The Family Jewels and How We Increase
家族瑰宝：如何让你在这些宝石中的份额不断增长
Your Share of These Gems On page A-1 we list Berkshire’s subsidiaries, a smorgasbord of businesses employing 360,000 at yearend. You can read much more about these controlled operations in the 10-K that fills the back part of this report. Our major positions in companies that we partly own and don’t control are listed on page 7 of this letter. That portfolio of businesses, too, is large and diverse.
在 A-1 页，我们列出了伯克希尔的子公司——一桌琳琅满目的商业“自助餐”，年末时吸纳了 36 万名员工。这些我们掌控的企业，你可以在本报告后半部分的 10-K 文件中看到更详尽的描述。至于那些我们持有重要股份但并不控股的公司，名单在本信第 7 页；这个投资组合同样庞大而多元。
Most of Berkshire’s value, however, resides in four businesses, three controlled and one in which we have only a 5.4% interest. All four are jewels.
然而，伯克希尔的真正价值大多集中在四块业务上：其中三项由我们控股，另一项则是我们只持有 5.4% 股权的公司。这四块资产，都是名副其实的瑰宝。
译注：
在这里，Family Jewels 的意义远比单纯的Jewels（瑰宝）更深远、更珍贵。更有着传承、核心、非卖品和身份认同的意味，指的是一个家族或组织赖以生存和繁荣的、最根本的、不可替代的资产。
这是个有趣的反转，巴菲特刚说玲琅满目的商业帝国，但转头就说我们最主要的价值集中在四块业务上。为什么只持有 5.4% 股权的公司，却能够与三家他 100% 控股的子公司，并列为同等重要的瑰宝呢？
伯克希尔都说自己只有四家好公司，但很多时候很多嘴上说着自己是价值投资的人们，却却投了很多公司，这是为什么？价值投资在科技时代是否依然还有效？
The largest in value is our property/casualty insurance operation, which for 53 years has been the core of Berkshire. Our family of insurers is unique in the insurance field.
在它们之中，价值最大的，是我们的产险业务——在过去 53 年里，它始终是伯克希尔的核心所在。而我们的保险家族，在整个行业里都是独一份的存在。
So, too, is its manager, Ajit Jain, who joined Berkshire in 1986. Overall, the insurance fleet operates with far more capital than is deployed by any of its competitors worldwide. That financial strength, coupled with the huge flow of cash Berkshire annually receives from its non-insurance businesses, allows our insurance companies to safely follow an equity-heavy investment strategy not feasible for the overwhelming majority of insurers.
自 1986 年加盟伯克希尔以来，Ajit Jain 一直是这支保险“舰队”的掌舵人。整体而言，伯克希尔旗下保险集团所配备的资本规模，远远超过全球任何一家竞争对手。雄厚的资本实力，再加上公司每年从非保险业务源源不断涌入的现金洪流，使我们的保险公司能够稳健地推行以股票为核心的投资策略——这一点，绝大多数同行既难以企及，也难以仿效。
译注：
普通保险公司需要确保任何时候都有足够的现金来应付巨额赔款。这是一个封闭的、脆弱的系统。而且你也很难快速复制出一个伯克希尔铁路或能源这样的优质资产作为安全垫。所以有了这些非保险业务的现金流做后盾，它可以把巨额的浮存金大胆地、长期地投资于股票市场。更重要还有巴菲特尤为珍视的阿吉特，这个全球公认的保险天才。
Those competitors, for both regulatory and credit-rating reasons, must focus on bonds. And bonds are not the place to be these days. Can you believe that the income recently available from a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond – the yield was 0.93% at yearend – had fallen 94% from the 15.8% yield available in September 1981? In certain large and important countries, such as Germany and Japan, investors earn a negative return on trillions of dollars of sovereign debt.
受制于监管约束和信用评级要求，竞争者们不得不将主要精力投向债券。然而，在当下的环境里，债券早已失去了昔日的光彩。试想，截至年末，美国十年期国债的收益率仅有 0.93%，较 1981 年 9 月高达 15.8% 的水平足足下跌了 94%。更令人咋舌的是，在德国、日本这样重要的经济体里，投资者持有着数万亿美元的主权债务，却只能接受负收益的现实。
译注：
负收益率这种现象，并非市场的自然选择，而是各国应对经济困境而采取的一种极端的货币政策。为了让钱动起来，才会出现这种怪现象。
而且这些大型企业（保险与养老基金），安全性和合规性是第一位，收益率是次要的。于是乎扭曲的金融行业把保险从一个盈利中心变成了一个成本中心，而与此对照的伯克希尔是何等的独特与优越。
Fixed-income investors worldwide – whether pension funds, insurance companies or retirees – face a bleak future.
