2023 年伯克希尔股东来信最后一部分，全文翻译完成。在文末有前边所有 2023 年来信的内容。
1.对查理·芒格的深情悼念、智慧传承
2.向习巴菲特的姐姐学习：少折腾、长期拿住好资产
3.作为投资者，第一要务是学会如何控制情绪
The Scorecard in 2023
Every quarter we issue a press release that reports our summarized operating earnings (or loss) in a manner similar to what is shown below. Here is the full-year compilation:
2023 年成绩单
每个季度，我们都会发布一份新闻稿，按下方类似的方式披露我们的营运收益（或亏损）摘要。
(in millions)
2023年 2022年
保险承保业务………………… 5,428 (30)
保险投资收益………………… 9,567 6,484
铁路运输……………………. 5,087 5,946
公用事业及能源………………. 2,331 3,904
其他业务及杂项………………. 14,937 14,549
营运收益……………………. 37,350 30,853
译注：
简单看下这份摘要：铁路和能源都遇到了利润压力，保险和现金投资力可以看到利率环境对它的放大效应极大，其他业务表现正常，说明伯克希尔的制造业、零售和服务业板块短期未受重击，当然关键是营运收益同比大幅增长（+21%）。
At Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 6, 2023, I presented the first quarter’s results which had been released early that morning. I followed with a short summary of the outlook for the full year:
2023年5月6日，在伯克希尔年度股东大会上，我首先报告了当天清晨公布的第一季度业绩，随后简要概述了全年展望：
(1) most of our non-insurance businesses faced lower earnings in 2023;
(2) that decline would be cushioned by decent results at our two largest non-insurance businesses, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) which, combined, had accounted for more than 30% of operating earnings in 2022;
(3) our investment income was certain to materially grow because the huge U.S. Treasury bill position held by Berkshire had finally begun to pay us far more than the pittance we had been receiving and
(4) insurance would likely do well, both because its underwriting earnings are not correlated to earnings elsewhere in the economy and, beyond that, property-casualty insurance prices had strengthened.
（1）我们的多数非保险业务在2023年将面临盈利下滑；
（2）这一跌幅将因两家最大的非保险子公司——BNSF铁路和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（“BHE”）——的稳健表现而得到部分抵消；这两家公司在2022年合计贡献了逾30%的营运收益；
（3）我们的投资收益有望显著增加，原因是我们持有的巨额美国国库券
（4）伯克希尔持有的美国国库券，终于不再只带来那点聊胜于无的收益，而是开始实实在在贡献可观回报。与此同时，我判断保险业务也大有可为：一来，承保利润与经济其它领域的盈利并无高度相关性；二来，财产与意外险的费率已明显走强。
译注：
- 美国国库券（Treasury bills）的收益率在 2020–2021 年非常低（0.1%–0.3% 左右），2022–2023 美联储激进加息，短期国债利率升到 5%以上。当下也是 4% 以上。
- 财产与意外险行业费率上调（即保费涨价），“finally” 传达了一个“苦尽甘来”的情绪，未来可期。
- 利率高时，巨额现金变成印钞机；降息时，现金收益也会迅速缩水。
Insurance came through as expected. I erred, however, in my expectations for both BNSF and BHE. Let’s take a look at each.
保险业务果然如预期般交出了亮眼答卷。相比之下，我在 BNSF 和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）上的判断则有偏差。下面，我们分别来看看。
译注：
谁都不是神，巴菲特也会出错：
- BNSF（铁路）应该能保持稳定甚至略有增长的运营收益，因为铁路是美国长途重载运输的核心（抗周期程度高，同时享有稳定市场地位）。
- BHE（能源）应该在能源转型和基础设施投资（输电、可再生能源，尤其风能、太阳能、新输电线路）大力推进下，继续贡献稳步增长的利润。
Rail is essential to America’s economic future. It is clearly the most efficient way – measured by cost, fuel usage and carbon intensity – of moving heavy materials to distant destinations. Trucking wins for short hauls, but many goods that Americans need must travel to customers many hundreds or even several thousands of miles away. The country can’t run without rail, and the industry’s capital needs will always be huge. Indeed, compared to most American businesses, railroads eat capital.
