强强联手。 在提交给股东征求批准的文件中，这两家老牌的新英格兰纺织企业，对未来满怀憧憬。
The Hathaway solicitation, for example, assured its shareholders that “The combination of the resources and managements will result in one of the strongest and most efficient organizations in the textile industry.”
以哈撒韦的致股东函为例，其中豪言： > “资源与管理层的结合，将缔造出纺织行业最强大、最高效的企业之一。”
That upbeat view was endorsed by the company’s advisor, Lehman Brothers (yes, that Lehman Brothers). I’m sure it was a joyous day in both Fall River (Berkshire) and New Bedford (Hathaway) when the union was consummated. 这样的乐观预期，还得到了财务顾问雷曼兄弟的背书（没错，就是那家后来家喻户晓的雷曼兄弟）。 可以想见，合并那天，在福尔里弗（伯克希尔的所在地）与新贝德福德（哈撒韦的所在地），一定是锣鼓喧天，欢庆不已。
After the bands stopped playing and the bankers went home, however, the shareholders reaped a disaster. In the nine years following the merger, Berkshire’s owners watched the company’s net worth crater from 51.4 million to 22.1 million.
然而，当乐队散场、银行家回家之后，留给股东的，却是一个苦涩的现实： 合并之后短短九年，伯克希尔的净资产就从 5,140 万美元，断崖式跌到 2,210 万美元——缩水逾半。
In part, this decline was caused by stock repurchases, ill-advised dividends and plant shutdowns. But nine years of effort by many thousands of employees delivered an operating loss as well. Berkshire’s struggles were not unusual: The New England textile industry had silently entered an extended and non-reversible death march.
造成亏损的原因有几方面：有些来自股票回购、不合时宜的分红，还有工厂关停。 可就算上千名员工苦干了九年，公司依然没能避免经营亏损的结果。其实，这并不是伯克希尔一家的问题——整个新英格兰的纺织业，早就默默走上了一条又长、又慢，而且不可逆转的衰亡之路。
During the nine post-merger years, the U.S. Treasury suffered as well from Berkshire’s troubles. All told, the company paid the government only 337,359 in income tax during that period – a pathetic 100 per day.
在合并后的九年里，美国财政部也跟着受了罪：伯克希尔一共才交了 337,359 美元的所得税，平均一天大约 100 美元——这个数额，真是拿不出手。
Early in 1965, things changed. Berkshire installed new management that redeployed available cash and steered essentially all earnings into a variety of good businesses, most of which remained good through the years.
到了 1965 年初，情况终于有了转机。 伯克希尔换上了新一届管理层，重新调配手里的现金，并且把几乎所有的盈利，都投进了好几个优质、而且经得住时间检验的业务里。
Coupling reinvestment of earnings with the power of compounding worked its magic, and shareholders prospered. Berkshire’s owners, it should be noted, were not the only beneficiary of that course correction. Their “silent partner,” the U.S.
当利润的再投资遇上复利的力量时，魔法开始显现，股东们的日子也一天天好起来。
不过，这次改弦更张的好处，并不是股东一个人全占了——他们的**“沉默合伙人”**，也就是美国财政部，也分得了一杯羹。
Treasury, proceeded to collect many tens of billions of dollars from the company in income tax payments. Remember the 100 daily? Now, Berkshire pays roughly 9 million daily to the Treasury. 4 In fairness to our governmental partner, our shareholders should acknowledge – indeed trumpet – the fact that Berkshire’s prosperity has been fostered mightily because the company has operated in America. Our country would have done splendidly in the years since 1965 without Berkshire. Absent our American home, however, Berkshire would never have come close to becoming what it is today. When you see the flag, say thanks.
美国财政部后来从伯克希尔这里，收走了数百亿美元的所得税。 还记得当年我们一天才交 100 美元吗？如今，我们平均每天要向财政部上交的税，是900 万美元左右。
说句公道话，作为“政府合伙人”，我们这些股东应该承认——甚至该大声宣扬——伯克希尔的繁荣，很大程度上靠的是扎根在美国这片土地。 诚然，即使没有伯克希尔，自 1965 年以来，美国的日子一样会过得很好；但如果我们不在美国，伯克希尔今天的成就就绝不可能发生。
所以，每当你看到星条旗，请心怀感激。
• From an 8.6 million purchase of National Indemnity in 1967, Berkshire has become the world leader in insurance “float” – money we hold and can invest but that does not belong to us. Including a relatively small sum derived from life insurance, Berkshire’s total float has grown from 19 million when we entered the insurance business to 147 billion. So far, this float has cost us less than nothing.