放眼全球，固定收益投资者——无论是养老金、保险公司，还是依靠投资收入生活的退休人群——都不得不面对一个相当阴郁的未来。
Some insurers, as well as other bond investors, may try to juice the pathetic returns now available by shifting their purchases to obligations backed by shaky borrowers. Risky loans, however, are not the answer to inadequate interest rates. Three decades ago, the once-mighty savings and loan industry destroyed itself, partly by ignoring that maxim.
一些保险公司及其他债券买家或许会试图转向由资质欠佳的借款人发行的债务，以期“榨出”那微薄的利息。然而，用高风险贷款弥补利率不足并非良策。三十年前，曾经风光无限的储蓄贷款行业正是因忽视这一箴言而走向覆灭。
Berkshire now enjoys 138 billion of insurance “float” – funds that do not belong to us, but are nevertheless ours to deploy, whether in bonds, stocks or cash equivalents such as U.S. Treasury bills.
目前，伯克希尔坐拥 1,380 亿美元的保险“浮存金”——这笔钱虽不属于我们，却可由我们调度，投向债券、股票，或美国国库券等现金等价物。
译注：
养老金、保险关系到亿万人的生活，尤其是哪些退休人士。这些人们的投资目的是为了获得安全的固定收益，但这些机构却去发行债务无异于饮鸩止渴，用贷款来弥补利率不足。上世纪80-90年代美国发生的储贷危机就是一个典型的例子。
巴菲特也没藏着掖着，转头说出的另外一面的伯克希尔魔法，更是穿越周期的秘密：靠其独特的、由浮存金驱动的商业模式，它可以超然于这个困境之外。这是一个在别人被迫犯错时，但伯克希尔还能坚持做正确事情的强大商业帝国。
Float has some similarities to bank deposits: cash flows in and out daily to insurers, with the total they hold changing very little. The massive sum held by Berkshire is likely to remain near its present level for many years and, on a cumulative basis, has been costless to us. That happy result, of course, could change – but, over time, I like our odds.
保险浮存金与银行存款颇有相似之处：资金每日在我们的保险公司间流进流出，但总量几乎不变。伯克希尔所持有的这笔庞大浮存金，很可能在未来多年维持现有规模，并且迄今为止，使用它的成本几乎为零。当然，这份幸运并非理所当然，未来也可能出现变化——不过从长远来看，我仍愿意押注我们的胜算。
译注：
伯克希尔不参与不合理的保险业务。假设保单的定价不合理，无法覆盖其风险，这样的生意就宁愿不做，市场份额下降。当然伯克希尔能做的保险很多保险公司也做不了，如一些超大额的、复杂的保险业务。再加上阿吉特这样的天才，尤其擅长评估和定价复杂风险，难怪伯克希尔所向披靡。
2000 年到 2024 年伯克希尔的浮存金大约是 1380 亿到 1780 亿，如果都是公开市场借来的话，需要支付的利息大致是 46 亿和 102 亿。这也是为什么每次风浪越大，伯克希尔反而都能拎着巨款去救火。
I have repetitiously – some might say endlessly – explained our insurance operation in my annual letters to you. Therefore, I will this year ask new shareholders who wish to learn more about our insurance business and “float” to read the pertinent section of the 2019 report, reprinted on page A-2. It’s important that you understand the risks, as well as the opportunities, existing in our insurance activities.
多年来，我在年度致股东信中一再——有人甚至说是“无休止”地——解释我们的保险业务。因此，今年我建议新股东若希望更深入认识保险运作以及“浮存金”，请翻阅 2019 年年报的相关章节（已重印在本报告 A-2 页）。充分了解我们保险业务的风险与机遇，对您至关重要。
Our second and third most valuable assets – it’s pretty much a toss-up at this point – are Berkshire’s 100% ownership of BNSF, America’s largest railroad measured by freight volume, and our 5.4% ownership of Apple.