铁路运输是美国经济未来的关键命脉。按成本、燃料消耗和碳排放强度衡量，它无疑是将重载货物长途运往目的地的最高效方式。短途运输卡车更胜一筹，但许多美国人所需的货物必须跨越数百、甚至数千英里，才能送到客户手中。没有铁路，这个国家难以运转；而这一行业对资本的需求将永远庞大。的确，相较于大多数美国企业，铁路业堪称“资本大胃王”。
译注：
铁路是经济不可替代的运输骨干。但未来是否还是“量高速增长”的故事？
投资者要接受的是铁路像公用事业一样稳定，但潜在面临能源结构转型、监管安全成本增加、自动驾驶卡车等长期竞争压力。
BNSF is the largest of six major rail systems that blanket North America. Our railroad carries its 23,759 miles of main track, 99 tunnels, 13,495 bridges, 7,521 locomotives and assorted other fixed assets at $70 billion on its balance sheet. But my guess is that it would cost at least $500 billion to replicate those assets and decades to complete the job.
BNSF 是北美六大干线铁路系统中规模最大的一家。它的铁路网络纵横大陆，包括 23,759 英里的主线、99 条隧道、13,495 座桥梁、7,521 台机车，以及各类其他固定资产。这些资产在资产负债表上的账面价值为 700 亿美元。但我估计，若要重新建成这样一套网络，至少需要 5,000 亿美元投资，并且要耗费数十年才能完成。
译注：
- 巴菲特强调 “资产的重置成本和进入壁垒”
- 但芒格在很多场合都明确过：“你买资产不是为了它现在值多少钱或者重建要花多少钱，而是为了它未来能给你带来多少现金流。”
毕竟，它未来几十年的现金流够好么？回报率能否长期高于资本成本？难以重建 ≠ 高价值。
BNSF must annually spend more than its depreciation charge to simply maintain its present level of business. This reality is bad for owners, whatever the industry in which they have invested, but it is particularly disadvantageous in capital-intensive industries.
BNSF 每年光是维持现有运营水准，投入的资金就要比折旧额多出一大截。 对任何行业的所有者来说，这都不是好消息；而在资本密集型行业，这样的负担更是雪上加霜。
At BNSF, the outlays in excess of GAAP depreciation charges since our purchase 14 years ago have totaled a staggering $22 billion or more than $11⁄2 billion annually. Ouch! That sort of gap means BNSF dividends paid to Berkshire, its owner, will regularly fall considerably short of BNSF’s reported earnings unless we regularly increase the railroad’s debt. And that we do not intend to do. 自我们在 14 年前收购 BNSF 以来，其资本支出超过 GAAP 折旧额的部分累计已达惊人的 220 亿美元，平均每年要多花 15 亿美元以上——够吓人的吧！ 这样的差额意味着，BNSF 向母公司伯克希尔支付的股息，几乎年年都会明显低于它的账面利润。除非我们不断给铁路加杠杆——而这，我们没打算做。
Consequently, Berkshire is receiving an acceptable return on its purchase price, though less than it might appear, and also a pittance on the replacement value of the property. That’s no surprise to me or Berkshire’s board of directors. It explains why we could buy BNSF in 2010 at a small fraction of its replacement value. 所以，伯克希尔在收购价上的投资回报还算过得去，但没有表面数字那么光鲜；而若按资产重建成本来算，那回报就真是少得可怜了。这一点对我和董事会来说毫不意外——这也是我们当初能在 2010 年以远低于重建成本的价格把 BNSF 买下的原因。
North America’s rail system moves huge quantities of coal, grain, autos, imported and exported goods, etc. one-way for long distances and those trips often create a revenue problem for back-hauls.
