2019 年伯克希尔股东来信 Part I
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1.巴菲特本质上是不认同 GAAP 的，他强调运营利润才是真正的利润，揭示了未入账的留存收益的巨大威力，并警惕调整后利润的陷阱
从 2018 年起，GAAP 就开始要求上市公司在损益表中，把持有的股票市值变动全部计入净利润。然而伯克希尔持有大量上市公司股票如苹果、可口可乐、美国运通等等，这些股票对应股价的短期波动会直接让 GAAP 报表中的净利润上下剧烈波动。
运营利润才是真正的业务板块的利润。巴菲特的观点是投资组合市值波动是正常的，而且是账面上的短期波动并非现金收益，所以并不代表持续的盈利能力。真正的能够用来派息、再投资的只能是运营利润。
有了运营利润才会有对应的留存收益，才能再投入业务，用于扩张、研发或收购，形成复利增长。从而让企业在长期发展中实现滚雪球一样的复利增长，让长期的价值更快速积累，但财报上短期看不到。
对于非 GAAP 调整后利润，很多企业会故意美化。也就是说会提出一些持续性、经营相关的支出。 最可靠的是回到真实可持续的业务运营利润，这个数字能反映公司的长期赚钱能力。
所以巴菲特认为：一家公司的全部盈利等于股东收到的现金分红 + 在该公司留存并再投资产生的价值提升，两者合起来才是股东的真实收益。
2.再次诠释复利的力量，为何内部再投资优先，顺带讨论了下收购的困境，回购的角色
巴菲特再次强调了复利的力量，引用了凯恩斯对留存收益的看法：留存收益与复利效应是推动企业长期价值增长的关键引擎。
优秀的企业不会把赚到的前立刻花掉，而是留下一部分再投资。这就像滚雪球一样，每年不间断地重复不断地投入，企业这样的不断再投资就形成了复利循环。这样的效应甚至比短期分红更具威力。当然这里有个前提：企业能高效运用这些留存收益。
人们也在热议巴菲特的估值模型偏好那些拥有实体资产、稳定现金流的旧经济公司。而对于英伟达、特斯拉等类似的科技巨头，显得力不从心。所以导致他完美错过了亚马逊、谷歌等公司的主要增长期。以至于在 2019 年前后的数年牛市中，股价表现多次跑输简单的标普 500 指数基金。所幸巴菲特投资了苹果扳回了一城，虽然他对苹果的估值模型依然是家拥有强大品牌和用户粘性的“消费品公司”。
3.不断增长的现金储备
2019 年的伯克希尔，现金储备接近历史高位，但巴菲特认为这是安全和机会的来源。外界认为这拖累了回报，尤其是 2019 年美国短期利率大约在 1-2% 左右，股票市场持续处于高位。
这就陷入了两难的境地：估值太高、所以吸引力不好很难出手，大量现金没用出去，说明连巴菲特都很难找到合适的投资机会。另一方面，现金储备过高会拖累整体回报率，尤其是当股票市场持续走高时。
这本质上是价值投资的耐心与短期回报要求的冲突。华尔街日报甚至批评说巴菲特为巨额现金储备辩护：“这不是疯狂的风险规避，而是保守主义。”
虽然在 2025 年的今天我们打开后视镜可以看到了 2020 年、2021 年伯克希尔连续两年，每年两百多亿的股票回购。
4.巴菲特的坦诚
坦承收购失误，仿佛一次糟糕的运营。巴菲特的这种坦诚在美国企业界极为罕见，提升了股东对他的信任，更是管理预期和承担结果的典范。
5.长期内股票优于债券
以前的绅士，热爱债券胜于股票。但以巴菲特借“绅士偏爱债券”的历史提醒我们不要重蹈覆辙，把大量的资金锁定在低回报资产上。尽管市场波动，但持有哪些优秀企业的股权，才能分享它们的增长与复利，更是长期致富的关键。
6.不要预测市场
短期股价是由无数因素随机组合形成的，包含情绪、突发新闻、政治、利率变化等等等，任何试图精准预测这些波动的人，几乎等同于赌博。
连巴菲特这样的投资老手，背后有着如此庞大企业的掌舵人，都在不断重复告诉我们：我没有能力预测未来几个月或几年的股市发展，也不认识任何有这种能力的人。
那如果想要分析企业，究竟看什么呢？巴菲特说你需要看的是企业的竞争力、管理质量、资本配置能力，是这些最终决定了它未来赚钱的能力，而这些比短期价格波动更重要、更可分析。
实际上巴菲特在很多次股东来信中都在说：忽略市场的噪音，不要被新闻、其他人的观点带偏。你要做的是关注真正能够分析的企业盈利模式、护城河于资本配置效率等，剩下的就是耐心做时间的朋友。
7.伯克希尔文化是永久遗产
巴菲特用股东来信，引导股东把长期思维作为主要工具，处处扮演者一位耐心的投资老师，并不断为未来数十年设定治理基调。
不管未来这种与巴菲特深度绑定的强大文化是否能被传承，但股东来信本身就是一次次努力。
2019 双语版正文 Part I #
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：
Berkshire earned 81.4 billion in 2019 according to generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called “GAAP”). The components of that figure are 24 billion of operating earnings, 3.7 billion of realized capital gains and a 53.7 billion gain from an increase in the amount of net unrealized capital gains that exist in the stocks we hold. Each of those components of earnings is stated on an after-tax basis.