目前，伯克希尔的第二和第三重要的资产——现在几乎可以算平起平坐——分别是我们全资拥有的伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路（BNSF），按货运量计它是美国最大的铁路公司；以及我们持有苹果公司 5.4% 的股份。。
And in the fourth spot is our 91% ownership of Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”). What we have here is a very unusual utility business, whose annual earnings have grown from 122 million to 3.4 billion during our 21 years of ownership. I’ll have more to say about BNSF and BHE later in this letter. For now, however, I would like to focus on a practice Berkshire will periodically use to enhance your interest in both its “Big Four” as well as the many other assets Berkshire owns.
我们的“第四张王牌”，是伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）91% 的股权。这是一家在公用事业领域十分罕见的优质企业——在我们拥有它的 21 年间，年度净收益从 1.22 亿美元增长到 34 亿美元。关于 BNSF 与 BHE 的更多故事，我会在后文细讲。此刻，我想先聚焦于伯克希尔不时会采用的一项做法——这项做法既能提升您在“四大王牌”中的持股份额，也能让您更多地分享我们旗下其他优质资产的价值。
Last year we demonstrated our enthusiasm for Berkshire’s spread of properties by repurchasing the equivalent of 80,998 “A” shares, spending 24.7 billion in the process. That action increased your ownership in all of Berkshire’s businesses by 5.2% without requiring you to so much as touch your wallet.
在过去一年，我们用实际行动表达了对伯克希尔资产版图的信心——斥资 247 亿美元，回购了相当于 80,998 股 A 类股票。这使得您在伯克希尔全部业务中的持股比例提高了 5.2%，而您本人一分钱都无需掏出。
Following criteria Charlie and I have long recommended, we made those purchases because we believed they would both enhance the intrinsic value per share for continuing shareholders and would leave Berkshire with more than ample funds for any opportunities or problems it might encounter.
遵循查理和我多年坚持的标准，我们进行这些回购，是因为坚信它们既能提升在册股东的每股内在价值，也能让伯克希尔在此之后依然保有充裕——甚至绰绰有余——的资金，从容应对未来可能发生的机遇或挑战。
译注：
对公司，对人生来说也是如此：最好的投资是你自己。但如果连巴菲特都找不到价格合理的大型收购目标，是否意味着整个市场的资产价格已经普遍过高？
对于一家股价低于其内在价值的公司，回购是比分红更好的回报股东的方式。2025 年的今天伯克希尔又是手握重金，这又会是大型并购，还是继续回购呢？
不管如何，老人家给出了一个清晰的视角：通过持续、大规模地回购来减少总股本，是提升公司每股内在价值的核心驱动力之一。看懂这也就明白了为什么大公司在疯狂回购股票了。
In no way do we think that Berkshire shares should be repurchased at simply any price. I emphasize that point because American CEOs have an embarrassing record of devoting more company funds to repurchases when prices have risen than when they have tanked. Our approach is exactly the reverse.
我们不会在任何价格都去回购伯克希尔的股票。我之所以特别强调这一点，是因为许多美国公司的 CEO 有着一个颇为尴尬的纪录：股价高企时慷慨回购，股价低迷时反而停手。我们的做法恰恰相反——价格低才是我们增持的好时机。
Berkshire’s investment in Apple vividly illustrates the power of repurchases. We began buying Apple stock late in 2016 and by early July 2018, owned slightly more than one billion Apple shares (split-adjusted). Saying that, I’m referencing the investment held in Berkshire’s general account and am excluding a very small and separately-managed holding of Apple shares that was subsequently sold.
伯克希尔在苹果的投资，是回购力量的一个鲜活例证。我们从 2016 年底开始买入苹果股票，到 2018 年 7 月初，在公司的“总账户”中持有略多于 10 亿股苹果股份（经拆股调整）。这里所指的持仓，不包括后来出售、由独立账户管理的那一小部分股票。
When we finished our purchases in mid-2018, Berkshire’s general account owned 5.2% of Apple. Our cost for that stake was 36 billion. Since then, we have both enjoyed regular dividends, averaging about 775 million annually, and have also – in 2020 – pocketed an additional 11 billion by selling a small portion of our position. Despite that sale – voila! – Berkshire now owns 5.4% of Apple. That increase was costless to us, coming about because Apple has continuously repurchased its shares, thereby substantially shrinking the number it now has outstanding.
