少预测，多准备；少操作，多持有。
伯克希尔如何穿越周期？一边创运营新高，一边用保险现金扩张。
CEO亲当风控官、大量持股，押注“美国经济”，把风险挡在门外。
The Past Year in Brief
Berkshire had a good year in 2022. The company’s operating earnings – our term for income calculated using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), exclusive of capital gains or losses from equity holdings – set a record at 30.8 billion. Charlie and I focus on this operational figure and urge you to do so as well.
过去一年简述
2022 年，伯克希尔·哈撒韦收获颇丰。公司的“运营收益”——按照美国通用会计准则（GAAP）计算，排除了因持有股票投资（权益类资产）产生的资本利得或资本损失后 —— 创下新高，达到 308 亿美元。我和查理始终关注这一指标，也希望各位股东同样将其作为重点。
译注：
也就是说股票投资不算，这里说的是伯克希尔的经营收益（operating earnings），不把股票投资组合因市值变动产生的浮盈或浮亏算进去。2018 年起按美国公认会计准则规定，公司必须每季度按市值重估所持股票，并把未实现的浮动盈亏计入当期的利润表。
老巴强调多次： 股价波动并不能真实反映公司的经营表现，反而会误导投资者。
The GAAP figure, absent our adjustment, fluctuates wildly and capriciously at every reporting date. Note its acrobatic behavior in 2022, which is in no way unusual:
未经调整的 GAAP 净利润在每个报告期都上蹿下跳、变化莫测。请看 2022 年的“杂技式”走势，这并非特例：
收益（单位：十亿美元）
2022 年季度 “运营收益” GAAP 净利润
第 1 季度 7.0 5.5
第 2 季度 9.3 (43.8)
第 3 季度 7.8 (2.7)
第 4 季度 6.7 18.2
译注：
注意，巴菲特的意思是不要用 GAAP 净利润这种短期、易被股价波动放大/扭曲的数字，来评判投资的成败。是指不要依赖这个短期数字做决策。
简单说来：
- 伯克希尔自身经营：用Operating Earnings来判断
- 投资组合表现：用持仓企业的财报、分红和长期股价趋势来判断
对股票，投资巴菲特建议看的是 1）股息或分红；2）盈利增长速度；3）五年或十年市值变化；4）CAGR/投入资本复合回报率
The GAAP earnings are 100% misleading when viewed quarterly or even annually. Capital gains, to be sure, have been hugely important to Berkshire over past decades, and we expect them to be meaningfully positive in future decades.
单纯看季度，甚至年度的 GAAP 净利润，都会产生极大的误导。必须承认，资本利得在过去数十年对伯克希尔确实意义重大；而我们也有理由相信，未来几十年它依然会持续并显著地贡献正向收益。
译注：
这里的 Capital Gains 可以是已实现（卖出变现金）或未实现（上涨但暂未卖出）。
这也是为什么巴菲特不希望股东盯短期资本利得，短期市场价格波动不可控、不可预测，短期资本“浮盈/浮亏”不等于投资的好坏。资本利得的真正价值只有放在长周期上才能判断，因此不应用季度或年度的价格波动来衡量。
But their quarter-by-quarter gyrations, regularly and mindlessly headlined by media, totally misinform investors.
然而，媒体总是照本宣科地把这些逐季波动搬上头条，却毫无分析与背景，结果彻底误导了投资者。
译注：
巴菲特这说的还是按季度计算的盈亏剧烈波动，结果就是——投资者被误导到以为这些季度波动就是公司经营好坏的晴雨表。而投资者得到这样的掐头去尾消息，本能地把利润大幅增长解读为形势大好，把巨额亏损解读为公司出事。常见的后果就是追涨杀跌，买在高点、卖在低点。
这正是芒格批评的“被情绪牵着鼻子走”的典型。
如何才能完全接受短期市场的不理性波动，如何才能真正把握住市场给你机会，在低价买到好公司？在股东来信中都有，作为投资者真的需要花点时间好好读读巴菲特在来信中谆谆教诲。
A second positive development for Berkshire last year was our purchase of Alleghany Corporation, a property-casualty insurer captained by Joe Brandon. I’ve worked with Joe in the past, and he understands both Berkshire and insurance.