北美的铁路系统承担着煤炭、粮食、汽车、各类进出口商品等大宗货物的长途单向运输。但这些“去程”生意往往赚头不错，回来的空车可就没什么收入，这也是一个老大难问题。
Weather conditions are extreme and frequently hamper or even stymie the utilization of track, bridges and equipment. Flooding can be a nightmare. None of this is a surprise. While I sit in an always-comfortable office, railroading is an outdoor activity with many employees working under trying and sometimes dangerous conditions.
极端天气常常会干扰，甚至彻底阻断铁轨、桥梁和设备的使用；洪水更是噩梦般的考验。这一切，我们早有心理准备。我呢，是坐在一年四季恒温、舒适的办公室里写信给你们，而铁路运营可是一项彻头彻尾的户外工作——无数员工每天都必须在艰苦、甚至有时是危险的环境中坚守岗位。
An evolving problem is that a growing percentage of Americans are not looking for the difficult, and often lonely, employment conditions inherent in some rail operations. Engineers must deal with the fact that among an American population of 335 million, some forlorn or mentally-disturbed Americans are going to elect suicide by lying in front of a 100-car, extraordinarily heavy train that can’t be stopped in less than a mile or more. Would you like to be the helpless engineer?
一个日益突出的难题是，如今越来越多的美国人不愿意接受某些铁路岗位里天生就有的艰辛和孤独。比如机车工程师——他们必须面对一个残酷的现实：在 3.35 亿人口中，不可避免地，总会有人在绝望中，或是在精神崩溃时，选择卧轨自尽。可你要知道，一列由 100 节车厢组成、重得惊人的列车，想要停下来，至少得跑出一英里才行。你愿意做那个只能眼睁睁看着而束手无策的工程师吗？
This trauma happens about once a day in North America; it is far more common in Europe and will always be with us.
这样的心理创伤，在北美平均每天都会发生一次；在欧洲，这种事甚至更频繁。而且，很遗憾，这恐怕是我们行业里会一直存在的阴影。
Wage negotiations in the rail industry can end up in the hands of the President and Congress. Additionally, American railroads are required to carry many dangerous products every day that the industry would much rather avoid. The words “common carrier” define railroad responsibilities. 铁路行业的劳资谈判，有时候能一直闹到总统和国会去裁决。此外，美国铁路每天都必须运输大量危险品——这是行业里谁都巴不得能免掉的活，但“公共承运人”这个身份让我们没得选择。
Last year BNSF’s earnings declined more than I expected, as revenues fell. Though fuel costs also fell, wage increases, promulgated in Washington, were far beyond the country’s inflation goals. This differential may recur in future negotiations.
去年，BNSF 的盈利下降得比我预料的还多，因为收入减少了。油价下来了，但华盛顿拍板的工资涨幅，却远远超过了全国通胀目标。这样的差距，将来谈判时恐怕还会再遇到。
Though BNSF carries more freight and spends more on capital expenditures than any of the five other major North American railroads, its profit margins have slipped relative to all five since our purchase. I believe that our vast service territory is second to none and that therefore our margin comparisons can and should improve.
自我们收购以来，BNSF 无论货运量还是资本开支都在北美六大铁路中排第一，但它的利润率反而落在其他五家之后。我相信，我们广阔的服务区域无出其右，所以利润率完全有可能、也应该追上去。
I am particularly proud of both BNSF’s contribution to the country and the people who work in sub-zero outdoor jobs in North Dakota and Montana winters to keep America’s commercial arteries open. Railroads don’t get much attention when they are working but, were they unavailable, the void would be noticed immediately throughout America. A century from now, BNSF will continue to be a major asset of the country and of Berkshire. You can count on that.