在 2018 年年中完成买入后，伯克希尔的“总账户”持有了苹果公司 5.2% 的股份，成本为 360 亿美元。自那时起，我们既享有了每年约 7.75 亿美元的稳定现金分红，也在 2020 年出售了极少量持仓，落袋 110 亿美元。即便进行了那次小规模出售——瞧！——伯克希尔目前的苹果持股比例仍上升到了 5.4%。这份增量对我们来说分文未花，全得益于苹果持续回购股票，从而显著缩减了其在外流通股数。
But that’s far from all of the good news. Because we also repurchased Berkshire shares during the 21⁄2 years, you now indirectly own a full 10% more of Apple’s assets and future earnings than you did in July 2018. This agreeable dynamic continues. Berkshire has repurchased more shares since yearend and is likely to further reduce its share count in the future. Apple has publicly stated an intention to repurchase its shares as well.
而好消息还不止于此。在过去两年半里，我们也同步回购了伯克希尔的股票。结果是，与 2018 年 7 月相比，您间接持有的苹果资产和未来收益已经整整增加了 10%。这一令人愉快的态势依旧在继续：在年终之后，伯克希尔进一步减少了流通股数，未来也很可能持续回购；与此同时，苹果也已公开承诺会继续回购自己的股票。
译注：
很是有趣：伯克希尔卖掉了少量苹果股票，入袋 110亿美元 现金，但其持股比例反而从 5.2% 上升到了 5.4%。
这就是著名的双重回购引擎 The Double Buyback Engine：两家公司都在回购，作为股东啥都不用做，真实资产份额就在增长。传统的复利，是你用利息去再投资。
As these reductions occur, Berkshire shareholders will not only own a greater interest in our insurance group and in BNSF and BHE, but will also find their indirect ownership of Apple increasing as well. The math of repurchases grinds away slowly, but can be powerful over time. The process offers a simple way for investors to own an ever-expanding portion of exceptional businesses.
随着这些回购一步步推进，伯克希尔股东不仅会在我们的保险集团、伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路（BNSF）以及伯克希尔哈撒韦能源（BHE）中拥有更高的持股比例，还会发现——在不知不觉间——自己间接持有的苹果股份也在增加。回购的“算术引擎”看似磨蹭缓慢，但如果让它持续运转足够长的时间，终会释放强大的威力。对于投资者而言，这是一条简单而有效的路径，让你在无需额外动作的情况下，不断扩大在卓越企业中的权益份额。
And as a sultry Mae West assured us: “Too much of a good thing can be . . . wonderful.”
正如那位风情万种的梅·韦斯特曾调侃道：“好东西，多到过头，也未尝不可——反而妙不可言。”
Investments Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend were our largest in market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding — 325,442,152 shares — because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for that investment using the “equity” method.
投资情况 下表列出了截至年末、按市值排序的我们持仓规模最大的十五只普通股。卡夫亨氏（Kraft Heinz）并未列入——我们持有 325,442,152 股——因为伯克希尔与其他股东一起构成控股集团，因此必须按“权益法”进行会计处理。
On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries the Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of 13.3 billion, an amount that represents Berkshire’s share of the audited net worth of Kraft Heinz on December 31, 2020. Please note, though, that the market value of our shares on that date was only 11.3 billion.
在资产负债表上，伯克希尔依照公认会计准则（GAAP），将这笔投资记为 133 亿美元，这一数字反映了截至 2020 年 12 月 31 日，我们所占卡夫亨氏经审计净资产的份额。需要注意的是，当天该持仓的市场价值仅为 113 亿美元。
译注：
会计准则（GAAP）有时不仅不会低估价值，反而会高估价值。因为会计准则的限制（无法计入留存收益），伯克希尔的真实价值被低估了。
然而在在卡夫亨氏这个投资上却高估了 20 亿。这是一个危险信号，反映的是伯克希尔拥有的卡夫亨氏净资产，而不是它在股市上的交易价格。巴菲特很诚实地承认了这个问题。
A Tale of Two Cities
Success stories abound throughout America. Since our country’s birth, individuals with an idea, ambition and often just a pittance of capital have succeeded beyond their dreams by creating something new or by improving the customer’s experience with something old. Charlie and I journeyed throughout the nation to join with many of these individuals or their families.