对伯克希尔而言，去年另一件可喜之事，是收购了由乔·布兰登（Joe Brandon）掌舵的财产与意外险公司——Alleghany Corporation。我与乔早有合作，他既熟悉伯克希尔，也精通保险业务。
译注：
事后看此次收购，极大地增强了伯克希尔的核心优势之一——保险浮存金。 得益于 Alleghany 的并入，伯克希尔的保险浮存金在 2022 年从 1470 亿美元增长至 1640 亿美元。到2024年，这一数字已攀升至1710亿美元。2025年第一季度为 1730 亿。 加上其他总计 3480 亿的庞大现金和短期投资储备，又将有大动作出现了吗？
耐心是核心策略，等待“最佳击球时机”。 究竟会等来大型并购，还是回购自有股份，或者派发股息？可以慢慢等待看看。
Alleghany delivers special value to us because Berkshire’s unmatched financial strength allows its insurance subsidiaries to follow valuable and enduring investment strategies unavailable to virtually all competitors.
Alleghany 对我们有着特别的价值：凭借伯克希尔无可匹敌的财务实力，我们旗下的保险子公司得以实施几乎所有竞争对手都难以企及的、既珍贵又长久有效的投资策略。
Aided by Alleghany, our insurance float increased during 2022 from 147 billion to 164 billion. With disciplined underwriting, these funds have a decent chance of being cost-free over time. Since purchasing our first property-casualty insurer in 1967, Berkshire’s float has increased 8,000-fold through acquisitions, operations and innovations.
得益于 Alleghany 的加入，2022 年我们的保险浮存金由 1,470 亿美元增至 1,640 亿美元。只要继续坚持严谨的承保纪律，这笔资金很有希望在长期内做到“零成本”使用。自 1967 年收购首家财产与意外险公司以来，伯克希尔的浮存金借助并购、经营与创新，规模已扩大了 8,000 倍。
译注：
八千倍，也就是当初你投入一万美元，到现在已经值八千万了吗？
其实并不如此，加上分红拆股等等毛估估当初投入的一万，到现在已经是 3 亿美金左右。
所以作为小资本投资者，是买伯克希尔这样的伟大企业，未来能有不错的稳健收益（可能 8%-10% 年化），还是寻找下一个伯克希尔，那个 20 年后的巨人呢？
Though not recognized in our financial statements, this float has been an extraordinary asset for Berkshire. New shareholders can get an understanding of its value by reading our annually updated explanation of float on page A-2.
尽管它并未在财务报表中单独反映，但对伯克希尔而言，这始终是一项非同寻常的资产。新加入的股东可参阅附录 A-2 页，我们每年都会在那里更新一篇关于浮存金的说明，以帮助理解其价值。
A very minor gain in per-share intrinsic value took place in 2022 through Berkshire share repurchases as well as similar moves at Apple and American Express, both significant investees of ours.
2022 年，每股内在价值也出现了小幅增长，这得益于伯克希尔的股份回购，以及我们两家重要持股企业——苹果和美国运通——采取的类似回购措施。
At Berkshire, we directly increased your interest in our unique collection of businesses by repurchasing 1.2% of the company’s outstanding shares. At Apple and Amex, repurchases increased Berkshire’s ownership a bit without any cost to us.
在伯克希尔，我们通过回购占已发行股份 1.2% 的股票，直接提升了您在这组独特业务中的持股份额。与此同时，苹果和美国运通的股份回购，也在不花我们一分钱的情况下，使伯克希尔的持股比例略有上升。
The math isn’t complicated: When the share count goes down, your interest in our many businesses goes up. Every small bit helps if repurchases are made at value-accretive prices. Just as surely, when a company overpays for repurchases, the continuing shareholders lose. At such times, gains flow only to the selling shareholders and to the friendly, but expensive, investment banker who recommended the foolish purchases.
这笔账并不复杂：当流通股数量减少时，你在我们众多业务中的持股份额就会随之提升。只要回购价格低于内在价值，即使增幅微小，也能为股东积累真正的价值。反之，若公司为回购支付了过高价格，长期持有的股东就会受损——此时，受益的只有卖出股票的人，以及那位彬彬有礼却收费高昂、还极力推荐这种糟糕交易的投行顾问。
译注：
并不是所有回购都能让股东获益。巴菲特这里强调：好的回购会均等地让所有留下的股东受益（gains），而坏的回购等于拿大家的钱去补贴卖出的人。
所以 value-accretive 的前提条件，回购价格低于每股内在价值的。那就是让股东口袋里价值“变高了”。
腾讯从 2024 年开始到现在每天五亿、十亿地回购，你认为是那种呢？想来应该不是巴菲特吐槽的’Invest Banker’们的行为，服务贵不说还掺杂了许多其他行为。
Gains from value-accretive repurchases, it should be emphasized, benefit all owners – in every respect. Imagine, if you will, three fully-informed shareholders of a local auto dealership, one of whom manages the business.