依据公认会计准则（GAAP），伯克希尔在2019年录得净利润814亿美元。该数字由三部分组成：240亿美元的营运收益、37亿美元的已实现资本利得，以及因所持股票净未实现资本利得增加而带来的537亿美元收益。上述各项均为税后数字。
That 53.7 billion gain requires comment. It resulted from a new GAAP rule, imposed in 2018, that requires a company holding equity securities to include in earnings the net change in the unrealized gains and losses of those securities. As we stated in last year’s letter, neither Charlie Munger, my partner in managing Berkshire, nor I agree with that rule.
这笔 537 亿美元 的收益，值得单独聊一聊。它来自 2018 年开始实施的一项新的 公认会计准则（GAAP）：只要公司持有股票类证券，就必须将这些股票的未实现盈亏净变动——也就是账面涨跌——直接计入当期利润。在去年的股东信里，我和我的长期合伙人 查理·芒格 就已经表过态：我们都不赞同这项规定。
The adoption of the rule by the accounting profession, in fact, was a monumental shift in its own thinking. Before 2018, GAAP insisted – with an exception for companies whose business was to trade securities – that unrealized gains within a portfolio of stocks were never to be included in earnings and unrealized losses were to be included only if they were deemed “other than temporary.”
会计界采纳这条新规，可以说是一次观念上的大逆转。在 2018 年之前，除非你的主营业务就是证券交易，否则 GAAP 坚持： 股票组合里的未实现收益，一律不得算进当期利润； 未实现亏损只有在被判定为“非暂时性”时才能入账。
Now, Berkshire must enshrine in each quarter’s bottom line – a key item of news for many investors, analysts and commentators – every up and down movement of the stocks it owns, however capricious those fluctuations may be.
现在情况完全变了：伯克希尔必须在每个季度的财报里——这个很多投资者、分析师和评论员最关心的数字——把我们持股的每一次涨跌都照单全收，不管这些波动有多随意、甚至是完全不可预测。
Berkshire’s 2018 and 2019 years glaringly illustrate the argument we have with the new rule. In 2018, a down year for the stock market, our net unrealized gains decreased by 20.6 billion, and we therefore reported GAAP earnings of only 4 billion.
如果还不觉得荒诞，看看我们最近两年的对比： 2018 年股市下挫，我们的未实现净收益骤减 206 亿美元，于是 GAAP 账面利润只剩 40 亿美元。
In 2019, rising stock prices increased net unrealized gains by the aforementioned 53.7 billion, pushing GAAP earnings to the 81.4 billion reported at the beginning of this letter. Those market gyrations led to a crazy 1,900% increase in GAAP earnings!
到了 2019 年，股价回升，未实现净收益增加了刚才提到的 537 亿美元，直接把 GAAP 利润推到本信开头的 814 亿美元——账面增幅整整 1,900%！
Meanwhile, in what we might call the real world, as opposed to accounting-land, Berkshire’s equity holdings averaged about 200 billion during the two years, and the intrinsic value of the stocks we own grew steadily and substantially throughout the period.