双城记
在美国的每一个角落，成功故事层出不穷。自立国以来，无数怀揣构想与雄心、甚至只握着微薄资金的人们，凭借创造全新的产品，或让老产品焕发新生并提升顾客体验，成就了超越想象的梦想。多年来，查理和我走遍全国，与许多这样的创业者及他们的家人结下了深厚情谊。
On the West Coast, we began the routine in 1972 with our purchase of See’s Candy. A full century ago, Mary See set out to deliver an age-old product that she had reinvented with special recipes. Added to her business plan were quaint stores staffed by friendly salespeople. Her first small outlet in Los Angeles eventually led to several hundred shops, spread throughout the West. Today, Mrs. See’s creations continue to delight customers while providing life-long employment for thousands of women and men.
在西海岸，这段旅程始于 1972 年我们收购了 See’s 糖果公司。一百年前，玛丽·希女士凭借独特的配方为老牌糖果注入了新意，并构想出布置温馨、由亲切店员服务的雅致小店。她在洛杉矶开出的第一家小门店，最终成长为遍布美国西部的数百家分店。直到今天，希女士的糖果依旧让顾客回味无穷，也为成千上万的员工提供了稳定而有尊严的职业。
Berkshire’s job is simply not to meddle with the company’s success.
伯克希尔在其中的角色，其实很简单——不去干扰它的成功，让它继续做它最擅长的事。
译注：
这位语言大师，借用狄更斯的《双城记》这个标题，绝非偶然。一个是西海岸的See’s糖果，一个是横贯美国中西部的BNSF铁路。小而美和基建巨头都是想要告诉股东商业的本质从未改变：一个难以复制的好产品，和卓越的客户体验才能构筑最持久的竞争优势。
当然最后也是在对前一部分信中他所鄙视的那些渴求倒买倒卖的集团经营的抨击。
When a business manufactures and distributes a non-essential consumer product, the customer is the boss. And, after 100 years, the customer’s message to Berkshire remains clear: “Don’t mess with my candy.” (The website is https://www.sees.com/; try the peanut brittle.)
在一家生产并销售非生活必需的消费品企业里，顾客才是真正的老板。百年过去，伯克希尔从顾客那里听到的信息始终如一：“别动我的糖果。”（官方网站：https://www.sees.com/；花生脆糖，真的值得一试。）
译注：
顾客才是老板，更是定价权的终极来源。当顾客说出别动我的糖果时，这已经不是一句普通的口号，而是品牌护城河的体现。
我们身边又有什么东西是顾客会说“别动我的X”呢？苹果的 iPhone，AirPods Pro，茅台、微信、微信读书……
Let’s move across the continent to Washington, D.C. In 1936, Leo Goodwin, along with his wife, Lillian, became convinced that auto insurance – a standardized product customarily purchased from agents – could be sold directly at a much lower price. Armed with 100,000, the pair took on giant insurers possessing 1,000 times or more their capital. Government Employees Insurance Company (later shortened to GEICO) was on its way.
现在，让我们跨越大陆，来到华盛顿特区。1936 年，利奥·古德温与他的妻子莉莲认定：汽车保险这种长期以来通过代理人销售的标准化产品，完全可以直接卖给车主，并且价格能低得多。于是，两人凭着区区 10 万美元的启动资金，向资本规模至少是他们千倍的保险巨头发起挑战——政府雇员保险公司（后来简称为 GEICO）由此诞生。
译注：
GEICO 的成功，是用了一种全新的、成本更低的商业模式——直销的方式，通过砍掉传统的、昂贵的保险代理人，然后能够将节省下来的成本以更低价格的形式返还给客户，从而获得巨大的竞争优势。这种不断精益求精的哲学，正是从以前邮寄、到电话销售，然后到今天的互联网和 App，方式在变，最低成本的承诺没变。
By luck, I was exposed to the company’s potential a full 70 years ago. It instantly became my first love (of an investment sort). You know the rest of the story: Berkshire eventually became the 100% owner of GEICO, which at 84 years of age is constantly fine-tuning – but not changing – the vision of Leo and Lillian.
幸运的是，70 年前我就有机会看到这家公司的潜力，并且瞬间“一见钟情”——当然，这是一段投资意义上的初恋。接下来故事你可能已经熟悉：伯克希尔最终全资拥有了 GEICO。如今，这家 84 岁的企业依然在细节上不断精益求精，但始终不改利奥和莉莲当年的宏愿。
There has been, however, a change in the company’s size. In 1937, its first full year of operation, GEICO did 238,288 of business. Last year the figure was 35 billion.