必须强调的是，只有在“价值增值型”条件下进行的回购，才会在各方面让所有股东真正获益。不妨设想这样一个场景：一家本地汽车经销商有三位完全知情的股东，其中一位负责日常经营。
Imagine, further, that one of the passive owners wishes to sell his interest back to the company at a price attractive to the two continuing shareholders. When completed, has this transaction harmed anyone? Is the manager somehow favored over the continuing passive owners? Has the public been hurt? When you are told that all repurchases are harmful to shareholders or to the country, or particularly beneficial to CEOs, you are listening to either an economic illiterate or a silver-tongued demagogue (characters that are not mutually exclusive).
不妨再设想一下，假如三位消息灵通的股东中，有一位被动持股者愿意将股份以一个令另外两位股东颇为心动的价格回售给公司。交易完成后，谁受损了吗？经理人是否因此在继续持股的被动股东之上获得优待？公众是否蒙受其害？倘若有人一口咬定所有股票回购都损害股东或国家利益，或只对 CEO 大有裨益，那么你听到的，不是经济学白丁的胡言，就是巧舌如簧的煽动之辞——这两类人并不冲突，往往兼而有之。
译注：
巴菲特这个例子是在说：回购本身只是一个工具，就像这个小汽车行故事里展示的，只要价格合理、信息对称、过程自愿，它完全可能是正和甚至双赢的。然而，确实会有人“一刀切”说所有股票回购都是坏事，这人要么是门外汉，要么是有意利用大众情绪煽动反对的人，或者两者兼有。
- 回购是否有利，取决于回购价格与内在价值的关系；
- 如同这个例子中，合理价格、信息对称、自愿交易的回购，根本不存在损害大众利益；
- 盲目反对或支持“所有回购”，都是缺乏独立判断的表现。
判断好坏的关键是价格与公平性，而不是动作的名字。
Almost endless details of Berkshire’s 2022 operations are laid out on pages K-33 – K-66. Charlie and I, along with many Berkshire shareholders, enjoy poring over the many facts and figures laid out in that section. These pages are not, however, required reading. There are many Berkshire centimillionaires and, yes, billionaires who have never studied our financial figures.
伯克希尔 2022 年几乎全部的运营细节，都详列在 K-33 至 K-66 页。查理和我，以及许多伯克希尔股东，都乐于捧读这些数字与事实。然而，它们并非必读：不少在伯克希尔坐拥逾亿、乃至十亿美元资产的股东，从未细究过我们的财务报表。
译注：
为啥不看报表？
- 理解生意的基本原理比天天钻报表更重要。
- 投资成功并不全靠复杂的财务分析和模型，更重要的是一直持有一家长期优秀、资本配置正确的企业。
投资者不必被复杂论和噪音左右，关键是常识 + 耐心。买对了长期复利型企业，耐心持有，成功可能性很大。这也是为什么伯克希尔的股东中很多亿万富翁。
当然巴菲特也不是说鼓励你不学习财务知识，而是提醒人们：不要因为不了解每个细节就焦虑退出。
They simply know that Charlie and I – along with our families and close friends – continue to have very significant investments in Berkshire, and they trust us to treat their money as we do our own. And that is a promise we can make. 查理和我——还有我们的家人和挚友——至今都在伯克希尔投入了巨额资金。股东们相信，我们会像对待自己的钱一样管理他们的财富。对此，我们可以郑重承诺。
译注：
是否有些企业管理者自己并不持股？是否企业的回购、分红、并购等决策更多是为了短期股价或业绩奖金？是否存在在经济下行时优先保自己工资奖金，不是保公司健康和股东利益？
但如果企业的管理层像巴菲特和芒格一样，财富大头都在这家企业里，那么他们天然会倾向于做长期正确的事，即便短期不受欢迎（比如在高估时不回购、在低迷时加仓、不盲目并购）。而这就是巴菲特反复强调的“skin in the game”原则。 哪些不看公司财务报表的亿万富翁股东们，看的是人和文化，而不仅仅是报表。
Finally, an important warning: Even the operating earnings figure that we favor can easily be manipulated by managers who wish to do so. Such tampering is often thought of as sophisticated by CEOs, directors and their advisors. Reporters and analysts embrace its existence as well. Beating “expectations” is heralded as a managerial triumph.