数字本身没有撒谎，但它们讲述的故事却不尽相同。 在我们所谓的“现实世界”——区别于会计准则构建的“账面世界”——伯克希尔在过去两年的股票投资平均规模约 2,000 亿美元，而这些我们持有的股票，其内在价值在这一期间始终稳步且显著地提升。
Charlie and I urge you to focus on operating earnings – which were little changed in 2019 – and to ignore both quarterly and annual gains or losses from investments, whether these are realized or unrealized.
查理与我建议各位股东，把关注重点放在营运收益上——这一指标在 2019 年几乎没有变化——而忽略投资带来的季度或年度盈亏，无论这些盈亏是已实现还是尚未实现。
Our advising that in no way diminishes the importance of these investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect our equity holdings – as a group – to deliver major gains, albeit in an unpredictable and highly irregular manner. To see why we are optimistic, move on to the next discussion.
我们的建议绝非降低这些投资对伯克希尔的重要性。长远来看，查理和我相信，我们持有的股票资产整体将带来可观的回报，只是这种回报的节奏难以预测，并且往往高度不规则。 至于我们为何依然保持乐观，请继续阅读下一节。
The Power of Retained Earnings In 1924, Edgar Lawrence Smith, an obscure economist and financial advisor, wrote Common Stocks as Long Term Investments, a slim book that changed the investment world. Indeed, writing the book changed Smith himself, forcing him to reassess his own investment beliefs.
留存收益的力量 1924 年，一位鲜为人知的经济学家兼理财顾问——埃德加·劳伦斯·史密斯（Edgar Lawrence Smith）——出版了一本名为《普通股作为长期投资》（Common Stocks as Long Term Investments）的薄册。这本小书不仅改变了整个投资世界，也让史密斯本人重新审视并修正了自己的投资信念。
Going in, he planned to argue that stocks would perform better than bonds during inflationary periods and that bonds would deliver superior returns during deflationary times. That seemed sensible enough. But Smith was in for a shock.
动笔之初，史密斯的设想是：在通货膨胀时期，股票会比债券表现更好；而在通货紧缩时期，债券的回报则会更优。这看上去合乎情理。然而，等待他的却是一场意外的冲击。
His book began, therefore, with a confession: “These studies are the record of a failure – the failure of facts to sustain a preconceived theory.” Luckily for investors, that failure led Smith to think more deeply about how stocks should be evaluated.
于是，书的开篇他就坦率地承认：“这些研究记录了一次失败——事实未能支持我原先的理论。” 对投资者来说，正是这场“失败”，促使史密斯更深入地思考股票究竟该如何评估。
For the crux of Smith’s insight, I will quote an early reviewer of his book, none other than John Maynard Keynes: “I have kept until last what is perhaps Mr. Smith’s most important, and is certainly his most novel, point.
至于他洞见的核心，不妨引用一位早期评论者的原话——这位评论者正是经济学大师约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）：“我把也许是史密斯先生最重要、而且无疑是最具新意的观点留到了最后。
Well-managed industrial companies do not, as a rule, distribute to the shareholders the whole of their earned profits. In good years, if not in all years, they retain a part of their profits and put them back into the business. Thus there is an element of compound interest (Keynes’ italics) operating in favour of a sound industrial investment. Over a period of years, the real value of the property of a sound industrial is increasing at compound interest, quite apart from the dividends paid out to the shareholders.”