我特别为 BNSF 的贡献和那些人感到骄傲——在北达科他州和蒙大拿州的零下严冬中，他们在户外坚守岗位，保持着美国商业大动脉的畅通。铁路运转正常时，很少有人注意；可一旦停摆，全国会立刻感受到缺口。一百年后，BNSF 依旧会是国家的骨干资产，也是伯克希尔的核心财富——这点你尽管放心。
译注：
- 劳资谈判可能被递交到总统和国会裁决，意味着行业议价权不完全掌握在自己手里，还掺杂政治因素。
- 必须运输危险品（common carrier 义务）。那么这就是法律责任，不是企业可自己选择的货类。即便不赚钱、风险大，也得拉。
- 最后说 BNSF 百年后还会是国之重器，也就是把短期经营困境放在极长期框架中淡化“失望感”的一种安慰吧。
Our second and even more severe earnings disappointment last year occurred at BHE. Most of its large electric-utility businesses, as well as its extensive gas pipelines, performed about as expected. But the regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of zero profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at California’s largest utility and a current threat in Hawaii). In such jurisdictions, it is difficult to project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among the most stable industries in America.
去年，我们更大的失望来自 BHE 能源。它的大型电力公用事业业务，以及广泛的天然气管道，大多数表现符合预期。但个别州的监管环境，却让“零盈利”甚至“破产”的阴影笼罩了进来（加州最大的公用事业公司已经中招，夏威夷现在也在面临同样威胁）。在这些地方，想预测未来收益和资产价值几乎是不可能的——而这，原本是一个被视为全美最稳定的行业。
译注：
- 极端气候频发（山火、风暴），导致了巨额诉讼和赔偿风险
- 监管趋严、高额赔偿无法完全转嫁给保险，导致利润直接受打击
- 还有大规模安全改造投资，价格监管限制、社会舆论压力等等
原本 BHE 是的“稳定现金牛”之一，长期持有美国西部大量电网、发电资产，这下一下子从“好资产”变成了的“雷区”。
For more than a century, electric utilities raised huge sums to finance their growth through a state-by-state promise of a fixed return on equity (sometimes with a small bonus for superior performance). With this approach, massive investments were made for capacity that would likely be required a few years down the road. That forward-looking regulation reflected the reality that utilities build generating and transmission assets that often take many years to construct. BHE’s extensive multi-state transmission project in the West was initiated in 2006 and remains some years from completion. Eventually, it will serve 10 states comprising 30% of the acreage in the continental United States.
一个多世纪以来，电力企业凭借各州监管机构承诺的固定股本回报（业绩突出者还可获得小幅奖励），源源不断地筹集到扩张所需的巨额资金。借助这一机制，企业能够未雨绸缪，提前投入巨额资本，建设数年后才可能派上用场的新产能。如此前瞻性的监管安排，正符合电力行业的现实——发电与输电资产往往需历时多年方能落地。以 BHE 能源 2006 年在美国西部启动的大型跨州输电项目为例，工程至今仍需数年才能竣工；完工后将覆盖 10 个州，服务范围相当于美国本土 30% 的土地面积。
With this model employed by both private and public-power systems, the lights stayed on, even if population growth or industrial demand exceeded expectations. The “margin of safety” approach seemed sensible to regulators, investors and the public.
得益于这一模式，无论私营还是公有电力系统，即便人口激增或工业需求高于预期，灯火仍能长明。“安全边际”这一理念因此赢得了监管者、投资者和公众的一致认可。
Now, the fixed-but-satisfactoryreturn pact has been broken in a few states, and investors are becoming apprehensive that such ruptures may spread. Climate change adds to their worries. Underground transmission may be required but who, a few decades ago, wanted to pay the staggering costs for such construction?