然而，公司规模早已今非昔比。1937年，GEICO在成立后的首个完整运营年度仅实现238,288美元的业务量；而到了去年，这一数字已跃升至350亿美元。
译注：
从 23 万到 350 亿的业务量增长，GEICO的成功绝非偶然。这是一个典型的从 0 到 1 的创业故事。难怪老爷子用我的初恋来形容为这笔纯粹的商业投资。
Today, with much of finance, media, government and tech located in coastal areas, it’s easy to overlook the many miracles occurring in middle America. Let’s focus on two communities that provide stunning illustrations of the talent and ambition existing throughout our country.
如今，金融、媒体、政府及科技行业大多扎根于东西海岸，人们往往忽视了美国腹地所孕育的无数奇迹。让我们聚焦两个社区，它们以惊艳的才华与雄心，生动诠释了全国各地蓬勃涌动的生命力。
译注：
对投资者而言，也可以去哪些被华尔街忽视的地方寻找机会。当所有人的目光都聚焦在硅谷时，价值洼地也可能正隐藏在哪些不那么光鲜亮丽的地方。
You will not be surprised that I begin with Omaha. In 1940, Jack Ringwalt, a graduate of Omaha’s Central High School (the alma mater as well of Charlie, my dad, my first wife, our three children and two grandchildren), decided to start a property/casualty insurance company funded by 125,000 in capital. Jack’s dream was preposterous, requiring his pipsqueak operation – somewhat pompously christened as National Indemnity – to compete with giant insurers, all of which operated with abundant capital.
毫不意外，我还是要从奥马哈讲起。1940 年，奥马哈中央高中的一位校友 Jack Ringwalt（这所学校同样培养了查理、我的父亲、我的第一任妻子、我们的三个孩子以及两位孙辈），决定用区区 12.5 万美元的资本创办一家财产与意外伤害保险公司。Jack 给这家袖珍企业取了一个颇显气派的名字——National Indemnity（“国家赔偿”保险公司）——却要让它去和资本雄厚的保险巨头同台竞争。
Additionally, those competitors were solidly entrenched with nationwide networks of well-funded and long-established local agents. Under Jack’s plan, National Indemnity, unlike GEICO, would itself use whatever agencies deigned to accept it and consequently enjoy no cost advantage in its acquisition of business.
那些行业“大鳄”不仅资金充裕，还坐拥遍布全国、根基深厚、财力充足的地方代理网络。按照 Jack 的设想，National Indemnity 与 GEICO 的直销模式不同，它必须依赖那些愿意接纳它的代理机构，因此在业务揽收的成本上毫无优势。
To overcome those formidable handicaps, National Indemnity focused on “odd-ball” risks, which were deemed unimportant by the “big boys.” And, improbably, the strategy succeeded.
为了跨越这些看似无法逾越的障碍，National Indemnity 把注意力集中在“大公司”不屑一顾的“冷门风险”上——这些业务在巨头眼中微不足道，却是 National Indemnity 的立足之地。令人惊讶的是，这一看似离奇的策略最终竟然取得了成功。
Jack was honest, shrewd, likeable and a bit quirky. In particular, he disliked regulators. When he periodically became annoyed with their supervision, he would feel an urge to sell his company. 8 Fortunately, I was nearby on one of those occasions. Jack liked the idea of joining Berkshire, and we made a deal in 1967, taking all of 15 minutes to reach a handshake.
杰克为人诚实、精明、讨人喜欢，又带着几分古怪。他尤为排斥监管。每当监管的羁绊令他心生烦躁，他就会冒出卖掉公司的念头。8 幸运的是，其中一次我正好在附近。杰克对加入伯克希尔的提议十分心动，我们在 1967 年不到 15 分钟便握手成交，我甚至连审计报告都未索要。
I never asked for an audit. Today National Indemnity is the only company in the world prepared to insure certain giant risks. And, yes, it remains based in Omaha, a few miles from Berkshire’s home office.
如今，National Indemnity 已是全球唯一愿意承保某些巨额风险的公司，而且仍旧扎根奥马哈，与伯克希尔总部仅相距数英里。
Over the years, we have purchased four additional businesses from Omaha families, the best known among them being Nebraska Furniture Mart (“NFM”). The company’s founder, Rose Blumkin (“Mrs. B”), arrived in Seattle in 1915 as a Russian emigrant, unable to read or speak English. She settled in Omaha several years later and by 1936 had saved 2,500 with which to start a furniture store.