管理得当的工业企业，一般不会把全部利润分配给股东。好年景里——甚至在多数年份——他们都会留下一部分盈利用于再投向业务之中。于是，复利这一因素（此处凯恩斯特意加了强调）便会在优秀工业企业的投资中发挥作用。多年下来，优秀企业的实际资产价值会以复利速度增长，而这与支付给股东的股息无关。”
译注：
巴菲特在这儿引用凯恩斯这句话，是在告诉大家优秀的企业留存一部分利润并再投资，会让企业价值像复利一样增长，而这种增长是除了股息之外的第二个回报来源，长期来看更加的重要。
人们曾经认为，债券可以提供固定、法律承诺的利息，所以非常确定、可预期。毕竟确定的现金流意味着生存和安全。
而留存收益是一种递延的、不确定的、非契约性的回报，谁知道管理层是否用来挥霍了？你需要相信所投资企业的管理层的品德和能力，还需要能理解复利的威力，当然更需要能够忍受延迟满足背后的心理压力。
这三点都是极其反人性的，信任是奢侈品，复利是抽象概念，而延迟满足几近于圣人的标准。
And with that sprinkling of holy water, Smith was no longer obscure.
有了这番“点睛之笔”，史密斯不再是名不见经传的人物。
It’s difficult to understand why retained earnings were unappreciated by investors before Smith’s book was published. After all, it was no secret that mind-boggling wealth had earlier been amassed by such titans as Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford, all of whom had retained a huge portion of their business earnings to fund growth and produce ever-greater profits. Throughout America, also, there had long been small-time capitalists who became rich following the same playbook.
令人难以理解的是，在史密斯的书出版之前，投资者竟长期忽视了留存收益的作用。毕竟，卡内基、洛克菲勒、福特等商业巨擘早已通过保留大量企业盈利，再投入业务扩张，从而获取更高利润，积累了令人惊叹的财富。全美各地，也早有不少小规模的资本家照着同样的剧本行事，最终跻身富有之列。
Nevertheless, when business ownership was sliced into small pieces – “stocks” – buyers in the pre-Smith years usually thought of their shares as a short-term gamble on market movements. Even at their best, stocks were considered speculations. Gentlemen preferred bonds.
然而，一旦企业所有权被切割成小份额——即“股票”，史密斯之前的投资者往往只是将其作为押注市场波动的短期赌局；即便是在最好的情形下，股票也只是被看作投机，绅士们依然更偏爱债券。
Though investors were slow to wise up, the math of retaining and reinvesting earnings is now well understood. Today, school children learn what Keynes termed “novel”: combining savings with compound interest works wonders.
尽管投资者的醒悟姗姗来迟，如今，人们对留存并再投资收益所蕴含的数学威力已十分清楚。今天的孩子在课堂上就会学到凯恩斯当年所称的“新颖”之道：将储蓄与复利结合，其威力非同凡响。
At Berkshire, Charlie and I have long focused on using retained earnings advantageously. Sometimes this job has been easy – at other times, more than difficult, particularly when we began working with huge and ever-growing sums of money.
在伯克希尔，查理和我始终致力于让留存收益发挥最大效益。这事有时轻松，有时却难比登天，尤其当我们要调度愈来愈庞大的资金时。
In our deployment of the funds we retain, we first seek to invest in the many and diverse businesses we already own. During the past decade, Berkshire’s depreciation charges have aggregated 65 billion whereas the company’s internal investments in property, plant and equipment have totaled 121 billion. Reinvestment in productive operational assets will forever remain our top priority.
在运用这些资金时，我们首先会加码投入到旗下各式各样的现有业务。过去十年，伯克希尔累计计提折旧 650 亿美元，而在厂房、设备等固定资产上的内部资本支出则高达1,210亿美元。向生产性运营资产再投资，永远是我们的首要任务。
译注：
这是伯克希尔最核心、最根本、最优先的支出方向。而且 650 亿和 1,210 亿的差额，正是资本的两种形态维持性投入和增长性资本开支的区别。
一个公司赚到钱后，通常有四种用法：内部再投资 > 收购其他公司 > 回购股票 > 分红。伯克希尔的做法是当前三条路都走不通时，才考虑把现金作为股息发给股东。这样做的目标是为股东创造长期价值最可靠、最高效的路径，永远将资本优先投向那些最高效、最可靠的价值创造渠道。
When we cannot find sufficient attractive opportunities to invest in our existing businesses, we look to acquire new ones. Our criteria for purchase are straightforward: We seek businesses that are easy to understand, that have favorable long-term economics and that are operated by able and trustworthy people.