如今，这份“固定且令人满意的回报”契约在少数州已被打破，投资者担心裂痕会进一步蔓延；气候变化更令忧虑雪上加霜。未来或许必须把输电线路改为地下敷设，可在几十年前，又有谁愿意为这笔天文数字的成本买单？
At Berkshire, we have made a best estimate for the amount of losses that have occurred. These costs arose from forest fires, whose frequency and intensity have increased – and will likely continue to increase – if convective storms become more frequent. It will be many years until we know the final tally from BHE’s forest-fire losses and can intelligently make decisions about the desirability of future investments in vulnerable western states. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory environment will change elsewhere. Other electric utilities may face survival problems resembling those of Pacific Gas and Electric and Hawaiian Electric.
我们在伯克希尔已对现有损失作出尽可能可靠的估算。这些损失源自森林火灾——随着对流风暴愈发频繁，火灾的发生率与烈度已经上升，而且极可能继续攀升。要弄清 BHE 因森林火灾造成的最终账单，还需多年时日；只有在那之后，我们才能理性判断是否仍应在西部那些高风险州继续投资。其他地区的监管环境会否随之转变，尚待观察。更多电力公司也可能面临与 Pacific Gas and Electric（太平洋煤气与电力公司）和 Hawaiian Electric（夏威夷电力公司）类似的生存压力。
A confiscatory resolution of our present problems would obviously be a negative for BHE, but both that company and Berkshire itself are structured to survive negative surprises. We regularly get these in our insurance business, where our basic product is risk assumption, and they will occur elsewhere. Berkshire can sustain financial surprises but we will not knowingly throw good money after bad.
若当下困境的解决方案带有“掠夺”性质，BHE 无疑会受到冲击；然而，无论是 BHE 还是伯克希尔-哈撒韦，本就具备抵御意外打击的韧性。类似的意外在我们的保险业务中屡见不鲜——毕竟，核心产品就是承担风险——而其他领域亦难以幸免。伯克希尔能够消化财务上的惊雷，但绝不会明知无望还继续投入资金。
Whatever the case at Berkshire, the final result for the utility industry may be ominous: Certain utilities might no longer attract the savings of American citizens and will be forced to adopt the public-power model. Nebraska made this choice in the 1930s and there are many public-power operations throughout the country. Eventually, voters, taxpayers and users will decide which model they prefer. When the dust settles, America’s power needs and the consequent capital expenditure will be staggering.
撇开伯克希尔不谈，公用事业行业的前景却可能更显阴霾：若部分电力公司再难吸引美国民众的储蓄，只能被迫转向“公用电力模式”。早在 20 世纪 30 年代，内布拉斯加州便已作此选择，如今全国各地亦有不少公有电力机构。最终，选民、纳税人和用户将用脚投票，决定自己更青睐哪一种模式。待尘埃落定，美国对电力的需求及其引发的资本支出，必将令人咋舌。
译注：
对伯克希尔来说，公用事业的吸引力在于“可预测回报+反周期属性”。但如果州转向 public power，就意味着私人资本需要退出：不再有市场投资机会，已经投入的资本可能被低价、甚至直接蒸发。 这也是为什么用 ominous（不祥的），就是在警告：这种转向意味着资本回报模式彻底改变，失去了长期持有的意义。
I did not anticipate or even consider the adverse developments in regulatory returns and, along with Berkshire’s two partners at BHE, I made a costly mistake in not doing so.
我当时既未预见，也未将监管回报的恶化纳入考量，与伯克希尔在 BHE 的两位合伙人一样，这一失察让我们付出了高昂代价。
Enough about problems: Our insurance business performed exceptionally well last year, setting records in sales, float and underwriting profits. Property-casualty insurance (“P/C”) provides the core of Berkshire’s well-being and growth. We have been in the business for 57 years and despite our nearly 5,000-fold increase in volume – from 17 million to $83 billion – we have much room to grow.