最后要特别提醒：哪怕是我们一直强调的营运收益数据，也能被有心的经理人轻易操弄。在不少 CEO、董事及其顾问眼里，这种“动手脚”算是高明手段；记者和分析师也往往乐于迎合。只要能够“击败预期”，就会被吹成管理层的又一次辉煌胜利。
That activity is disgusting. It requires no talent to manipulate numbers: Only a deep desire to deceive is required. “Bold imaginative accounting,” as a CEO once described his deception to me, has become one of the shames of capitalism.
这种做法令人作呕。操纵数字不需要任何才华，唯一需要的，是强烈的欺骗冲动。就像一位 CEO 曾对我自鸣得意地形容他的欺诈：“大胆而富于想象力的会计。” 这种行为，已经成了资本主义的一大耻辱。
译注：
很多公司财务优化为代表的相关业界惯例反倒成了“创意”和“能力”，明知在误导市场、包装。 他们“CEO、董事、投行顾问、媒体、分析师、短线投资者”都乐此不疲。
超预期成了 CEO 的能力，为了短期 KPI 会动用各种聪明，短期主义加上媒体的放大，默许这种数字操弄。最后长期股东成了受害者。
那投资者怎么办呢？你必须用常识去看企业本质，而不是依赖华丽的季度数据。
58 Years – and a Few Figures In 1965, Berkshire was a one-trick pony, the owner of a venerable – but doomed – New England textile operation.
58 年——兼谈几个数字
1965 年的伯克希尔，只是一匹“单项马”，手里只有一家历史悠久、却注定走向衰落的新英格兰纺织厂。
With that business on a death march, Berkshire needed an immediate fresh start. Looking back, I was slow to recognize the severity of its problems. And then came a stroke of good luck: National Indemnity became available in 1967, and we shifted our resources toward insurance and other non-textile operations.
随着纺织业务一步步走向穷途末路，伯克希尔迫切需要一次重生。事后回想，我当时对问题的严重性反应得有些迟钝。接着，幸运之神敲响了大门：1967 年，国民赔偿保险公司（National Indemnity）出现收购良机，我们随即把资源转向保险及其他非纺织业务。
Thus began our journey to 2023, a bumpy road involving a combination of continuous savings by our owners (that is, by their retaining earnings), the power of compounding, our avoidance of major mistakes and – most important of all – the American Tailwind. America would have done fine without Berkshire. The reverse is not true.
从那一刻起，我们踏上了通往 2023 年的旅程。这是一条颠簸的道路，但一路上有四股力量为我们护航：股东们通过留存收益不断积累资金、复利的威力、我们对重大错误的谨慎回避——以及最重要的，“美国顺风”（American Tailwind）。没有伯克希尔，美国照样会欣欣向荣；但如果没有美国，伯克希尔就无从谈起。
译注：
表面上是回顾历史，说自己运气好。实则是想教会大家核心投资与经营哲学。
- 首先不要去迷信表面数字，看企业本质；
- 然后企业管理者也罢，投资者也罢，需要资本挪到有生命力的业务上；
- 再然后突出关键点：你需要有识别并抓住机会的竞争能力；
- 最后终于到了关键点：伯克希尔成功的根源，并不是神奇公式，而是随时准备把资本从差生行业挪到优生行业。
再好的公司都可能是消失，关键是你面对困局能够不被“绑架”及时调整方向的能力。这才是伯克希尔长期价值的根本保障。
如果当初的巴菲特认为自己是对的，不接受纺织业的衰退，继续投入，伯克希尔可能早已不在。切换到保险这个能自带资金池的行业才是真正的开始。
在投资和经营中，最大的智慧不是证明自己一直是对的，而是在该放弃时放弃，并转向能带来长期复利的赛道。
Berkshire now enjoys major ownership in an unmatched collection of huge and diversified businesses.
今天，伯克希尔在一批规模庞大、业务多元且无可匹敌的企业中拥有重要持股。
Let’s first look at the 5,000 or so publicly-held companies that trade daily on NASDAQ, the NYSE and related venues. Within this group is housed the members of the S&P 500 Index, an elite collection of large and well-known American companies. 先让我们把视线转向纳斯达克、纽交所及相关市场中每日交易的约 5,000 家上市公司。在这个母群中，标普 500 指数的成分股——那些美国规模最大、知名度最高的企业——则是精英中的精英。
In aggregate, the 500 earned 1.8 trillion in 2021. I don’t yet have the final results for 2022. Using, therefore, the 2021 figures, only 128 of the 500 (including Berkshire itself) earned 3 billion or more. Indeed, 23 lost money.