当我们在现有业务中找不到足够有吸引力的再投资机会时，我们会着眼于收购新的企业。我们的收购标准十分明晰：我们寻找那些容易理解、具备长期良好经济特性、并由才干出众且值得信赖的人经营的企业。
In addition, we constantly seek to buy new businesses that meet three criteria. First, they must earn good returns on the net tangible capital required in their operation. Second, they must be run by able and honest managers. Finally, they must be available at a sensible price.
此外，我们还持续物色符合三项标准的新公司：第一，它们必须能在经营所需的净有形资本上取得优良的回报；第二，它们必须由能力卓越、诚信可靠的管理者掌舵；第三，它们必须能够以合理的价格收购。
When we spot such businesses, our preference would be to buy 100% of them. But the opportunities to make major acquisitions possessing our required attributes are rare. Far more often, a fickle stock market serves up opportunities for us to buy large, but non-controlling, positions in publicly-traded companies that meet our standards.
一旦遇到这样的企业，我们的偏好是将其百分之百收购。不过，符合这些条件的大型并购机会并不常见。更多的时候，反复无常的股市会给我们送来机会，让我们能够以大额、但非控股的方式买入符合标准的上市公司股份。
Whichever way we go – controlled companies or only a major stake by way of the stock market – Berkshire’s financial results from the commitment will in large part be determined by the future earnings of the business we have purchased. Nonetheless, there is between the two investment approaches a hugely important accounting difference, essential for you to understand.
无论是取得控制权，还是仅通过股市持有重要持股，伯克希尔最终的财务成绩在很大程度上都系于所投企业未来的盈利表现。不过，这两条投资路径在会计呈现上存在着至关重要的差异，您务必了解。
In our controlled companies, (defined as those in which Berkshire owns more than 50% of the shares), the earnings of each business flow directly into the operating earnings that we report to you. What you see is what you get.
在我们控股的企业——即伯克希尔持股超过 50% 的公司——每一分盈利都会直接并入我们向各位报告的营运收益，所见即所得。
In the non-controlled companies, in which we own marketable stocks, only the dividends that Berkshire receives are recorded in the operating earnings we report. The retained earnings? They’re working hard and creating much added value, but not in a way that deposits those gains directly into Berkshire’s reported earnings.
而在那些我们仅持有流通股、并未控股的上市公司里，只有伯克希尔实际收到的股息才会算进我们披露的营运收益。至于它们留存的盈利？它们也在努力创造可观的价值，但这些成果并不会直接进入伯克希尔的账面利润。
At almost all major companies other than Berkshire, investors would not find what we’ll call this “non-recognition of earnings” important. For us, however, it is a standout omission, of a magnitude that we lay out for you below.
在几乎所有大型公司（伯克希尔除外）中，投资者通常不会认为这种“未计入收益”有多重要；但对我们来说，这却是显而易见、足以影响整体的重大缺口，其分量，我们会在下文具体说明。
Here, we list our 10 largest stock-market holdings of businesses. The list distinguishes between their earnings that are reported to you under GAAP accounting – these are the dividends Berkshire receives from those 10 investees – and our share, so to speak, of the earnings the investees retain and put to work.
这里，我们列出伯克希尔持有的十大上市公司股票，并区分两类数据：一类是依照公认会计准则（GAAP）报告的数字——也就是伯克希尔从这些公司收取的股息；另一类是按持股比例“享有”，但由对方留存并再投资的盈利。
Normally, those companies use retained earnings to expand their business and increase its efficiency. Or sometimes they use those funds to repurchase significant portions of their own stock, an act that enlarges Berkshire’s share of the company’s future earnings.
通常，这些企业会用留存收益来扩展业务、提升效率；有时，也会用它们回购本公司大量股票，从而提高伯克希尔未来在其盈利中的占比。
Obviously, the realized gains we will eventually record from partially owning each of these companies will not neatly correspond to “our” share of their retained earnings. Sometimes, alas, retentions produce nothing. But both logic and our past experience indicate that from the group we will realize capital gains at least equal to – and probably better than – the earnings of ours that they retained. (When we sell shares and realize gains, we will pay income tax on the gain at whatever rate then prevails. Currently, the federal rate is 21%.)