问题说够了：去年我们的保险业务表现卓越，保费收入、浮存金与承保利润均创历史新高。财产与意外险（“P/C”）是伯克希尔安身立命、持续壮大的基石。57 年来，我们深耕此道，业务规模已由 1,700 万美元跃升至 830 亿美元，增长近 5,000 倍，仍大有可为。
Beyond that, we have learned – too often, painfully – a good deal about what types of insurance business and what sort of people to avoid. The most important lesson is that our underwriters can be thin, fat, male, female, young, old, foreign or domestic. But they can’t be optimists at the office, however desirable that quality may generally be in life.
此外，我们也——常常以痛苦为学费——明白了哪些保险业务、哪些人选需要敬而远之。最重要的一课是：承保人可以高矮胖瘦、男女老少、本土或海外，但在办公室里绝不可盲目乐观——尽管乐观在日常生活中本是一种可贵品质。
译注：
在生活中乐观很可贵，但在保险承保间里，乐观是灾难。即便伯克希尔这么注重纪律，也有过被乐观假设坑惨的历史。
比如1992 年安德鲁飓风，9·11 事件，2005年飓风季等等，这些不按风险真实成本去定价的乐观心理，对保险来说就是慢性自杀。
Surprises in the P/C business – which can occur decades after six-month or one-year policies have expired – are almost always negative. The industry’s accounting is designed to recognize this reality, but estimation mistakes can be huge. And when charlatans are involved, detection is often both slow and costly. Berkshire will always attempt to be accurate in its estimates of future loss payments but inflation – both monetary and the “legal” variety – is a wild card.
在财产与意外险（P/C）领域，迟来的“惊喜”——即便在六个月或一年期保单到期后的几十年才浮现——几乎无一不是坏消息。行业会计制度虽旨在呈现这一现实，但对未来赔付的估算仍可能出现巨大偏差；若再有骗子掺和，问题的揭露往往既缓慢又代价高昂。伯克希尔始终力求精准预估未来赔付，但通胀——无论货币层面的，还是“法律层面的”——始终是一枚难以驾驭的变数。
译注：
在 P/C 保险（Property & Casualty，财产与意外险）业务上最核心、最难控制的一颗“雷”——通胀，而且是两种通胀。
- 货币通胀超过精算假设，会导致盈利被压缩甚至亏损。
- 新的法律/法规要求保险公司对一些原本免责的情况承担责任，也是类似。
关键在于无法锁定赔付金额的未来购买力变化，尤其是法律体系不断抬高赔偿标准这种“隐性通胀”，它就像一张不可预测的牌局，随时可能让长期准备金亏损。
I’ve told the story of our insurance operations so many times that I will simply direct newcomers to page 18. Here, I will only repeat that our position would not be what it is if Ajit Jain had not joined Berkshire in 1986. Before that lucky day – aside from an almost unbelievably wonderful experience with GEICO that began early in 1951 and will never end – I was largely wandering in the wilderness, as I struggled to build our insurance operation.
关于我们的保险业务，我早就讲过无数遍了，新读者要是有兴趣，不妨直接翻到第 18 页看看细节。在这里我只想再说一遍：如果不是 Ajit Jain 在 1986 年加入伯克希尔，我们今天的保险地位根本不可能有这样的规模。在那天到来之前——除了自 1951 年初就开始、并且永不会结束的那段和 GEICO 几乎可以用“奇迹”来形容的合作——我在打造保险业务的漫长路上，其实更多时候是一个人在荒野里摸索前行。
Ajit’s achievements since joining Berkshire have been supported by a large cast of hugely-talented insurance executives in our various P/C operations. Their names and faces are unknown to most of the press and the public. Berkshire’s lineup of managers, however, is to P/C insurance what Cooperstown’s honorees are to baseball. Bertie, you can feel good about the fact that you own a piece of an incredible P/C operation that now operates worldwide with unmatched financial resources, reputation and talent. It carried the day in 2023.