1967 年，我们花了 860 万美元收购了 National Indemnity（国家赔偿保险公司）。
从那一刻起，伯克希尔一路做到全球保险“浮存金”领域的领头羊。
浮存金，就是那种我们手里暂时持有、可以用来投资，但并不真正属于我们的资金。
把规模相对较小的人寿保险浮存金也算上，我们的总浮存金，从刚开始进入保险业时的 1,900 万美元，一路增长到 1,470 亿美元。
迄今为止，这笔浮存金的成本不仅为零，反而还倒贴地帮我们赚钱。
Though we have experienced a number of years when insurance losses combined with operating expenses exceeded premiums, overall we have earned a modest 55-year profit from the underwriting activities that generated our float. Of equal importance, float is very sticky. Funds attributable to our insurance operations come and go daily, but their aggregate total is immune from precipitous decline. When it comes to investing float, we can therefore think long-term. If you are not already familiar with the concept of float, I refer you to a long explanation on page A-5. To my surprise, our float increased 9 billion last year, a buildup of value that is important to Berkshire owners though is not reflected in our GAAP (“generally-accepted accounting principles”) presentation of earnings and net worth. Much of our huge value creation in insurance is attributable to Berkshire’s good luck in my 1986 hiring of Ajit Jain. 有些年份里，我们的保险赔付加上运营成本，加起来比收上来的保费还多。 但放在 55 年的大背景下，这些产生浮存金的承保业务，总体上还是给我们带来了一笔不错的利润。
更重要的是——浮存金的“黏性”很强。 保险资金每天都有流入和流出，但总体规模却很少会突然减少。 正因为如此，在运用浮存金时，我们可以心无旁骛地着眼长远。
如果你对“浮存金”还不太熟悉，可以翻到 A-5 页，看我写的长篇解释。
让我惊喜的是，去年我们的浮存金居然增加了 90 亿美元。 这笔价值增长，对伯克希尔股东来说意义重大——只是，你在照 GAAP（美国通用会计准则）编的收益和净资产表里，是看不到它的。
在保险领域创造的巨额价值，很大程度上要感谢我在 1986 年做的一件走运的事—— 我聘请了 Ajit Jain（阿吉特·贾恩）。
We first met on a Saturday morning, and I quickly asked Ajit what his insurance experience had been. He replied, “None.” I said, “Nobody’s perfect,” and hired him. That was my lucky day: Ajit actually was as perfect a choice as could have been made. Better yet, he continues to be – 35 years later. One final thought about insurance: I believe that it is likely – but far from assured – that Berkshire’s float can be maintained without our incurring a long-term underwriting loss. I am certain, however, that there will be some years when we experience such losses, perhaps involving very large sums. Berkshire is constructed to handle catastrophic events as no other insurer – and that priority will remain long after Charlie and I are gone. Our Four Giants Through Berkshire, our shareholders own many dozens of businesses. Some of these, in turn, have a collection of subsidiaries of their own. 我们第一次见面是在一个周六的早晨。 我一开口就问 Ajit：“你有保险方面的经验吗？” 他答：“没有。” 我说：“谁是十全十美的呢？” 然后，我就把他招进来了。
事实证明，那天是我的幸运日——Ajit 不仅是当时能找到的最佳人选，而且 35 年后的今天，他依然是。
关于保险，我还有最后一点想说： 我相信，伯克希尔的承保浮存金，很有可能在未来得以延续，而且长期看不用为此承担承保亏损——不过，这不是百分之百的保证。
可以确定的是，总会有一些年份，我们会出现承保亏损，而且金额可能会非常大。
但伯克希尔的架构，就是为应付灾难级事件而打造的——这点别的保险公司很难比得上。 这种风险防御的优先级，即使在查理和我不在的那一天，依然会保持不变。
我们的“四大支柱业务”
通过伯克希尔，股东们间接拥有数十家公司，其中不少公司自己又拥有庞大的子公司“家族”。
For example, Marmon has more than 100 individual business operations, ranging from the leasing of railroad cars to the manufacture of medical devices. • Nevertheless, operations of our “Big Four” companies account for a very large chunk of Berkshire’s value. Leading this list is our cluster of insurers. Berkshire effectively owns 100% of this group, whose massive float value we earlier described. The invested assets of these insurers are further enlarged by the extraordinary amount of capital we invest to back up their promises. 5 The insurance business is made to order for Berkshire. The product will never be obsolete, and sales volume will generally increase along with both economic growth and inflation. Also, integrity and capital will forever be important. Our company can and will behave well. There are, of course, other insurers with excellent business models and prospects. Replication of Berkshire’s operation, however, would be almost impossible.