显而易见，未来我们因部分持有这些公司的股份而记录的资本利得，并不会与“属于我们”的留存收益份额严丝合缝地对应。有时，留存收益终究没有产生任何成果，这令人遗憾。然而，逻辑和我们过去的经验都显示，整体来看，我们从这一组企业中实现的资本利得至少会等于——甚至可能超过——它们替我们保留的盈利。（当我们出售股票并实现利得时，需要按当时适用的税率缴纳所得税；目前的联邦税率为 21%。）
It is certain that Berkshire’s rewards from these 10 companies, as well as those from our many other equity holdings, will manifest themselves in a highly irregular manner. Periodically, there will be losses, sometimes company-specific, sometimes linked to stock-market swoons. At other times – last year was one of those – our gain will be outsized. Overall, the retained earnings of our investees are certain to be of major importance in the growth of Berkshire’s value.
可以肯定的是，伯克希尔从这 10 家企业以及其他众多股权投资中获得的回报，将呈现高度不均衡的特点。期间会有亏损，有时出于企业自身的原因，有时则因为股市的低迷；而在另一些年份——去年便是例证——收益则会异常丰厚。总体而言，我们所投资企业的留存收益，毫无疑问将在伯克希尔价值的增长中发挥极为重要的作用。
Mr. Smith got it right.
史密斯先生的看法，确实一语中的。
Non-Insurance Operations
Tom Murphy, a valued director of Berkshire and an all-time great among business managers, long ago gave me some important advice about acquisitions: “To achieve a reputation as a good manager, just be sure you buy good businesses.”
非保险业务
伯克希尔董事、商界传奇经理人汤姆·墨菲（Tom Murphy）早年给过我一句收购箴言：“若想赢得优秀管理者的声誉，先确保买到的是好企业。”
Over the years Berkshire has acquired many dozens of companies, all of which I initially regarded as “good businesses.” Some, however, proved disappointing; more than a few were outright disasters. A reasonable number, on the other hand, have exceeded my hopes.
几十年来，伯克希尔收购了数十家公司。起初，我都坚信它们属于“好企业”。然而，部分后来令人失望，甚或沦为彻头彻尾的灾难。当然，也有不少项目表现远超我的预期。
In reviewing my uneven record, I’ve concluded that acquisitions are similar to marriage: They start, of course,with a joyful wedding – but then reality tends to diverge from pre-nuptial expectations. Sometimes, wonderfully, the new union delivers bliss beyond either party’s hopes. In other cases, disillusionment is swift. Applying those images to corporate acquisitions, I’d have to say it is usually the buyer who encounters unpleasant surprises. It’s easy to get dreamy-eyed during corporate courtships.
回望这份喜忧参半的成绩单，我愈发觉得收购与婚姻颇为神似——总在喜气洋洋的“婚礼”中启程，却常与婚前憧憬渐行渐远。有时，新组合带来的幸福远超双方想象；有时，幻灭却来得迅雷不及掩耳。映射到企业并购，通常遭遇“惊喜”考验的多半是买方。企业“热恋”期间，人们极易被美好前景冲昏头脑。
Pursuing that analogy, I would say that our marital record remains largely acceptable, with all parties happy with the decisions they made long ago. Some of our tie-ups have been positively idyllic. A meaningful number, however, have caused me all too quickly to wonder what I was thinking when I proposed.
沿着这个比喻继续说，我认为我们的“婚姻档案”大体可圈可点，多数参与方至今对当年的决定仍心怀庆幸。有些联姻堪称天作之合；也有不少让我在“蜜月”尚未结束时就暗自嘀咕，当初求婚究竟是怎么想的。
Fortunately, the fallout from many of my errors has been reduced by a characteristic shared by most businesses that disappoint: As the years pass, the “poor” business tends to stagnate, thereupon entering a state in which its operations require an ever-smaller percentage of Berkshire’s capital. Meanwhile, our “good” businesses often tend to grow and find opportunities for investing additional capital at attractive rates. Because of these contrasting trajectories, the assets employed at Berkshire’s winners gradually become an expanding portion of our total capital.