总体来看，2021 年，标普 500 家成员企业合计赚取了 1.8 万亿美元的利润。我尚未拿到 2022 年的最终数据，因此以下仍以 2021 年为基准。在这 500 家公司中，只有 128 家（包括伯克希尔）利润在 30 亿美元及以上；另有 23 家竟然亏损。
At yearend 2022, Berkshire was the largest owner of eight of these giants: American Express, Bank of America, Chevron, Coca-Cola, HP Inc., Moody’s, Occidental Petroleum and Paramount Global.
截至 2022 年底，伯克希尔已是其中 8 家巨头的第一大股东：美国运通（American Express）、美国银行（Bank of America）、雪佛龙（Chevron）、可口可乐（Coca-Cola）、惠普（HP Inc.）、穆迪（Moody’s）、西方石油（Occidental Petroleum）以及派拉蒙环球（Paramount Global）。
In addition to those eight investees, Berkshire owns 100% of BNSF and 92% of BH Energy, each with earnings that exceed the 3 billion mark noted above (5.9 billion at BNSF and 4.3 billion at BHE). Were these companies publicly-owned, they would replace two present members of the 500.
除了这 8 家被投资巨头外，伯克希尔还全资拥有伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路（BNSF），以及持有 92% 股权的伯克希尔哈撒韦能源（BHE）。这两家企业的年度利润同样远超 30 亿美元门槛——BNSF 为 59 亿美元，BHE 为 43 亿美元。假如它们是上市公司，将会顶替标普 500 榜单上的两席。
All told, our ten controlled and non-controlled behemoths leave Berkshire more broadly aligned with the country’s economic future than is the case at any other U.S. company.
总的来说，凭借控股与参股的这 10 家庞然大物，伯克希尔在与美国经济未来的契合度上，已高于国内任何一家企业。
(This calculation leaves aside “fiduciary” operations such as pension funds and investment companies.) In addition, Berkshire’s insurance operation, though conducted through many individually-managed subsidiaries, has a value comparable to BNSF or BHE.
（上述计算未计入养老金、投资公司等“受托”性质的业务。）
此外，伯克希尔的保险业务虽由众多独立管理的子公司组成，其整体价值足以与伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路（BNSF）或伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）比肩。
译注：
伯克希尔的规模与质量是一批能代表美国经济核心动脉的超大型企业组成，多元化涉及能源、铁路、金融、消费、工业、石油、媒体等等。那么意味着：只要美国继续增长，伯克希尔就会跟着增长。持有伯克希尔，就不需要去押注某个行业或单一趋势。
这些资产都是美国经济中高质量、不可轻易替代的核心资产，作为各个行业的巨头极难被竞争对手颠覆。这样的多元化更能抵御风险，在美国经济中持续不断为股东长期创造价值。这样的投资是整个市场上找不到第二个。
但如果再次遇到新冠疫情这种突发全球性危机，还是会让几乎所有大规模经营企业受到冲击，想来伯克希尔也不例外。
那么巴菲特为啥如此自信呢？
多元化可以降低任何一个板块的风险，其次别忘了伯克希尔手里的天量现金，这可是随时能抄底的真家伙。所以并不是伯克希尔不是不受突发事件的冲击，而是能“扛过去”。这也是巴菲特常说一句话：“我们无法预知未来事件，但我们能控制自己的准备。”
Though practically all days are uneventful, tomorrow is always uncertain.And if you can’t predict what tomorrow will bring, you must be prepared for whatever it does.
As for the future, Berkshire will always hold a boatload of cash and U.S. Treasury bills along with a wide array of businesses. We will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs at inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses.
展望未来，伯克希尔将一如既往地持有大量现金与美国国库券，并由多元化的业务阵列为我们护航。我们同样会避免一切可能让公司在关键时刻——无论是金融恐慌还是史无前例的巨额保险赔付——出现资金紧张的行为。
Our CEO will always be the Chief Risk Officer – a task it is irresponsible to delegate. Additionally, our future CEOs will have a significant part of their net worth in Berkshire shares, bought with their own money.