举个例子，Marmon 旗下就有一百多家独立经营单位，业务范围从铁路车厢租赁，一直到医疗器械制造，应有尽有。 尽管如此，我们的“四大支柱业务”，依然在伯克希尔整体价值中占了极大的比重。 排在第一的，就是我们的保险集团。
伯克希尔几乎 100% 拥有这个集团。 它庞大的承保浮存金规模，前面我已经说过。 除此之外，我们还投入了大量额外资本来兑现保险承诺，这让保险集团的可投资资产更加可观。
保险业务几乎是为伯克希尔量身定做的： 它的产品永不过时，销售规模通常会随着经济增长和通货膨胀一道上升。 而且，在这个行业里，诚信和资本永远是铁律——这两点，我们都具备，并且会一直保持。
当然，市场上也有很多保险公司，拥有出色的模式和前景。 但要把伯克希尔的这一整套玩法照搬过去？ 几乎是不可能的事。
• Apple – our runner-up Giant as measured by its yearend market value – is a different sort of holding. Here, our ownership is a mere 5.55%, up from 5.39% a year earlier. That increase sounds like small potatoes. But consider that each 0.1% of Apple’s 2021 earnings amounted to 100 million. We spent no Berkshire funds to gain our accretion. Apple’s repurchases did the job. It’s important to understand that only dividends from Apple are counted in the GAAP earnings Berkshire reports – and last year, Apple paid us 785 million of those. Yet our “share” of Apple’s earnings amounted to a staggering 5.6 billion. Much of what the company retained was used to repurchase Apple shares, an act we applaud. Tim Cook, Apple’s brilliant CEO, quite properly regards users of Apple products as his first love, but all of his other constituencies benefit from Tim’s managerial touch as well.
苹果——按年末市值计算，是我们“巨头”阵容中的第二名——在我们的投资里，算是一种特别的存在。 我们持有苹果的股份只有 5.55%，比一年前的 5.39%略高一点。 增幅看起来微不足道，但别小看它： 以苹果 2021 年的盈利来说，每增加 0.1 个百分点的股权，就等于多出了 1 亿美元的利润。
更妙的是，这点“增厚”我们一分钱都没掏，全靠苹果自己回购股票帮我们做到。
需要特别说明的是，伯克希尔在 GAAP（美国通用会计准则）口径下，只会把来自苹果的现金分红计入利润——去年这一项是 7.85 亿美元。 但如果按我们的持股比例算，我们“应享”的苹果利润，其实高达 56 亿美元。
苹果留下的那部分盈利，大多又被用来回购自家股票，这让我们非常乐见。
苹果的 CEO 蒂姆·库克（Tim Cook）是一位出色的领导者。 他理所当然地把苹果用户当作“第一爱”， 但在他的管理下，其他所有利益相关方——股东、员工、合作伙伴——同样受益匪浅。
• BNSF, our third Giant, continues to be the number one artery of American commerce, which makes it an indispensable asset for America as well as for Berkshire. If the many essential products BNSF carries were instead hauled by truck, America’s carbon emissions would soar. Your railroad had record earnings of 6 billion in 2021. Here, it should be noted, we are talking about the old-fashioned sort of earnings that we favor: a figure calculated after interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization and all forms of compensation. (Our definition suggests a warning: Deceptive “adjustments” to earnings – to use a polite description – have become both more frequent and more fanciful as stocks have risen. Speaking less politely, I would say that bull markets breed bloviated bull . . ..) BNSF trains traveled 143 million miles last year and carried 535 million tons of cargo. Both accomplishments far exceed those of any other American carrier. You can be proud of your railroad.