自 Ajit 加盟伯克希尔以来，他的斐然战绩离不开集团各家财产与意外保险（P/C）业务中那支才华横溢的高管团队。对媒体与公众而言，这些人或许默默无闻，但若论在财险业的分量，他们之于行业，正如库珀斯敦名人堂成员之于棒球。Bertie，你大可欣慰：你所持有的这家出类拔萃的财险公司，如今布局全球，财力、声誉与人才皆冠绝同行，并在 2023 年再度独领风骚。
What is it with Omaha? Come to Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 4, 2024. On stage you will see the three managers who now bear the prime responsibilities for steering your company. What, you may wonder, do the three have in common? They certainly don’t look alike. Let’s dig deeper. Greg Abel, who runs all non-insurance operations for Berkshire – and in all respects is ready to be CEO of Berkshire tomorrow – was born and raised in Canada (he still plays hockey).
奥马哈究竟有何魅力？欢迎你于 2024 年 5 月 4 日莅临伯克希尔年度股东大会。届时，舞台上将亮相三位现今掌舵公司的核心管理者。你也许会好奇：他们究竟有何共通之处？外貌显然迥异——那就让我们细细探究。Greg Abel 主管伯克希尔所有非保险业务，各方面条件已足以随时接任集团首席执行官。他出生并成长于加拿大，如今仍驰骋冰场，挥杆击冰。
In the 1990s, however, Greg lived for six years in Omaha just a few blocks away from me. During that period, I never met him. A decade or so earlier, Ajit Jain, who was born, raised and educated in India, lived with his family in Omaha only a mile or so from my home (where I’ve lived since 1958). Both Ajit and his wife, Tinku, have many Omaha friends, though it’s been more than three decades since they moved to New York (in order to be where much of the action in reinsurance takes place).
然而，到了 1990 年代，Greg 在奥马哈住了六年，离我家不过几个街区，可我们竟始终未曾碰面。再往前十年左右，Ajit Jain——生于斯、长于斯、受教育于印度——也曾携家人住在离我家约一英里处（我自 1958 年起一直居于此地）。Ajit 与妻子 Tinku 在奥马哈结交了许多好友，但为了贴近再保险业务的最前线，他们三十多年前便迁往纽约。
Missing from the stage this year will be Charlie. He and I were both born in Omaha about two miles from where you will sit at our May get-together. In his first ten years, Charlie lived about a half-mile from where Berkshire has long maintained its office. Both Charlie and I spent our early years in Omaha public schools and were indelibly shaped by our Omaha childhood. We didn’t meet, however, until much later. 今年的舞台上，Charlie 将不再现身。他和我同在奥马哈出生，距你们五月聚会时所坐之处不过两英里。Charlie 童年头十年的住处，离伯克希尔的常驻办公室仅半英里。我们都在奥马哈的公立学校读书，童年的奥马哈岁月给我们烙下了不可磨灭的印记，但彼此相识却已是多年之后的事了。
(A footnote that may surprise you: Charlie lived under 15 of America’s 45 presidents. People refer to President Biden as #46, but that numbering counts Grover Cleveland as both #22 and #24 because his terms were not consecutive. America is a very young country.)
（一个或许让你意想不到的脚注：在美国迄今 45 位总统中，Charlie 亲历了其中 15 位的在任时期。人们把拜登总统称作第 46 任，但之所以有这一编号，是因为格罗弗·克利夫兰两次非连续执政，被分别计为第 22 任和第 24 任；美国终究仍是个十分年轻的国家。）
Moving to the corporate level, Berkshire itself relocated in 1970 from its 81 years of residence in New England to settle in Omaha, leaving its troubles behind and blossoming in its new home.
把镜头转到公司层面：1970 年，伯克希尔-哈撒韦结束在新英格兰长达 81 年的扎根，迁至奥马哈，甩掉旧日烦恼，在新家园蓬勃生长。
As a final punctuation point to the “Omaha Effect,” Bertie – yes that Bertie – spent her early formative years in a middle-class neighborhood in Omaha and, many decades later, emerged as one of the country’s great investors.