伯克希尔的首席执行官将永远兼任首席风险官；把这一职责交给别人，是对股东的不负责任。未来的 CEO 还必须用自己的真金白银购买伯克希尔股票，让相当比例的个人净资产与公司命运紧密捆绑。
译注：
大而不倒如何做到？ 不论投资、经营，first rule: never lose money。
伯克希尔和一般企业的思路相反：好年景囤现金，危机来临反而成为能下场扫货的买家。
这是极端保守的流动性策略，配合企业多元化业务护城河，CEO 必须精通业务，然后在利益深度“绑定”。
And yes, our shareholders will continue to save and prosper by retaining earnings. At Berkshire, there will be no finish line. 是的，凭借持续的留存收益，伯克希尔的股东将继续积累财富、共享繁荣。在这里，没有终点线。
Some Surprising Facts About Federal Taxes
During the decade ending in 2021, the United States Treasury received about 32.3 trillion in taxes while it spent 43.9 trillion. Though economists, politicians and many of the public have opinions about the consequences of that huge imbalance, Charlie and I plead ignorance and firmly believe that near-term economic and market forecasts are worse than useless.
关于联邦税收的一些令人意外的事实
在截至 2021 年的十年间，美国财政部共征收税收约 32.3 万亿美元，而同期支出却高达 43.9 万亿美元。对于这一惊人的收支缺口，经济学家、政界人士以及大众各有各的看法；至于会产生什么结果，查理和我坦诚并不自诩明白，却坚信一点：短期经济或市场预测不仅毫无用处，甚至有害无益。
译注：
巴菲特几十年来一贯立场：经济短期走向不可预测：因为它取决于政策+人类情绪+全球偶发事件，这些变量的组合几乎无解。所以他宁可承认无知，避免误导他人。而且他避免高调介入正在激烈争论的政治经济话题，尤其不在股东信里表达具体政策立场。
所以他选择了做的是“适应各种天气的船”，而不是“猜天气的船长”。 无论发生通胀、加税还是市场波动，公司都能活下来并在低谷出手买资产。
Our job is to manage Berkshire’s operations and finances in a manner that will achieve an acceptable result over time and that will preserve the company’s unmatched staying power when financial panics or severe worldwide recessions occur. Berkshire also offers some modest protection from runaway inflation, but this attribute is far from perfect. Huge and entrenched fiscal deficits have consequences. 我们的工作，是用一种能够在长期取得令人满意成果的方式来管理伯克希尔的经营与财务，并确保在金融恐慌或严重的全球衰退来临时，公司依然保持无与伦比的韧性。伯克希尔在一定程度上也能为投资者提供应对失控通胀的缓冲，但这种作用绝非完美无缺。可以肯定的是，巨额而长期存在的财政赤字，终会带来后果。
The 32 trillion of revenue was garnered by the Treasury through individual income taxes (48%), social security and related receipts (341⁄2%), corporate income tax payments (81⁄2%) and a wide variety of lesser levies. Berkshire’s contribution via the corporate income tax was 32 billion during the decade, almost exactly a tenth of 1% of all money that the Treasury collected.
财政部的 32 万亿美元收入中，48% 来自个人所得税，34.5% 来自社会保障及相关项目，8.5% 来自企业所得税，其余则由五花八门的小税种贡献。过去十年间，单伯克希尔一家公司缴纳的企业所得税就达 320 亿美元，占财政部总收入的千分之一左右。
And that means – brace yourself – had there been roughly 1,000 taxpayers in the U.S. matching Berkshire’s payments, no other businesses nor any of the country’s 131 million households would have needed to pay any taxes to the federal government. Not a dime.
换句话说——请先做好心理准备——如果美国再有大约 1,000 家与伯克希尔纳税额相当的企业，那么全国其他所有企业，乃至全国 1.31 亿个家庭，都可以分文不交联邦税。是的，一分钱都不用。
Millions, billions, trillions – we all know the words, but the sums involved are almost impossible to comprehend. Let’s put physical dimensions to the numbers: • If you convert 1 million into newly-printed 100 bills, you will have a stack that reaches your chest. • Perform the same exercise with 1 billion – this is getting exciting! 百万、十亿、万亿——这些数字大家都会念，但要真正体会它们规模的庞大，却几乎超出想象。不妨用一些“看得见、摸得着”的尺度来感受：
如果把 100 万美元换成崭新的 100 美元纸币堆起来，这座钞票塔大约会高到你的胸口。 如果用同样的方法堆出 10 亿美元——光是想象场景，就已经让人热血沸腾了！
– and the stack reaches about 3⁄4 of a mile into the sky.