幸运的是，许多收购失误的负面影响，被一个共同特征所削弱：那些令人失望的企业，随着时间的推移往往会停滞下来，进入一种状态——它们的运营所需资本在伯克希尔总资本中占比越来越小。与此同时，“好企业”通常在不断成长，并且能找到机会，在可观的回报率下吸纳更多新增资本。正因为这两类企业的发展轨迹截然不同，伯克希尔资本中的优质部分会随着时间逐步扩大，占比也不断提升。
As an extreme example of those financial movements, witness Berkshire’s original textile business. When we acquired control of the company in early 1965, this beleaguered operation required nearly all of Berkshire’s capital.For some time, therefore, Berkshire’s non-earning textile assets were a huge drag on our overall returns. Eventually,though, we acquired a spread of “good” businesses, a shift that by the early 1980s caused the dwindling textile operation to employ only a tiny portion of our capital.
最极端的例子，是伯克希尔最早的纺织业务。1965 年初，我们取得了这家艰难经营企业的控股权，当时它几乎占用了伯克希尔全部资本。在相当一段时间里，这些不产生收益的纺织资产严重拖累了我们的整体回报。不过，随着我们陆续买入一批“好企业”，情况发生了变化。到 20 世纪 80 年代初，日渐萎缩的纺织业务只需要占用伯克希尔总资本中极小的一部分。
Today, we have most of your money deployed in controlled businesses that achieve good-to-excellent returns on the net tangible assets each requires for its operations. Our insurance business has been the superstar. That operation has special characteristics that give it a unique metric for calibrating success, one unfamiliar to many investors. We will save that discussion for the next section.
如今，我们将股东的大部分资金，配置在控股的企业中。这些企业在运营所需的有形净资产上，都取得了良好乃至卓越的回报。其中，保险业务可以说是表现最为突出的“明星”。这一板块具有一些独特的特性，使得衡量它成绩的指标也十分特别，而这类指标对许多投资者来说并不熟悉。关于这一点，我们会在下一节做详细说明。
In the paragraphs that follow, we group our wide array of non-insurance businesses by size of earnings, after interest, depreciation, taxes, non-cash compensation, restructuring charges – all of those pesky, but very real, costs that CEOs and Wall Street sometimes urge investors to ignore. Additional information about these operations can be found on pages K-6 – K-21 and pages K-40 – K-52.
接下来，我们会按照税后盈利的规模，对伯克希尔旗下种类繁多的非保险业务进行归类。这些收益，已经扣除了利息、折旧、所得税、非现金薪酬、重组费用等各类令人皱眉但确实存在的开支——那正是一些 CEO 和华尔街人士有时会劝投资者忽略的成本。如需更多信息，请参阅 K-6 至 K-21 页，以及 K-40 至 K-52 页。
Our BNSF railroad and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) – the two lead dogs of Berkshire’s non-insurance group – earned a combined 8.3 billion in 2019 (including only our 91% share of BHE), an increase of 6% from 2018.
在伯克希尔的非保险业务阵营中，BNSF 铁路公司和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（Berkshire Hathaway Energy，简称 BHE）是两位“领头羊”。2019 年，这两家公司合计为伯克希尔贡献了 83 亿美元盈利（BHE 仅计入我们持有的 91% 股权），较 2018 年增长 6%。
Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts, had aggregate earnings in 2019 of 4.8 billion, little changed from what these companies earned in 2018.
紧随其后的五家非保险子公司——此处按字母顺序排列——分别是 Clayton Homes、International Metalworking、Lubrizol、Marmon，以及 Precision Castparts。2019 年，它们的合计盈利为 48 亿美元，与上一年相比几乎没有变化。
The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Berkshire Hathaway Automotive, Johns Manville, NetJets, Shaw and TTI) earned 1.9 billion last year, up from the 1.7 billion earned by this tier in 2018.
再往下的五家公司——Berkshire Hathaway Automotive、Johns Manville、NetJets、Shaw 和 TTI——在 2019 年的合计盈利为 19 亿美元，高于 2018 年该组公司实现的 17 亿美元。
The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – had aggregate earnings of 2.7 billion in 2019, down from 2.8 billion in 2018.
伯克希尔旗下的其他众多非保险业务在 2019 年共实现盈利 27 亿美元，低于 2018 年的 28 亿美元。