这些年来，我们还从奥马哈的几户家族手中收购了四家企业，其中最为人熟知的要数 Nebraska Furniture Mart（“NFM”）。其创始人 Rose Blumkin（人称“B 夫人”）1915 年以俄罗斯移民身份抵达西雅图，当时既不识字，也不会说英语。数年后，她在奥马哈落脚，并于 1936 年攒下 2,500 美元，创办了自己的家具店。
Competitors and suppliers ignored her, and for a time their judgment seemed correct: World War II stalled her business, and at yearend 1946, the company’s net worth had grown to only 72,264. Cash, both in the till and on deposit, totaled 50 (that’s not a typo).
竞争对手和供应商对她不屑一顾，而他们的判断当时似乎并非毫无道理：二战让她的生意几乎停滞，到 1946 年底，公司净资产才 72,264 美元。账面可动用的现金——无论是现金盒里的，还是银行账户上的——加起来只有 50 美元（没错，这不是印刷错误）。
One invaluable asset, however, went unrecorded in the 1946 figures: Louie Blumkin, Mrs. B’s only son, had rejoined the store after four years in the U.S. Army. Louie fought at Normandy’s Omaha Beach following the D-Day invasion, earned a Purple Heart for injuries sustained in the Battle of the Bulge, and finally sailed home in November 1945.
不过，有一项无价之宝并没有出现在 1946 年的财务报表上：Louie Blumkin —— Mrs. B 唯一的儿子。那年，他在美国陆军服役四年后重返故里。Louie 曾在 D-Day 诺曼底登陆的奥马哈海滩奋勇作战，在突出部战役中负伤并荣获紫心勋章，直到 1945 年 11 月才终于归国。
Once Mrs. B and Louie were reunited, there was no stopping NFM. Driven by their dream, mother and son worked days, nights and weekends. The result was a retailing miracle. By 1983, the pair had created a business worth 60 million. That year, on my birthday, Berkshire purchased 80% of NFM, again without an audit.
自母子重逢后，NFM 便势不可挡。怀着同一个梦想，母子俩白天、夜晚、甚至周末都在工作，毫不停歇。最终，他们在零售业谱写了一段传奇：到 1983 年，这家他们亲手打造的企业市值已达 6,000 万美元。那一年，在我生日那天，伯克希尔再次“无审计”直接购入 NFM 80% 的股权。
I counted on Blumkin family members to run the business; the third and fourth generation do so today. Mrs. B, it should be noted, worked daily until she was 103 – a ridiculously premature retirement age as judged by Charlie and me.
我始终信赖布鲁姆金家族来延续这份事业，如今已由第三代与第四代接棒。值得一提的是，B 夫人每天坚持到店工作，直到 103 岁才“退休”。在查理和我看来，这实在算是严重提前离岗。
译注：
投资就是投人。所有成功的企业背后，都站着一群优秀的企业家。
出身、学历、初始资本都不是最重要的，最重要的是那种激情和梦想。B 夫人和儿子 Louie 的故事，正是这种精神的最好诠释。
B 夫人对信任巴菲特不是投机者，巴菲特相信 B 夫人母子的品格。那么当人与人之间的信任达到极致时，完全可以超越复杂的商业流程。这是一个活生生的、发生在家门口的、由他亲自参与的传奇故事。
NFM now owns the three largest home-furnishings stores in the U.S. Each set a sales record in 2020, a feat achieved despite the closing of NFM’s stores for more than six weeks because of COVID-19.
如今，NFM 拥有全美规模最大的三家家居卖场。即便在 2020 年因新冠疫情被迫停业六个多星期，这三家门店依然各自刷新了销售纪录。
A post-script to this story says it all: When Mrs. B’s large family gathered for holiday meals, she always asked that they sing a song before eating. Her selection never varied: Irving Berlin’s “God Bless America.”
这个故事还有一个温暖的尾声：每当布鲁姆金大家族在节日聚餐时，B 夫人总会在开席前请大家合唱同一首歌——欧文·柏林的《天佑美利坚》（God Bless America）。
译注：
这些异国他乡的人，都在这片土地上，通过自己的才华和奋斗，实现了个人价值，创造了巨大的财富。这是一种感恩，也是发自肺腑的赞美。
乐观主义是长期投资的关键，当你有了对未来的信心，就能更坚定地持那些优秀的资产。