——堆到这一步，这叠纸钞已经直插云霄，足有四分之三英里高。
Finally, imagine piling up 32 billion, the total of Berkshire’s 2012-21 federal income tax payments. Now the stack grows to more than 21 miles in height, about three times the level at which commercial airplanes usually cruise. When it comes to federal taxes, individuals who own Berkshire can unequivocally state “I gave at the office.”
最后，再想象把伯克希尔在 2012 至 2021 年间缴纳的联邦所得税——共计 320 亿美元——堆成同样的百元钞票塔。此时，高度将超过 21 英里，相当于民航客机巡航高度的三倍。说到联邦税，伯克希尔的股东完全可以理直气壮地说一句：“办公室那一票，我早就出了。”
At Berkshire we hope and expect to pay much more in taxes during the next decade. We owe the country no less: America’s dynamism has made a huge contribution to whatever success Berkshire has achieved – a contribution Berkshire will always need.
在伯克希尔，我们希望，也预期，未来十年会缴纳更多税款。这是我们应尽的责任：美国的蓬勃活力，为伯克希尔的每一份成绩都提供了巨大的助力——而这种助力，我们永远都需要。
We count on the American Tailwind and, though it has been becalmed from time to time, its propelling force has always returned. I have been investing for 80 years – more than one-third of our country’s lifetime.
我们一直信赖这股“美国顺风”。它虽偶尔会暂时停歇，但推动我们前行的力量总会回来。我已经投资了 80 年——这段时间，足足占据了美国历史的三分之一多。
Despite our citizens’ penchant – almost enthusiasm – for self-criticism and self-doubt, I have yet to see a time when it made sense to make a long-term bet against America. And I doubt very much that any reader of this letter will have a different experience in the future.
尽管美国人一贯热衷于自我反省，甚至有几分自我批评、自我怀疑的癖好，但在我这一生中，从未见过任何时期长期押注美国衰落是明智之举。我非常怀疑，正在读这封信的各位在未来会有相反的体验。
Nothing Beats Having a Great Partner
Charlie and I think pretty much alike. But what it takes me a page to explain, he sums up in a sentence. His version, moreover, is always more clearly reasoned and also more artfully – some might add bluntly – stated.
伟大的伙伴，价值无可比拟
我与查理几乎心有灵犀。我需要用整页纸才能讲清的道理，他往往寥寥数语就能点破；而且他的表述总是更严谨、更传神——有时还更直截了当。
Here are a few of his thoughts, many lifted from a very recent podcast:
以下摘录几句他最近在播客中的思考：
• The world is full of foolish gamblers, and they will not do as well as the patient investor.
• If you don’t see the world the way it is, it’s like judging something through a distorted lens.
• All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there. And a related thought: Early on, write your desired obituary – and then behave accordingly.
- 世界上充满了愚蠢的赌徒，他们永远干不过有耐心的投资者。
- 看世界不诚实，就像透过一面变形的镜片去判断。
- 我只想知道自己会在哪里死去，好让我永远不去那里。
补充一句：早点写下你理想的讣告，然后照着它去生活。
• If you don’t care whether you are rational or not, you won’t work on it. Then you will stay irrational and get lousy results.
• Patience can be learned. Having a long attention span and the ability to concentrate on one thing for a long time is a huge advantage.
• You can learn a lot from dead people. Read of the deceased you admire and detest.
• Don’t bail away in a sinking boat if you can swim to one that is seaworthy.
- 如果你根本不在乎自己是不是理性，你就永远不会去培养理性；结果是，你会一直非理性，并收获糟糕透顶的结果。
- 耐心是可以练出来的。能长时间盯紧一件事，全神贯注，是难得的巨大优势。
- 多向逝者学习。读那些你敬重的，和你厌恶的人的传记。
- 如果你能游到一条稳固且适航的船上，就别在一艘快沉的破船里徒劳地舀水。
• A great company keeps working after you are not; a mediocre company won’t do that.
• Warren and I don’t focus on the froth of the market. We seek out good long-term investments and stubbornly hold them for a long time.
• Ben Graham said, “Day to day, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long term it’s a weighing machine.” If you keep making something more valuable, then some wise person is going to notice it and start buying.
• There is no such thing as a 100% sure thing when investing. Thus, the use of leverage is dangerous. A string of wonderful numbers times zero will always equal zero. Don’t count on getting rich twice.