BNSF 是我们的第三大支柱，依旧是美国商业的首要动脉。 这让它不仅对伯克希尔至关重要，对美国同样如此。
如果 BNSF 运输的大量关键商品改由卡车来跑，美国的碳排放会立刻飙升。
2021 年，BNSF 实现了创纪录的 60 亿美元利润。 这里我们说的是那种我最喜欢的“老派”利润：扣掉利息、税费、折旧、摊销，以及各种薪酬之后的净数字。
顺便提醒一点：这个定义也自带一个警示——随着股市一路高歌，“财务报表里的巧妙调整”（用委婉的说法）变得越来越常见，而且花样百出。 如果不那么客气，我会说：牛市总会催生吹得天花乱坠的牛市废话……
去年，BNSF 的列车总共跑了 1.43 亿英里，运输货物 5.35 亿吨。 这两项数字，都远远超过美国的任何其他运输商。
你完全可以为这家铁路公司感到自豪。
• BHE, our final Giant, earned a record 4 billion in 2021. That’s up more than 30-fold from the 122 million earned in 2000, the year that Berkshire first purchased a BHE stake. Now, Berkshire owns 91.1% of the company. BHE’s record of societal accomplishment is as remarkable as its financial performance. The company had no wind or solar generation in 2000. It was then regarded simply as a relatively new and minor participant in the huge electric utility industry. Subsequently, under David Sokol’s and Greg Abel’s leadership, BHE has become a utility powerhouse (no groaning, please) and a leading force in wind, solar and transmission throughout much of the United States. Greg’s report on these accomplishments appears on pages A-3 and A-4. The profile you will find there is not in any way one of those currently-fashionable “green-washing” stories. BHE has been faithfully detailing its plans and performance in renewables and transmissions every year since 2007.
伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）是我们的第四位、也是最后一位“巨人”。 2021 年，它的盈利创下历史新高，达到 40 亿美元——而在 2000 年，也就是伯克希尔第一次买入 BHE 股权的那一年，这个数字只有 1.22 亿美元。 这二十多年，增长了30多倍。
如今，伯克希尔持有 BHE 91.1% 的股权。 BHE 在社会层面的贡献，与它出色的财务表现同样令人瞩目。
2000 年，公司还没有任何风电或光伏发电业务，当时不过是庞大电力公用事业行业里，一家比较新、也比较不起眼的小玩家。 后来，在 David Sokol 和 Greg Abel 的带领下，BHE 发展成了公用事业领域的动力巨擘（这个双关，别皱眉），并且在美国的风能、太阳能和输电领域，占据了领军地位。
Greg 对这些成果有一份更详细的报告，你可以在 A-3 到 A-4 页找到。 我要强调的是，你看到的绝不是那种时下流行的“绿色洗白”宣传。 自 2007 年起，BHE 就年复一年、实实在在地披露它在可再生能源与输电方面的规划和业绩。
To further review this information, visit BHE’s website at brkenergy.com. There, you will see that the company has long been making climate-conscious moves that soak up all of its earnings. More opportunities lie ahead. BHE has the management, the experience, the capital and the appetite for the huge power projects that our country needs. 6 Investments Now let’s talk about companies we don’t control, a list that again references Apple. Below we list our fifteen largest equity holdings, several of which are selections of Berkshire’s two long-time investment managers, Todd Combs and Ted Weschler. At yearend, this valued pair had total authority in respect to 34 billion of investments, many of which do not meet the threshold value we use in the table. Also, a significant portion of the dollars that Todd and Ted manage are lodged in various pension plans of Berkshire-owned businesses, with the assets of these plans not included in this table. 想更深入了解这些内容，可以去看看 BHE 的网站：brkenergy.com。 在那里，你会看到，这家公司这些年来始终在做关注气候的布局，并且把赚到的每一分钱，都重新投入到了业务里。
未来，还有更多机会摆在它面前。 BHE 具备了我们国家在推进大型电力项目时所需要的一切：一流的管理团队、丰富的经验、充足的资本，以及干大事的决心。
六、关于投资
接下来，我们聊聊那些我们并不控股的企业——其中，又一次会看到苹果的名字。
下面这张表是我们持有的十五大股票仓位。 其中有几项，是由伯克希尔的两位长期投资经理 Todd Combs 和 Ted Weschler 精心挑选的。
截至年末，这两位值得信赖的伙伴，全权管理着约 340 亿美元 的投资。 他们负责的一些项目，没有达到我们在表格中使用的披露门槛，所以表里看不到。
另外，Todd 和 Ted 管理的资金中，还有一部分放在伯克希尔旗下企业的各类养老金计划里——这些资产也没有算进这张表。