作为“奥马哈效应”的收官注脚，Bertie——没错，就是那位 Bertie——童年在奥马哈一个中产阶级社区度过，数十年后跻身美国顶尖投资者之列。
You may be thinking that she put all of her money in Berkshire and then simply sat on it. But that’s not true. After starting a family in 1956, Bertie was active financially for 20 years: holding bonds, putting 1⁄3 of her funds in a publicly-held mutual fund and trading stocks with some frequency. Her potential remained unnoticed.
你或许以为她只是在伯克希尔买了满仓后就静待财富增值，但事实并非如此。1956 年成家后的二十年间，Bertie 金融操作颇为积极：既持有债券，又将三分之一资金投向一家上市公募基金，并频繁买卖股票。她的潜力当时无人识得。
Then, in 1980, when 46, and independent of any urgings from her brother, Bertie decided to make her move. Retaining only the mutual fund and Berkshire, she made no new trades during the next 43 years. During that period, she became very rich, even after making large philanthropic gifts (think nine figures). Millions of American investors could have followed her reasoning which involved only the common sense she had somehow absorbed as a child in Omaha. And, taking no chances, Bertie returns to Omaha every May to be re-energized.
1980年，46岁的 Bertie 并未听从哥哥的任何建议，便毅然行动。此后整整 43 年，她只留下那只共同基金和伯克希尔-哈撒韦股票，再未做过一笔新交易。其间，即便捐出高达九位数的善款，她的财富仍滚雪球般累积。其实，无数美国投资者本可照着她的思路来——这只是她在奥马哈少年时代耳濡目染的一点常识而已。稳健如她，每年五月仍要回到奥马哈，为自己“充电”。
So what is going on? Is it Omaha’s water? Is it Omaha’s air? Is it some strange planetary phenomenon akin to that which has produced Jamaica’s sprinters, Kenya’s marathon runners, or Russia’s chess experts? Must we wait until AI someday yields the answer to this puzzle? Keep an open mind. Come to Omaha in May, inhale the air, drink the water and say “hi” to Bertie and her good-looking daughters. Who knows?
那这背后的奥秘究竟是什么？奥马哈的水？奥马哈的空气？还是一种堪比牙买加短跑、肯尼亚马拉松、俄罗斯棋坛的奇特“星球现象”？莫非得等哪天 AI 才能解开此谜？保持一颗开放的心吧。五月来奥马哈，深呼吸这里的空气，畅饮这里的水，顺便向 Bertie 及其貌美的女儿们打声招呼——谁知道会发生什么呢？
译注：
巴菲特的姐姐，也经历了这样的一个过程：
- 46 岁前：喜欢买卖股票，可能是想“做点什么”让钱增长（典型的积极理财心态）。投资被“短期噪音”左右，想象力还分散在多处
- 46 岁后：转向高度笃定、极低干预的投资哲学。核心信念稳定化：只要底层企业优秀，时间就是复利的真正引擎
真正的高水平投资，很多时候是“不做什么”。 你不需要早年就懂所有的，关键是认定之后后坚定执行，成功与否更多取决于持有纪律，而不是研究技巧。
There is no downside, and, in any event, you will have a good time and meet a huge crowd of friendly people. To top things off, we will have available the new 4th edition of Poor Charlie’s Almanack. Pick up a copy. Charlie’s wisdom will improve your life as it has mine. 这趟完全没坏处——反正你一定会度过一段开心的时光，还能遇到一大群热情友好的朋友。更妙的是，今年我们还会准备好新版《穷查理宝典》第四版，等着你来带一本回家。 查理的智慧改变了我的人生，我相信，它也一定会让你的生活受益匪浅。
译注：
第四版的穷查理宝典增加收录2014-2022部分精华讲话、语录，补进了近十年的芒格智慧，同时删去了过时或不相关的部分。