- 伟大的公司，即便你离场，也会持续创造价值；平庸的公司不会。
- 沃伦和我从不迷恋市场的泡沫，只寻找优质的长期投资，并固执地长期持有。
- 本·格雷厄姆说：“短期来看，股市是投票机；长期来看，它是称重机。” 只要你不断让资产更有价值，总有人会注意到并买入。
- 投资没有百分之百的把握，所以加杠杆很危险。一串漂亮的数字乘以零，永远等于零。别指望能第二次暴富。
• You don’t, however, need to own a lot of things in order to get rich.
• You have to keep learning if you want to become a great investor. When the world changes, you must change.
• Warren and I hated railroad stocks for decades, but the world changed and finally the country had four huge railroads of vital importance to the American economy. We were slow to recognize the change, but better late than never.
• Finally, I will add two short sentences by Charlie that have been his decision-clinchers for decades: “Warren, think more about it. You’re smart and I’m right.”
- 致富并不需要囤一大堆资产。
- 想成为一流投资者，就得终身学习。世界在变，你也必须随之而变。
- 沃伦和我曾经对铁路股嗤之以鼻长达数十年，但形势变了，最终全国只剩下四家对美国经济不可或缺的大铁路公司。我们虽然反应迟缓，但迟到总比不到好。
- 查理拍板的常用终极两句：“沃伦，多想一想。你很聪明，但我是对的。”
And so it goes. I never have a phone call with Charlie without learning something. And, while he makes me think, he also makes me laugh.
事情就是这样。每次和查理通电话，我总能学到新东西。他不仅让我动脑思考，还总能让我开心地笑出声来。
I will add to Charlie’s list a rule of my own: Find a very smart high-grade partner – preferably slightly older than you – and then listen very carefully to what he says.
在查理的“清单”之外，我再加上一条属于自己的原则：找一位极其聪明、品格高尚、最好比你年长几岁的伙伴，然后，认真倾听他的话——一字一句都别漏。
A Family Gathering in Omaha Charlie and I are shameless. Last year, at our first shareholder get-together in three years, we greeted you with our usual commercial hustle. From the opening bell, we went straight for your wallet.
奥马哈的“家庭聚会”
查理和我向来脸皮不薄。去年，阔别三年，我们的股东大会终于回归线下，一开场就玩起了老套路——开锣第一声响，直奔你们的钱包。
In short order, our See’s kiosk sold you eleven tons of nourishing peanut brittle and chocolates. In our P.T. Barnum pitch, we promised you longevity. After all, what else but candy from See’s could account for Charlie and me making it to 99 and 92?
转眼间，See’s 糖果亭就卖出了整整 11 吨酥脆花生糖和巧克力，甜到你心里，也“滋补”到你身体。
借着一腔“巴纳姆式”的推销热情，我们还敢夸口包你长寿——毕竟，要不是天天吃着 See’s 糖果，查理和我哪能一个活到 99 岁，一个活到 92 岁？
I know you can’t wait to hear the specifics of last year’s hustle. On Friday, the doors were open from noon until 5 p.m., and our candy counters rang up 2,690 individual sales. On Saturday, See’s registered an additional 3,931 transactions between 7 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., despite the fact that 61⁄2 of the 91⁄2 operating hours occurred while our movie and the question-and-answer session were limiting commercial traffic. 我知道，你们爱听具体战报。周五中午到下午 5 点，糖果柜台成交 2,690 笔；周六早上 7 点到下午 4 点半，尽管在 9 个半小时营业中，有 6 个半小时被影片放映和问答环节分流了人流，See’s 依然再添 3,931 笔交易。
10 Do the math: See’s rang up about 10 sales per minute during its prime operating time (racking up 400,309 of volume during the two days), with all the goods purchased at a single location selling products that haven’t been materially altered in 101 years. What worked for See’s in the days of Henry Ford’s model T works now.
算算这笔账：在高峰营业时段，See’s 平均每分钟能成交大约 10 单，两天的销售额累计达到 400,309 美元。所有商品都出自同一个柜台，而且配方自 101 年前起几乎原封未动。让 See’s 在亨利·福特“T 型车”年代风靡的秘诀，如今依然有效。
Charlie, I, and the entire Berkshire bunch look forward to seeing you in Omaha on May 5-6. We will have a good time and so will you.
February 25, 2023 Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board
查理、我，以及伯克希尔的全体伙伴，诚挚期待在 5 月 5–6 日 奥马哈与大家相聚。我们一定会度过美好的时光，而且，相信你们也是。
2023 年 2 月 25 日 沃伦·E·巴菲特 董事会主席